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1. Introduction  
‘It shouldn’t be about life at any cost but about someone’s quality of life’1  
These words spoken by the wife of the British man Tony Nicklinson before her 
husband eventually died in August 2012 have received attention around the 
world. Tony Nicklinson suffered from Locked-in Syndrome after having had a 
stroke in 2005. Ever since then he had wanted to die and considered his well-
being as severely diminished due to the ‘increasing indignity and misery’ (The 
Telegraph 2012b) which he went through. Because he was suffering from al-
most total paralysis, he was physically not able to commit suicide. Nicklinson 
thus started a legal battle for a right to assistance in dying. Shortly after losing 
the campaign, Nicklinson died of pneumonia. His case once again raised public 
awareness to the already contentious debate on whether there should be a moral 
and legal right to assistance in dying in situations in which patients request it, 
since they judge their well-being as diminished to such an extent that they wish 
to die.  
The notion of well-being not only plays an important role in bioethical is-
sues dealing with the final phase of life as in the case of Tony Nicklinson: 
when browsing through well-known newspapers such as The New York Times 
one comes across a great number of articles such as ‘Should a Fetus’s Well-
being Override a Mother’s Rights?’ (Greenhouse 2000), which obviously al-
ludes to the field of reproduction and the beginning of life. The German weekly 
newspaper Die Zeit raises the question, ‘In the Interest of the Patient’s Well-
being?’2 (Reuter 2011) when dealing with the topic of appropriate treatment for 
patients suffering from mental illness. The notion of well-being accompanies us 
in bioethical discussions right from the beginning of our lives and through to 
their end. This holds true for the media but also for conversations in everyday 
life about difficult decisions which have or had to be taken. We might, for in-
stance, chat with our neighbour over the garden fence about the recent death of 
our great Aunt Margaret, who suffered from severe dementia, and the difficul-
                                           
1  The Telegraph 2012a 
2  Translation by author. Original title: ‘Zum Wohl des Patienten?‘. 
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ties we had to face when deciding whether to forego life-sustaining treatment 
prior to her death. In this case we might make comments such as: ‘it was for the 
best since her life was not worth living anymore’, ‘it was a happy release’ or ‘it 
is good that her suffering has ended’ in order to ease our conscience and justify 
our decision. These remarks inevitably allude to the notion of well-being and 
the case described is just one of many examples of dilemmatic situations in 
everyday life in which we apply the concept of well-being as an argument or 
within a justification for a decision we have already taken.  
Also in political and academic deliberations within the context of biomed-
ical ethics the notion of well-being constitutes an important point of reference. 
This was clearly noticeable in the discussions which took place when the Ger-
man Parliament passed a new law allowing preimplantation genetic diagnosis, 
albeit within strict limits, in July 2011. Participants in the debate from various 
disciplines such as medicine, law, philosophy and theology as well as politi-
cians from different parties made frequent references to the well-being of the 
prospective parent and the future child.  
Taking a step back from everyday discussions about well-being and delv-
ing into the philosophical appraisal of the concept, it becomes clear that well-
being is, above all, applied when utilitarian approaches underlie the arguments, 
which maintain that the collective overall well-being is to be maximized. None-
theless, the notion of well-being also comes into play within lines of reasoning 
tied to other approaches such as deontological theories. In addition to being an 
explicit point of reference in many bioethical3 debates, well-being is frequently 
also considered implicitly where other lines of argumentation are concerned, as 
in, for instance, discussions about the notion of autonomy. In these cases of 
implicit reference, well-being has a rather hidden presence which one might 
easily overlook. Furthermore, there are a number of concepts applied in medi-
cal ethics that are closely related to – or appear to be used as if they are equiva-
lent to – the notion of well-being as for example quality of life, welfare, flour-
ishing or the notion of a good life. Although obviously not identical in mean-
ing, these various terms and concepts still refer to one specific idea rather than 
to a manifold variety of related concepts. Overall, against the background of the 
furnished tapestry regarding the reference to the notion of well-being it be-
                                           
3  The book focuses on the field of medical ethics. Therefore, in the following the term bio-
ethics is applied with a narrow connotation in order to refer to the domain of medical eth-
ics.  
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comes apparent that it enjoys great popularity in current bioethical debates, 
both in academia and everyday life. 
The notion of well-being is vague 
When analysing the way in which the concept of well-being (and related terms) 
is applied in bioethical debates, it is recognizable that it has a broad connotation 
and is referred to in many different ways. Sometimes it is applied with refer-
ence to the feelings of the patient and at other times to refer to his/her health 
status determined by medical facts without taking into account the subjective 
experience of the patient, to mention just one example. Although well-being 
establishes an important point of reference, there appears to be not a suggestion 
of agreement as to what well-being actually is. Different concepts are used as a 
matter of course. We can therefore claim that there is an equivocation present 
with regard to the application of the term well-being in biomedical ethics. The 
term is used in order to refer to a plethora of different meanings. In conse-
quence, the concept remains vague within this field and is a matter of constant 
contest.  
One of the most controversial issues is the basic question as to whether the 
notion of well-being is correctly captured by subjectivist or objectivist ap-
proaches or a combination of both. According to subjective accounts, that 
which contributes to a person’s well-being depends on what he/she desires or 
what makes him/her happy.4 Objectivist accounts, on the other hand, refer to 
specific objective goods as requirements for well-being, which do not depend 
on a person’s desires or on what makes him/her happy. When surveying the 
distribution of alternative concepts of well-being we can ascertain that in the 
various debates in biomedical ethics there are different concepts prevalent. 
There appear to be discussions in which subjective conceptions prevail whereas 
in others objective accounts of well-being are predominant. Tensions between 
rival concepts even occur within some of the debates themselves. Despite the 
prevalent ambiguities, the different concepts of well-being are often applied as 
a matter of course within the respective debates and there are rarely clear rea-
sons provided for the choice of a specific approach. Sometimes even discus-
                                           
4  However, there are a number of different ways of understanding the subjective/objective 
differentiation and this is simply one way of making a distinction. We will come back to 
this distinction in due course. 
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sions at cross purposes within biomedical ethics appear to be the consequence 
of the vagueness of the concept of well-being.  
However, the realization that there are alternative concepts of well-being 
and that these are a matter of dispute does not in any way break new ground. 
Different concepts of the essence of well-being have been at the centre of de-
bates in ethical theory since antiquity. There are a number of sustained philo-
sophical reflections on this matter (Griffin 1996; Sumner 2003). Issues linked 
to these reflections deal with, for example, what we should improve in our lives 
in order to live well, and whether the components of a good life are universal or 
culturally variant. The differentiation between three major kinds of theories has 
become a standard: hedonism, the desire-fulfilment theory and, finally, the ob-
jective list theory.5 Hence, we can conclude that there are various approaches to 
the notion of well-being present in the field of biomedical ethics as well as in 
the philosophical discussions dealing with this notion. 
The need for a common language  
There are various ways of dealing with the presence of alternative conceptions 
of well-being and the vagueness of the notion within biomedical ethics: one 
could, for instance, argue that the existence of various concepts is a good thing 
since it does justice to the pluralism with regard to the notion of a good life 
which is to be found in our society. However, there appear to be a number of 
practical reasons why there is a need for clarification and a reduction of the plu-
rality of concepts within the realm of biomedical ethics. In order to avoid dis-
cussions at cross purposes, it is vital that there is a common language concern-
ing the notion of well-being. In health care many comparative statements with 
regard to well-being are made, which have far reaching implications for the in-
dividuals concerned and in many cases effect large numbers of people. This, for 
instance, is the case when scarce medical resources are allocated or when dif-
ferent medical procedures are evaluated in terms of their efficacy in adding 
quality to a patient’s life. The outcome of such comparisons should serve as 
guidance for health and medical care. If the assessments reached by practition-
ers are based on different concepts of well-being or quality of life, they could 
easily be misleading. This would, in turn, have serious consequences and, as in 
                                           
5  This three-way division is taken from Derek Parfit (1984): Appendix I. A detailed dis-
cussion can be found in chapter 2. 
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the case of the allocation of donor organs, could even include questions of life 
or death.  
Furthermore, the equivocation of the term well-being leads to problems in 
the context of medical treatment when it comes to resolving cases of high ur-
gency. Too great a demand is placed upon health professionals if they are asked 
to differentiate between different concepts of well-being when making deci-
sions as to how particular patients should be treated. As John Arras points out: 
‘They have neither the time nor the inclination to discuss matters on this lev-
el …’ (Arras 2010). Taking all these different aspects into consideration, the 
field of biomedical ethics obviously is in need of clarification with regard to the 
notion of well-being and strongly requires a common language. The meaning 
ascribed to well-being in the various debates cannot and should not be left to 
chance. Well-being needs to have a clearly defined character so that the notion 
can have a meaningful function within biomedical ethics and to avoid the po-
tential for discussions at cross purposes. This proposition constitutes the under-
lying hypothesis and starting point of this book. But how are we to tackle this 
problem and how can we identify what kind of concept of well-being would be 
appropriate for the context of biomedical ethics?  
1.1. The goal and methodology  
Obviously the development of an adequate concept of well-being constitutes a 
demanding and comprehensive task which can only be accomplished step-by-
step. This book sets out to provide an initial step towards this comprehensive 
task by establishing a critical analysis of the present state of affairs with regard 
to the role which well-being currently plays in biomedical ethics. Therefore, the 
central question which this book aims to approach is: what role does well-being 
play in the realm of biomedical ethics? In answering this question we will try to 
rethink the notion of well-being within the context of biomedical ethics.  
But what exactly are we to understand by the expression role of well-
being? Within this book the term role is used in a specific connotation that en-
compasses two dimensions: the presence and the character of well-being. 
When examining the presence of well-being it is investigated whether well-
being plays an overt or a subliminal role in bioethical discussions: it has al-
ready been briefly mentioned in the above that the notion of well-being some-
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times appears to have a hidden presence. It will be investigated where exactly 
this subliminal presence occurs and why that is. In addition, the presence of 
well-being in the face of other prevalent notions in the respective debates is ex-
plored. When enquiring into the character of well-being within biomedical eth-
ics the meaning which the term has will be analysed in the various debates. Do 
subjective or objective dimensions prevail? Are narrow or broad concepts of 
well-being applied? Are the discussions mainly concerned with the restoration, 
the protection or the promotion of well-being? These are the questions on 
which we focus where the character of well-being is concerned in the follow-
ing. Furthermore, it is examined why exactly the character of well-being adopts 
specific attributes. Also the underlying reasons for changes which occur with 
regard to well-being’s character will be analysed. 
Over the course of four analytic chapters the argument will be established 
that the concept of well-being plays manifold roles in the context of biomedical 
ethics and is subject to the influence of other notions prevalent in the various 
debates, namely the notions of moral status, human nature, justice and auton-
omy. The influences deriving from the respective notions occur with regard to 
the presence as well as to the character of well-being. On the grounds of our 
findings three different types of influences will be identified: requirements, in-
strumentalisations and interferences. It is argued that especially the latter two 
kinds of impact are troublesome since they provoke illusions about the charac-
ter of well-being in biomedical ethics. Influences which are classified as re-
quirements, in contrast, are considered to be of a different kind since they ex-
press specific needs on a concept of well-being to function in biomedical ethics 
and thus bring us closer to the ‘true’ character of well-being within this field. 
Identifying the role of well-being and the influences depicted above re-
quires a critical review of the literature on major debates in biomedical ethics, 
which will be provided in the following chapters. As a detailed examination of 
well-being within the whole literature on the broad field of biomedical ethics 
cannot be accomplished within the scope of this book, a careful selection of 
specific debates to be analysed has been carried out. For this reason, the follow-
ing provides an exemplary analysis of four major biomedical topics, namely 
discussions concerning the beginning of life, enhancement, the allocation of 
scarce goods and those dealing with the end of life. There are several reasons 
underlying the selection of these four debates: first of all, the subjects listed can 
be considered eminent controversial issues discussed in the present context of 
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biomedical ethics. All of them have received considerable attention and are 
present to a great extent in the literature within the field of biomedical ethics. 
Hence, in order for the analysis of the role of well-being to grasp the main 
points of contention, these four debates form the basis of the examination. 
Moreover, in each of the debates well-being appears to have, at least to some 
extent, a changing presence: in some debates the reference to the notion is im-
mediately apparent whereas in others it is not directly recognizable. Hence, the 
exploration of the four debates is likely to provide us with a diverse picture of 
the role of well-being within biomedical ethics. Finally, the exploration of the 
listed debates is biographically comprehensive since the discussions placed un-
der scrutiny range from the beginning to the end of life.  
In addition, it should be noted that in the following chapters we will not 
embark upon a comprehensive analysis of the four broad fields of discussion 
mentioned in the above but rather set a specific focus within each debate. When 
dealing with discussions concerning the beginning of life we will concentrate 
on the role of well-being within the debate on prenatal testing and selection. In 
the case of the enhancement debate the main concern will be procedures of 
non-therapeutic mood enhancement. Within the chapter on the role of well-
being in discussions on the allocation of scarce goods the example of organ al-
location is dealt with and finally, in the context of end of life issues we concen-
trate on the role of well-being in the debates on assistance in dying and forego-
ing life-sustaining treatment. These respective focuses are set to enable a de-
tailed and in-depth analysis of the role of well-being in the various debates. 
The literature-selection is for the most part taken from the academic de-
bates dealing with the four bioethical subjects under consideration, that is to 
say the works of scholars from the fields of philosophy, medicine, law and the-
ology. Nonetheless, chapters 5 and 6, which concentrate on debates on organ 
allocation and euthanasia, also include an analysis of the role of well-being 
within the criteria as applied in practice. This is due to the fact that in both cas-
es the academic debates are held against the background of the specific criteria 
applied in practice and are strongly influenced by them. Hence, in order to gain 
a better understanding and to provide a complete picture, the analysis of the 
role of well-being within discussions on organ allocation and euthanasia also 
takes into account the criteria as applied in practice. Since the practical aspect 
is of lesser importance within the other two debates, namely prenatal testing 
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and selection and mood-enhancement, the exploration of these discussions is 
only concerned with the academic debate.  
In the chapters dealing with prenatal testing and selection and on euthana-
sia special attention is drawn to discussions in Germany. This is in order to ex-
amine how events during the Nazi era influence the reference to well-being in 
biomedical ethics, above all, in this country. 
1.2. The structure of the book 
In order to pave the way for the analysis of the four major bioethical debates 
chapter 2 provides preliminaries with regard to the concept of well-being. It 
gives an initial idea of the character of well-being, thus equipping the reader 
with a provisional and rough idea about the philosophical discussions dealing 
with this matter. In addition, this chapter lays a first foundation for the analysis 
of the role of well-being by establishing the analytical framework that will be 
put to use. This framework is based upon the three-way division of approaches 
to well-being which constitutes a standard point of reference in the philosophi-
cal discussions. Thus, the main body of this chapter provides a taxonomy of the 
major kinds of theories of well-being deployed in ethical theory. The taxonomy 
encompasses the three standard theories of well-being: hedonism, the desire-
fulfilment theory and the objective list theory. This classification functions as a 
framework for the analysis carried out in the following part of the book. More-
over, it is depicted that the three alternative theories can, to varying degrees and 
in different respects, be classified as objective or subjective accounts of well-
being. On the grounds of this finding, also close attention is paid to the objec-
tive/subjective divide when dealing with well-being. All of these aspects need 
to be addressed prior to embarking upon an investigation into the different bio-
ethical discussions since a coherent analysis of the character of well-being re-
quires a framework by means of which we can identify and classify alternative 
concepts. 
In chapter 3 the journey through the four bioethical debates starts covering 
the various stages of life. The point of departure is the discourse dealing with 
prenatal testing and selection. Before a detailed exemplary analysis of the ref-
erence to the notion of well-being in the debates dealing with the practice of 
prenatal diagnosis (PND) and selective abortion and the procedure of preim-
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plantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is established, the procedures in question 
are characterized in a first step (3.1.). After these preliminaries have been fur-
nished, the analysis of the role of well-being in debates on prenatal testing and 
selection is carried out against the background of the framework consisting of 
the conceived philosophical theories of well-being (3.2.). Thereby, the focus is 
first set upon the consideration of the well-being of the prospective parents. 
The findings of the analysis illustrate that the notion of well-being often has a 
concealed presence hidden behind the principle of procreative autonomy which 
has an overriding importance within the debate on prenatal testing and selec-
tion. The reference to the future child’s well-being constitutes the next point of 
interest. Whereas considerations of the future child’s well-being frequently oc-
cur in the Anglo-American debate, they are rarely to be found within the Ger-
man discussions. It is shown that the role which well-being plays where the fu-
ture child is concerned strongly depends on the notion of moral status (3.3.). 
This notion is found to influence well-being’s presence as well as its character. 
Also the identified opposition between objectivist and subjectivist concepts of 
well-being is attributed to differing notions of prenatal moral status. On the ba-
sis of the findings, it is concluded that the framework for analysis provided in 
chapter 2, which consists of the three alternative theories, is not sufficient for 
our goal. This is due to the fact that it cannot provide a clear insight into the 
opposition of subjective and objective concepts of well-being. For this reason, 
it is then supplemented by a subjective/objective scheme which enables us to 
differentiate between the ontological, the epistemic and the evaluative level. 
This amendment will also be applied in the subsequent chapters. 
Within chapter 4 the journey through the various fields of discussion 
reaches the middle phase of life. The role of well-being in the debate on so-
called ‘mood enhancement’ is explored within this chapter. After a short intro-
duction as well as a brief summary of preliminary definitions (4.1.), the exami-
nation concentrates on well-being based lines of reasoning within opposing ar-
guments in the discussion on enhancement (4.2.). First of all the focus is set on 
arguments which reject the procedures in question as brought forward by the 
so-called bioconservatives such as The President’s Council on Bioethics. In a 
second step, the consideration of well-being within contentions in favour of 
mood enhancement are scrutinized. Within this section we take a closer look at 
arguments purported by transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom and Julian 
Savulescu and at the lines of reasoning of the American psychiatrist Peter D. 
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Kramer. The findings suggest that, contrary to expectations, rival lines of ar-
gumentation in the debate on mood enhancement do not necessarily rest upon 
rival concepts of well-being. With regard to the character of well-being, there is 
a prevalence of broad objective concepts. Finally, this chapter pays special at-
tention to the relationship of the concept of well-being and the notion of human 
nature within the debate on mood enhancement (4.3.). It is extrapolated that the 
essentialist notion of human nature leads to a prevalence of objective concepts 
of the character of well-being in the realm of debates on enhancement. 
In Chapter 5 the role of well-being in the context of organ allocation is 
explored. As in the previous chapters, first of all a short introduction to the sub-
ject is provided, namely the quandary of organ allocation (5.1.). It has already 
received a short mention in the above, that the academic debate on organ allo-
cation is held against the background of the criteria currently applied in prac-
tice. For this reason we explore, to begin with, the role of well-being within the 
criteria and models currently applied (5.2.). Having ascertained a first impres-
sion of the subordinate role which well-being has within this context, the focus 
is set on the examination of well-being as a consideration in the broader aca-
demic debate (5.3.). Above all, the role of well-being within two specific crite-
ria, that is to say the criteria of outcome and patient need, is explored. The find-
ings of the analysis illustrate that rather than playing a prominent role, the con-
cept of well-being constitutes one of many considerations in the context of or-
gan allocation. With regard to the character of well-being, there is a striking 
prevalence of narrow objectivist concepts. Moreover, the results suggest that, 
within the context of organ allocation, the concept of well-being cultivates a 
special relationship with the principle of justice. In a next step, this relationship 
is subject to a more detailed examination (5.4.). It is shown that the principle of 
justice is very powerful within the debate on organ allocation and strongly in-
fluences the presence and character of well-being. The prevalence of objective 
concepts of well-being is attributed to the weight given to the notion of justice. 
The journey through bioethical issues in the various phases of life finally 
reaches the end of life in chapter 6. The role of well-being in discussions on 
euthanasia or, to be more precise, the debates on assistance in dying and fore-
going life-sustaining treatment is explored. First of all some introductory facts 
about the various practices concerned in discussions on euthanasia are fur-
nished (6.1.). As in the case of the analysis of the role of well-being in organ 
allocation, we take a look at two examples of practice (6.2.): physician-assisted 
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dying in the Netherlands and physician-assisted suicide in the U.S. state of Or-
egon. After having dealt with the role well-being plays in these two jurisdic-
tions, the analysis concentrates on the academic discussions (6.3.). Two parts 
constitute this section: the first part examines the reference to well-being in dis-
cussions on assistance in dying in the case of competent patients while the sec-
ond deals with well-being in debates on foregoing life-sustaining treatment in 
the case of incompetent patients. The results of the examination indicate that 
well-being has a partly subliminal presence and that further investigation is 
needed with regard to the relationship between well-being and the notion of au-
tonomy. This is accomplished in a next step (6.4.). On the grounds of the find-
ings, this chapter closes with the diagnosis that the major weight given to au-
tonomy within the context of euthanasia leads, above all, to interferences in the 
character of well-being and to the prevalence of subjective concepts of well-
being. All in all, the results of the examination within this chapter support the 
hypothesis established over the course of the analyses in the previous chapters 
that the concept of well-being appears to be vulnerable to influences from other 
dominant notions and principles in biomedical ethics. 
After having reached the end of the journey through the four major fields 
of discussion, chapter 7 recapitulates the findings with regard to the role of 
well-being in the various debates and thereby provides a first attempt to rethink 
well-being within biomedical ethics. Firstly, it focuses on the way in which the 
other notions and principles impact on the role of well-being in biomedical eth-
ics (7.1.). It is shown in detail how the presence and the character of the con-
cept of well-being are affected by the influences. Three different kinds of im-
pact should be distinguished, namely instrumentalisations, interferences and 
requirements. The latter two (instrumentalisations and interferences) are con-
sidered as leading to a ‘false’ character of well-being, whereas the requirements 
express demands which the field of biomedical ethics has on a concept of well-
being and are thereby of help when rethinking well-being within biomedical 
ethics. Section 7.1 deals with the impact of instrumentalisations and interfer-
ences on the concept of well-being. In a second step, further attributes of the 
character of well-being, which are not subject to the impact of other notions but 
rather derive from the specific content under consideration are scrutinized 
(7.2.). They are attributed to the category ‘requirements for a concept of well-
being’. The chapter closes with an elaboration on the implications of our results 
and an outlook (7.3.). Tentative requirements for an adequate concept of well-
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being within biomedical ethics are developed on the grounds of the findings. It 
is argued that the requirements do indeed suggest that there is a need for a more 
comprehensive concept if well-being is to function in the field of biomedical 
ethics. 
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2. Paving the way for the analysis ― 
preliminaries with regard to the concept 
of well-being 
Before the journey through the four debates in biomedical ethics starts it is im-
portant to gain a clearer picture of our object of enquiry, namely the concept of 
well-being. This chapter is primarily concerned with an initial approximation of 
the character of well-being. By depicting the current state of the philosophical 
debate with regard to alternative theories of well-being, a preliminary theoreti-
cal background for the analysis is provided. We take a closer look at the three-
way division of theories which constitutes a standard point of reference in dis-
cussions on the notion of well-being as well as at the subjective/objective dis-
tinction. 
2.1. Well-being and related concepts 
It has been already suggested in the introduction that the term ‘well-being’ is 
just one of many expressions in use to allude to the idea of a good life, which is 
in itself vague and applied in many different ways. This holds true for its use in 
the field of biomedical ethics, the broader context of philosophy and for every-
day life in general. Albert W. Musschenga describes a similar impression and 
provides a host of examples: 
In everyday common language as well as in philosophical literature, 
there are several terms available for evaluating the quality or good-
ness of a person's life, including happiness, well-being, welfare, con-
tentment, satisfaction, pleasure, flourishing, and excellence. None of 
these terms has a fixed meaning. Their meaning (their connotation - 
defining characteristics - and also their denotation - range of applica-
tion) and the relation between them is highly culture and theory de-
pendent. (Musschenga 1997: 17) 
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Musschenga draws attention to two distinct observations: 1. The existence of a 
plurality of terms in use to refer to one idea and 2. the perception that none of 
these expressions is consistently defined and that the idea they refer to is in it-
self vague. Let us first of all concentrate on Musschenga’s first observation that 
various terms are applied to refer to one idea. This indeed is a quite commonly 
held view: L. W. Sumner, for instance, maintains that ‘a person’s welfare is 
more or less the same as her well-being or interest or (in one of its many mean-
ings) her good’ (Sumner 2003: 1). He, thus, supports the impression that the 
different terms and concepts are applied to refer to one idea rather than to a 
manifold variety of related concepts. Moore and Crisp provide an even longer 
list of near-equivalents of well-being. ‘The numerous near-equivalents to well-
being include a person’s good, benefit, advantage, interest, prudential value, 
welfare, happiness, flourishing, eudaimonia, and utility.’ (Moore and Crisp 
1996: 599) We can, hence, observe that there are, indeed, a great number of dif-
ferent terms applied to refer to one idea. Above all, the expressions quality of 
life and well-being find wide application within the context of biomedical eth-
ics.6 For this reason, this book is primarily concerned with these two terms. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that in the course of our analysis we will also 
take into account those lines of reasoning in which the concept of well-being is 
not explicitly referred to but near-equivalents are applied or the notion is im-
plicitly suggested. There is, however, another important conception prominent 
in the context of biomedical ethics which ought to be addressed before com-
mencing our analysis. 
Health and well-being 
In the context of biomedical ethics, above all, the concept of health is a central 
issue. This concept is closely linked to well-being. Thus, it is important to lay 
down how we are to define the notion of health and the relationship between 
the notions of health and well-being for the task in hand. Health is considered 
to be ‘the absence of disease so if disease is biological malfunction or abnor-
mality, it follows that a healthy person is someone whose biological systems 
are all in order’ (Murphy 2009). However, the concepts of health and disease 
are in themselves highly contested matters and rival conceptions exist.7 The 
                                           
6  See, for instance, Veatch 1991c; Wasserman et al. 2005; Brock 2009. 
7  See, for instance, Schramme 2012. 
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traditional debate deals with the opposition between naturalist and normative 
approaches. Naturalists such as Christopher Boorse (1977, 1997) and Norman 
Daniels (1985) base their definition of health on conceptions of biological func-
tioning which they consider purely descriptive. Hence, health and disease are 
viewed as objective conditions. Normativist approaches, in contrast, are based 
upon the assumption that conceptions of health and disease are inherently val-
ue-laden since they are derived from specific social and moral values and 
norms. 
The relationship of both well-being and health is also defined in different 
ways. The well-known, often cited and highly criticized definition of health as 
‘a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO 2006) provided by The World Health 
Organization suggests that both concepts have a similar scope and puts them 
on an equal footing.8 More often health is viewed as a central component 
among others of individual well-being such as in the accounts of Wayne 
Sumner (2003) or Martha Nussbaum (2000). This view will be followed in the 
subsequent analysis. Arguments which refer to health are classified as dealing 
with one important dimension of well-being. Hence, the notion of well-being is 
considered to have a broad scope encompassing more than just health. Our per-
ception of the notion of well-being involves both negative dimensions such as 
the absence of disease, pain and suffering as well as positive aspects such as 
pleasure and components which extend beyond the restoration and protection of 
health. That is to say, in our investigation we are concerned with the restora-
tion, the protection and the promotion of well-being. In the respective debates 
we will scrutinize which of these dimensions of well-being prevail.  
2.2. An initial insight into the character of well-being 
Since it is the aim of this book to provide a clearer picture of the character of 
well-being in biomedical ethics, we are not, at the moment, in a position to give 
a distinct and clear-cut definition. To have a starting point, however, we can 
follow Dan Brock (2009: 96) and take an utterly broad conception of well-
being as a working definition based on Derek Parfit’s words ‘what makes a life 
                                           
8  For a critical perspective on the definition of health provided by the WHO see, for in-
stance, Callahan 1973. 
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go best’ (Parfit 1984: app.). This working definition is rough and broad and en-
compasses a multitude of things. However, in the course of the analysis we will 
continually reveal dimensions which will provide a deeper understanding of the 
character of well-being.  
In addition, there are some philosophical deliberations which we can fall 
back on, for the time being, in order to gain a first insight into alternative ap-
proaches to well-being. These deliberations will serve as a background for clas-
sification within the analysis. It has already been mentioned in the introduction 
that the philosophical discussion on the notion of well-being is by no means a 
new endeavour. In contrast, ‘[m]odels of the good life (for human beings) are 
as old as philosophy itself’ (Sumner 2003: 26). Philip Brey provides the follow-
ing overview of the history of well-being within philosophical deliberation: 
In philosophy, well-being (the good life, happiness) has been studied 
since the ancient Greeks. It is an important theme in the works of Ar-
istotle, as it is in ancient Greek philosophy throughout. In modern 
philosophy, well-being and happiness take center stage in the works 
of the 18th- and 19th-century philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill, who present a modern version as part of their theory of 
utilitarianism. (Brey 2012: 15) 
After a period of respite it is again at the centre of interest (cf. Bayertz 2010). 
Alternative theories of well-being have been developed and there are ongoing 
discussions as to which of them is most appropriate. A three-way division of 
theories, that is to say hedonism, desire-fulfilment theories and objective list 
accounts, which was first purported by Derek Parfit (1984) has become a 
standard model for differentiation in the discussions dealing with alternative 
approaches to well-being and is often referred to (cf. Griffin 1986; Sumner 
2003; Fenner 2007; Brock 2009). In the subsequent sections the three alterna-
tive theories are briefly presented in order to be au fait with the philosophical 
discussions and to have a background for classification when examining the 
well-being based lines of reasoning within biomedical ethics. 
Hedonism 
Hedonic accounts of well-being have a long history. The beginnings of this 
doctrine go back to the fourth century B.C. when Aristippus stated that experi-
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encing the maximum amount of pleasure is the goal of life. In his view happi-
ness was the totality of one’s hedonic moments. Above all, Hedonism has been 
an essential element of classical utilitarianism (cf. Shafer-Landau 2007: 281). 
Whereas hedonist accounts in antiquity, as for instance in the works of Aristip-
pus and Epicurus, were of an egoistic nature, utilitarian accounts focus on the 
promotion of happiness of all persons affected. Generally speaking, hedonist 
doctrines are based on the assumption that experiential quality constitutes our 
well-being. Since they presuppose that there is a connection between well-
being and different mental states, they have also received attention under the 
title mental state accounts (cf. Adler 2012: 162). Put simply, the hedonist doc-
trine considers well-being to consist of the greatest balance of pleasure over 
pain. Hedonists ‘hold that only pleasure is intrinsically good, and pain is the 
only intrinsic bad. A person’s life therefore goes well to the extent that he or 
she is able to accumulate pleasure and avoid pain.’ (Brey 2012: 16) Nonethe-
less, as Fred Feldman points out, there are various forms of hedonism and 
many representations and formulations of what is essential to the hedonist doc-
trine (cf. Feldman 2004: 1). Andrew Moore differentiates between two rival 
hedonist accounts: the experience account and the attitude account (Moore 
2011). Approaches to experiential hedonism derive especially from the works 
of the classical hedonistic utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. The experience account is based on the notion that there are experiences 
of pleasure and pain of varying intensity (cf. Tännsjö 2013). Accounts of expe-
riential hedonism, in turn, can be divided in to those of quantitative hedonism 
and others, which have been classified as qualitative hedonism. According to 
the quantitative approach, which was purported by Jeremy Bentham (1789), 
duration and the intensity are the central features to determine the value of 
pleasure. Qualitative accounts such as the hedonism found within the works of 
Mill, in contrast, differentiated between higher and lower pleasures. A contem-
porary approach to experiential hedonism can be found in the works of Tor-
björn Tännsjö (1998). A different form of hedonism called attitudinal hedonism 
also identifies well-being with a pleasurable life. According to this kind of he-
donism, pleasure is not a feeling or sensation but rather an attitude of enjoy-
ment. This view is put forward by Fred Feldman (2004). However, hedonism 
has often been subject to fierce criticism like, for instance, the objection that we 
care about other things apart from pleasure such as connection to reality. This 
objection is often brought forward with regard to Robert Nozick’s thought ex-
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periment known as the ‘Experience Machine’ (Nozick 1974: 42-5). In this the 
reader is asked to imagine a machine which is directly attached to the brain and 
able to provide any kind of experience one wants. Would people choose to be 
hooked on to the machine for the rest of their lives? Nozick argues that people 
would not want to hook on to the machine as they want their experiences to be 
real and to have contact with reality: ‘We want to do certain things, and not just 
have the experience of doing them. … [W]e want to be a certain way, to be a 
certain sort of person … plugging into an experience machine limits us to a 
man-made reality.’ (Nozick 1974: 43) 
Desire-fulfilment theories 
As Roger Crisp points out ‘[t]he experience machine is one motivation for the 
adoption of a desire theory’ (Crisp 2008) since this theory is in a position to 
circumvent the criticism with which hedonism is confronted. Desire-fulfilment 
theories ‘emerged in the 19th century, in part as an outgrowth of welfare eco-
nomics’ (Brey 2012: 17) and have recently enjoyed great popularity. The cen-
tral notion of desire-fulfilment theories is that well-being results from the satis-
faction of personal desires and preferences. Hence, within these approaches to 
well-being there is no “experience requirement” involved. Desire-fulfilment 
theories do justice to pluralism with regard to well-being since individual de-
sires and preferences constitute their basis (cf. Steinfath 2011: 297). ‘The sim-
plest version of a desire theory one might call the present desire theory, accord-
ing to which someone is made better off to the extent that their current desires 
are fulfilled.’ (Crisp 2008) However, this simple version is confronted with the 
problem that we often desire things which to not contribute to our long-term 
interests and our well-being in the long run. Philip Brey provides the following 
example for such a case: ‘An angry and impulsive adolescent, who chooses a 
life of crime and substance abuse and engages in reckless acts, may follow his 
short-term desires but is not likely to be better off by following them in the 
long run’ (Brey 2012: 18). In recent times more elaborate versions of fulfilment 
theories have been expressed within philosophical discussions. These are based 
upon informed desires and are able to provide an explanation for the fact that 
we are frequently mistaken about what might promote our well-being since this 
is viewed as a result of a lack of information. ‘According to the informed desire 
account, the best life is the one I would desire if I were fully informed about all 
19 
the (non-evaluative) facts.’ (Crisp 2008) Informed desires have to meet specific 
requirements such as the fact that they are based upon full information and ra-
tionality (cf. Adler 2012: 160). ‘Relevant information could include infor-
mation about possible alternative courses of action and objects of desire, about 
possible and likely consequences of actions, and about one’s own psychologi-
cal makeup and behavioural tendencies.’ (Brey 2012: 18) Examples of in-
formed desire accounts can, for instance, be found within the works of Griffin 
(1986), and Stemmer (1998). Although desire-fulfilment theories provide us 
with information about the ‘necessary and sufficient conditions of well-being’, 
namely that our desires are fulfilled, they have been criticized since they do 
‘not tell us anything about the source of these desires’ (Brey 2012: 18). 
Objective list theories 
Objective list accounts of well-being, in contrast, offer information with regard 
to the source of our desires. They take the opposite view to desire fulfilment 
theories: rather than presupposing that things are valued because they are de-
sired, they are tied to the assumption that the recognition of an objective good 
leads to the development of a preference or desire for it: ‘Friendship and love 
may also seem to be things whose goodness explains, rather than results from, 
people’s preference’ (Wolf 1997: 208). In this context Griffin differentiates be-
tween the taste model and the perception model (cf. Griffin 1991). In following 
the taste model specific goods are valuable because they are desired, whereas 
the perception model is based on the notion that specific goods are desired be-
cause they are valuable. The latter represents the stance taken within objective 
list accounts. ‘The lists is objective in the sense that items on the list increase 
the value of one’s life independently of one’s tastes, attitudes, traits, or inter-
ests.’ (Brey 2012: 19) Hence, these theories are tied to the notion that goods 
can promote our well-being even if they are not desired and do not lead to more 
experiential quality. Nonetheless, mental states and preference satisfaction are 
not necessarily absent within objective list accounts (cf. Adler 2012: 167). As 
the name of the theory implies, lists of goods which are considered as intrinsic 
constituents of well-being are provided (cf. ibid.: 165). However, it should be 
noted that these lists differ with regard to their scope and content. Examples of 
such lists can be found in Finnis 1980, Parfit 1984 and Nussbaum 2000. When 
purporting a neo-Aristotelian approach Martha Nussbaum, for instance, lists the 
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following capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the senses, imagina-
tion and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play and 
control over one’s environment. Her list is tied to the anthropological assump-
tion that all human beings share certain essential capabilities. Objective list ac-
counts are often linked to the notion of perfectionism ‘according to which what 
makes things constituents of well-being is their perfecting human nature’ (Crisp 
2008). Thomas Hurka (1996) has purported such an account which is based on 
the assumption that components contribute to our well-being if they perfect 
human nature. Objective list accounts often are faced with the accusation that 
they throw the doors wide open to paternalism9, since specific goods are con-
sidered as contributing to individual well-being even if the person concerned 
does not enjoy or desire them. For this reason they are also frequently consid-
ered elitist (cf. Crisp 2008).  
 
This three-way division of theories constitutes a standard point of reference 
whenever the question of the character of well-being arises. For this reason we 
will adopt the three-tiered framework for our analysis of the role of well-being 
in biomedical ethics. It is to function as a yardstick in order to classify the well-
being based lines of reasoning in the various debates which we will be explor-
ing. We will investigate in which debates the respective theories are applied 
and whether a particular theory is predominant in the field of biomedical ethics. 
Nevertheless, the three major philosophical theories can – to varying degrees 
and in different respects – be classified as objective or subjective accounts of 
well-being (cf. Brock 2009). Since this differentiation might also be of assis-
tance within the analysis it is briefly elucidated in the subsequent section. 
Subjective versus objective concepts of well-being 
When exploring the discussions dealing with the character of well-being it be-
comes evident that also the opposition between subjective and objective con-
ceptions is a major point of reference.10 Brock states: ‘A major issue concern-
ing ethical judgements generally, and judgements concerning a good life in par-
ticular, is the sense and extent to which such judgements are objective and sub-
                                           
9  For information on the concept of paternalism and the problems associated with it see 
section 6.4.1. of chapter 6. 
10  See Sumner 2003; Schramme 2008; Brock 2009; Schaber 2013. 
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jective’ (Brock 2009: 97). Generally speaking, the terms subjective and objec-
tive have various meanings (cf. Birnbacher 2007: 251) and are therefore not 
precise. What exactly is meant when the terms subjective and objective are ap-
plied in connection with alternative concepts of well-being? When referring to 
the term subjective Sumner states ‘the kind of subjectivity I have in mind here 
is the dependence of the prudential value of a life on the feelings, or aims, or 
preferences’ (Sumner 1992: 5). Hence, what is viewed as the essence of well-
being depends on the subject under consideration. The term objective within 
this context, in contrast, refers to approaches which deny the dependence of 
values on feelings and preferences. Objectivist conceptions, thus, consider the 
components of well-being as subject independent. They often stem from an-
thropological theses from which specific needs are derived (cf. Siep 2004: 
279). ‘Thus, when our task is to determine whether some particular thing or ac-
tivity is good for an agent or not, the subjective theories of well-being advise us 
to consult the agent whose well-being is being assessed, to pay attention to her 
own preferences and attitudes of favor and disfavor.’ (Varelius 2003: 364) Ob-
jective accounts are based upon the assumption that we can also estimate the 
well-being of a person from an external point of view by determining if specific 
components of a good life are present and human needs are fulfilled. On the 
grounds of these elaborations we can observe that ‘[h]edonist and preference 
theories are both subjective in the sense that both hold that what is good for a 
particular person depends on what in fact makes that person happy or what that 
person in fact (with appropriate corrections) desires’ (Brock 2009: 98). Due to 
the fact that objective list theories set down specific components which are 
viewed as promoting individual well-being independent of the desires and ex-
periential quality they constitute a form of objective theories of well-being. 
 
We have already obtained a preliminary insight into the character of well-being 
and existing alternative approaches to it. The information gained so far pro-
vides a framework for the analysis of the role of well-being within biomedical 
ethics, which will now follow. 
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3. Well-being in debates concerning the 
beginning of life: prenatal testing and 
selection 
We have gained first insights into the theoretical discussion on the nature of 
well-being as well as existent alternative theories and are now equipped with a 
framework which aids orientation when tackling the goal of this book: to ana-
lyse the role of well-being in biomedical ethics. The point of departure is the 
beginning of life or more precisely debates about reproductive technology. 
Rapid developments in the field of genetics as well as reproductive tech-
nology have brought about many changes in the field of human reproduction. 
New methods of assisted reproduction, for instance, have provided hitherto in-
fertile or gay couples or single women with the opportunity to conceive chil-
dren which are biologically related to them. By means of egg-freezing women 
are in a position to conceive even after the menopause. Furthermore, new as 
well as in the meantime well established techniques also give the means to de-
tect certain diseases and impairments in utero or even prior to conception and 
also to reduce their occurrence. Procedures of prenatal diagnosis (PND) for 
example have become well-established practices in pregnancy care. More re-
cently, however, the method of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has, 
above all in Germany, augmented the debate. To a greater degree the process of 
human reproduction is becoming easier to influence and control at different 
stages.  
However, the various technologies in the field of reproduction have raised 
a host of challenging and profound ethical as well as a number of social issues. 
Arguments which oppose the new or already established practices refer, for ex-
ample, to the moral status of the embryo or foetus, the notion that mankind 
should not interfere with human nature or the social implications these proce-
dures might have in the long run. Proponents of the reproductive techniques, on 
the other hand, call attention to the procreative autonomy of the parents. It is 
argued, for instance, that parents should have the opportunity to make decisions 
about having children and, furthermore, that they should be in a position to de-
cide to have a child without a disorder or disability (cf. Glover 2006: 39).  
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When taking a closer look at the arguments put forward in favour of or 
against these technologies in the field of reproduction, it becomes obvious that 
the notion of well-being is also concerned. Even though, at first glance, well-
being does not constitute one of the pivotal arguments in debates on the ethical 
acceptability of the various technologies in the field of reproduction, on closer 
examination it appears, nevertheless, to be an important point of reference. 
Sometimes it comes into play implicitly whereas in other instances it is explic-
itly addressed. On the one hand the well-being of the prospective parents is al-
luded to; on the other hand the well-being of the future child plays an important 
role in the discussions.11 As a broader analysis of the role of well-being in the 
various bioethical discussions encompassed by the phrase beginning of life 
would go beyond the scope of this book, the focus of the following is centred 
on debates concerning prenatal testing and selection.  
This chapter provides a detailed exemplary analysis of the presence and 
character of the notion of well-being in the debates dealing with the practice of 
PND and selective abortion and the comparatively new procedure PGD.12 In a 
first step the practices in question are characterized. Having laid out these pre-
liminaries, the exploration of the role of well-being in debates on prenatal test-
ing and selection is the focus of interest. First of all, the analysis concentrates 
on the reference to the well-being of the prospective parents. In a next step the 
consideration of the future child’s well-being in discussions on prenatal testing 
and selection is examined.  
3.1. A short introduction to techniques and practices  
There is hardly any other area in modern medicine which has developed as rap-
idly as the field of reproductive technology (cf. Schramme 2002: 52). The vari-
ous practices of prenatal testing and selection, which constitute one part of re-
                                           
11  In some cases also the well-being of siblings of the future child is concerned or that of 
other interest groups such as people who live with a disability in the case of the so-called 
expressivist argument. This argument states that procedures of prenatal testing and selec-
tive abortion express hurtful attitudes and messages to people who live with a disability 
or severe disease and thus reduce their well-being (cf. Parens and Asch 2000: 13). How-
ever, in order to keep this analysis concise, the following concentrates on arguments 
based on the well-being of the prospective parents and the future child. 
12  In the following the expression prenatal testing and selection is applied in order to refer 
to the procedures of PGD and PND followed by selective abortion. 
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productive technology, have created the possibility for parents to be advised of 
disabling conditions or predispositions to illness and to select embryos or foe-
tuses which do not have these conditions. There are in particular two practices, 
the moral legitimacy of which has been a much discussed topic in bioethical 
debates:  
1. PND, followed by abortion if a foetus is found to be affected by certain 
genetic or chromosomal abnormalities and  
2. the selection of embryos which have been created through in vitro fertili-
zation (IVF) by means of PGD.  
It should, however, be noted that ‘the existence of genetically compromised 
children can be prevented not only by aborting already existing fetuses [or se-
lecting embryos ex utero] but also by preventing conception in the first place’ 
(Purdy 1996: 40).13 Due to the fact that the two alternative procedures of prena-
tal testing and selection have received considerable attention lately, the analysis 
of the role of well-being in debates on the beginning of life provided in this 
chapter primarily focuses on PND followed by abortion and PGD. The subse-
quent section furnishes a short overview of both interventions in order to gain a 
more vivid picture of the techniques and practices under consideration in the 
debate on prenatal testing and selection before the analysis of the role of well-
being in the discussions is provided. 
Prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion 
PND is used for the early detection of high-risk pregnancies and births as well 
as in cases in which there are indications of a genetic risk in the family. The 
term prenatal diagnosis is applied to a variety of non-invasive as well as inva-
sive techniques which are employed to detect disabling conditions or those 
which cause illness of the foetus in utero. Generally speaking, ‘[t]he type of 
procedure undertaken depends on the stage of pregnancy, the nature of the test 
and personal preferences’ (Bankier and Cram 2008: 12). Whereas the invasive 
techniques involve an intrusion into the abdomen of the pregnant woman and, 
therefore, carry to varying degrees a risk to the unborn baby14, non-invasive 
                                           
13  See also Schöne-Seifert and Krüger 1993. 
14  These risks include, for instance, the danger of miscarriage or of infection and leakage of 
amniotic fluid. However, generally speaking, there is just a low probability that these 
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techniques are comparatively safer and encompass, for example, the detection 
of foetal DNA present in maternal blood or ultrasonography, which has be-
come a standard procedure in pregnancy care. Through ultrasound scans a visu-
al representation of the developing embryo or foetus is provided and anatomi-
cal abnormalities can be detected (cf. DeGrazia et al. 2010: 525). The nuchal 
scan, for instance, constitutes one form of prenatal screening and is used in or-
der to identify a higher risk of chromosomal defect that might lead to malfor-
mations such as Down’s Syndrome or Turner’s syndrome. This test is per-
formed in weeks 11–13 of pregnancy.  
If the non-invasive tests detect anatomical abnormalities or, in the case of 
advanced maternal age (over 35) or a family history of certain diseases or disa-
bilities, the pregnant woman might in some cases be advised to have invasive 
tests for further and more detailed detection of genetic diseases. Among the in-
vasive methods is the procedure of amniocentesis. Under ultrasound guidance, 
a needle is inserted through the woman’s abdomen in order to obtain foetal 
cells from amniotic fluid (cf. Bankier and Cram 2008: 13). The foetal cells ob-
tained in this way are tested. Apart from genetic diseases it also identifies other 
conditions such as an abnormal number or arrangement of chromosomes or 
neural-tube defects (DeGrazia et al. 2010: 525). This method is not performed 
before the 15th week of gestation. As the results might not be available before 
the 20th week, the procedure of selective abortion is administered in some cas-
es at a more advanced developmental stage of the foetus. For this reason abor-
tions following amniocentesis are considered even more problematic in moral, 
psychological or social terms in comparison to abortions at an earlier develop-
mental stage (cf. ibid). 
Chorionic villi sampling, in contrast, can be applied during early pregnan-
cy and provides an alternative to amniocentesis. It is administered in the first 
trimester mostly between the 10th and 12th week and allows for an earlier deci-
sion as whether to continue or terminate the pregnancy if a disabling condition 
is diagnosed. It is also used to detect chromosomal or genetic abnormalities in 
the foetus. Samples of the placental tissue (chorionic villus cells) are obtained 
for biopsy from the placenta either through the cervix or through the abdomen. 
                                                                                                                                  
phenomena might occur. For more detailed information and statistics see German Na-
tional Ethics Council 2003: 24.  
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For all these various procedures of PND it is the case that, if the foetus is found 
to have a genetic disease or chromosomal abnormality, the selective process 
which sometimes follows is accomplished through abortion (cf. PCB 2004: 
89).15 The way in which the pregnancy is terminated depends upon the gesta-
tional age of the embryo or foetus.16 It is especially this combination of PND 
and selective abortion which raises ethical issues. DeGrazia et al. maintain that 
‘since prenatal diagnosis is ordinarily undertaken with an eye towards selective 
abortion, the practice of prenatal diagnosis clearly confronts us with one partic-
ular aspect of the more general problem of abortion […]’ (DeGrazia et al. 2010: 
525; see also Nippert 1998; Siep 2004: 324). Thus, on the one hand, the combi-
nation of PND and selective abortion is confronted with the objections to abor-
tion in general, such as the argument of the moral status17 of the foetus and the 
psychological and physical burdens caused by the intervention. On the other 
hand, there are also objections formulated specifically against the procedure of 
selective abortion as, for instance, the disability rights critique, which is dealt 
with in the following. However, PND followed by abortion is not the only prac-
tice of prenatal testing and selection which has been confronted with criticism. 
Recently the discussion has also focused on PGD.  
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
In Germany especially the procedure of PGD has received much attention since 
the decision was taken to make it legal (albeit within strict limits) in July 
2011.18 In other countries such as Great Britain, PGD has been permitted in li-
                                           
15  It is important to note, however, that prospective parents seek the practice of PND during 
pregnancy for different reasons: PND might facilitate, for instance, the medical treatment 
in utero in a case of disease. It might also enable parents to prepare themselves for the 
potential risk of a stillbirth or life with a child with a disability or severe disease. In some 
cases of positive diagnosis after PND parents are confronted with the challenge of decid-
ing if the foetus should be aborted. Above all the combination of prenatal diagnosis and 
selective abortion often faces fierce criticism. The following concentrates primarily on 
the combination of both procedures. 
16  For further information on the alternative procedures see for instance DeGrazia et al. 
2010: 457-458. 
17  For a more detailed description of arguments which refer to the moral status see, for in-
stance Schöne-Seifert 2007: 155pp. and section 3.3.1. in this chapter. 
18  As the German Ethics Council states, ‘[u]ntil recently, PGD was largely regarded as in-
compatible with the German Embryo Protection Act. However, in a decision of July 
2010, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) held that PGD carried out after 
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censed centres for many years. Couples at risk of transmitting certain genetic 
diseases consider the procedure of PGD to be a better alternative to selective 
abortion with regard to the physical and psychological burdens and also in 
moral terms (cf. Schöne-Seifert 2007: 173). ‘The couples who choose the re-
productive option usually have either a moral objection to termination of preg-
nancy, have had one or more terminations in the past, have recently lost a child 
to a genetic disease or hold great hope that the new technology will deliver 
them an unaffected child.’ (Bankier and Cram 2008: 14)  
PGD has been developed against the background of IVF and aims at se-
lecting early-stage embryos in vitro. As the procedure of PGD requires IVF or 
alternatively intracytoplasmic sperm injection19 it faces the risks and side ef-
fects of this technique such as the ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome20 or the 
risk of infection through the withdrawal of egg cells. The procedure is often 
criticized for requiring the artificial as opposed to natural creation of life which 
is said to conflict with central values such as the value of the natural (cf. 
Schramme 2002: 51).21 Embryonic cells are extracted from the embryos ob-
tained by IVF. In the most common form of PGD one or two cells are removed 
from the embryo which is at approximately the eight-cell stage (cf. DeGrazia et 
al. 2010: 531).22 The cells are screened for a specific genetic disease or chro-
mosomal abnormality. The procedure can detect the conditions for certain and 
immediate diseases such as Tay-Sachs or Down’s Syndrome, but also diseases 
                                                                                                                                  
extracorporeal fertilization by means of blastocyst biopsy and subsequent examination of 
the harvested pluripotent trophoblast cells for serious genetic damage does not constitute 
an offence under the Embryo Protection Act […]’ (German Ethics Council 2012: 7). 
19  If this method is applied ‘a single sperm is directly injected into the oocyte under the mi-
croscope’ (German Ethics Council 2012: 10). 
20  Ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome results from the injection of hormones for triggering 
the oocyte release. The symptoms range from mild to severe and encompass, for in-
stance, abdominal bloating, pain in the abdomen or weight gain. 
21  For more detailed information on the notion of the natural and the differentiation between 
the natural and the artificial see chapter 4. 
22  It should be noted that in the eight-cell stage many of the embryonic cells are totipotent 
which means that they are capable of developing into a human organism. For this reason 
the destruction of totipotent cells is regarded as problematic in legal and moral terms. In 
Germany PGD of totipotent cells is prohibited by the Embryo Protection Act. Pluripotent 
embryonic cells, in contrast, have a limited developmental capacity since they can only 
develop into various organs. For this reason they are considered to have a different moral 
status and are, therefore, not subject to moral or legal prohibition. Medical progress has 
made it possible to apply PGD methods which can exclusively be carried out on pluripo-
tent embryonic cells (cf. Leopoldina 2011: 13).  
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that will occur later in life such as Huntington’s Disease (cf. PCB 2004). In the 
international literature dealing with the subject of PGD the following indica-
tions are listed among others: the presence of monogenic diseases in family 
such as Cystic Fibrosis, Myotonic Dystrophy, Spinal Muscular Atrophy, 
Sickle-cell Disease, Thalassemia, Huntington’s Disease, Epidermolysis bullosa 
and the Marker X Syndrome (cf. DRZE 2013). After the process of screening, 
affected embryos are discarded while those unaffected are implanted into the 
womb to initiate a pregnancy (cf. Siep 2004: 324). Due to the fact that embryos 
are created with the aim of selection, the procedure of PGD is often confronted 
with the charge of creating ‘lives on trial’ (Schramme 2002: 51)23 and is for this 
reason highly controversial. 
There is also the possibility that PGD might be used for purposes which 
go beyond the reduction or elimination of disabilities and diseases. This issue is 
discussed under the title ‘designer babies’ (Schöne-Seifert 2007: 171) and re-
fers to selecting embryos for desired traits such as height, muscularity, cogni-
tive capacity or a strong immune system – procedures of so-called enhance-
ment.24 However, as Bankier and Cram maintain, ‘in reality the complexity of 
the determinants of traits [such as height and intelligence]…severely limits the 
potential of such options’ (Bankier and Cram 2008: 17). Sex-selection is possi-
ble by means of PGD although it should be noted that it is usually used to avoid 
sex-linked diseases. ‘More rarely and above all outside Europe [it is also used] 
for what is known as social sexing or family balancing in accordance with the 
parent’s desire for a female or male child.’ (German Ethics Council 2012: 19) 
Moreover, in the US and Great Britain the technique is applied in order to cre-
ate so-called saviour siblings. Embryos with the best genetic match are selected 
and transferred into the womb so that the future child can provide an organ or 
cell transplant to an older sibling that is affected with a fatal disease. However, 
the following analysis concentrates primarily on the debate dealing with PND 
and PGD as a means for preventing the birth of children with severe disabilities 
and diseases and does not consider other cases such as saviour siblings or sex-
selection for family balancing.  
23  Linked to this charge is the question of whether it is a morally legitimate act to discard 
embryos and the question with regard to the moral status of the embryo ex utero. 
24  However, the question as to where one crosses the boundary between medical interven-
tions and enhancement is a moot point. For an extensive discussion of this problem, the 
topic of enhancement in general and definitions see chapter 4. 
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Generally speaking, one should bear in mind that procedures of prenatal 
testing and selection still do not give a guarantee that a healthy and non-
disabled child will be born. This is the case for a number of reasons, among 
others that the birth process in itself presents risks and that genetic testing is not 
in a position to detect every possible disabling condition. Furthermore, the class 
of disabilities and diseases which are reduced or eliminated through PND and 
selective abortion as well as by means of PGD is heterogeneous. ‘Prenatal di-
agnosis [for instance] can now detect conditions as different as Lesch-Nyhan 
syndrome and ectrodactyly (a trait involving a partial fusion on bones of fingers 
and toes). Further, not only are the traits heterogeneous, but so are perceptions 
of their significance and/or seriousness.’ (Parens/Asch 2000: 8) In addition, 
‘the number and variety of conditions for which tests are available grow daily’ 
(ibid.: 3). As both methods, PND in combination with selective abortion as well 
as PGD, provide means for selection in the case of disability and disease, their 
administration has been very controversial. Especially advocates of the disabil-
ity rights have strongly criticized these techniques for, among other things, 
their alleged discriminatory impact. We will come back to this issue in due 
course. Before embarking on the analysis one should be aware of the fact that 
the question of the moral permissibility of prenatal testing and selection in-
volves two different issues, namely whether the embryo or foetus is allowed to 
be discarded in the first place and secondly, whether it is morally legitimate to 
select against disability and illness. As will be discovered both issues are deep-
ly interwoven.  
3.2. The reference to well-being in the debate on 
prenatal testing and selection 
When dealing with the moral acceptability of procedures such as PGD and 
PND followed by selective abortion, there are especially two lines of reasoning 
which prevail: the argument of the procreative autonomy of potential parents as 
an assertion in favour of these procedures and the argument of the moral status 
of the embryo or foetus as an objection to the legitimacy of these techniques. 
This has already received a short mention in the introduction to this chapter. 
Nonetheless, when taking a closer look at the various arguments in the debate, 
or alternative ways in which the pivotal arguments in the discussions are char-
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acterized, it is clearly discernible that the notion of well-being also plays a 
prominent role. Equally, we can encounter presentations of the central argu-
ments such as the following by the Ethic-Task Force of the European Society 
of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) concerning PGD: 
At stake are two main principles. Firstly, the technology is justified 
by referring to the welfare of the child by avoiding harm to the future 
offspring. Secondly, the application of PGD increases the autonomy 
of the parents, both by allowing them to choose a technique that bet-
ter fits their moral principles and reduces the psychological burden 
(by avoiding repeated terminations of pregnancy) and by giving them 
the possibility to protect their interest in favouring the health of their 
offspring. (ESHRE 2003: 650)25 
According to these lines, well-being does indeed play an important role in de-
bates on the moral acceptability of procedures such as PGD. For the time being 
we can maintain that the well-being of the future child is considered in order to 
argue in favour of PGD as disability and disease appear to be widely associated 
with a reduction in well-being. However, is that all that is to be said about the 
role of well-being in debates on prenatal testing and selection? The following 
analysis goes into more detail concerning this matter. It focuses primarily on 
the consideration of the well-being of the potential parents and the future child. 
Thereby, it explores the presence of well-being and the character it is ascribed 
within the arguments against the background of the alternative theories por-
trayed in chapter 2.26 
                                           
25  For a critical comment on this statement see Thomas Gutmann 2010: 89. Gutmann points 
out that the argument of the well-being of the child no longer holds water if one takes 
Derek Parfit’s Non-identity problem into account. We will come to the Non-identity 
problem in due course.  
26  The following analysis does not deal with considerations of well-being which are based 
upon safety concerns such as medical risks which accompany procedures of prenatal test-
ing and selection. In the debate attention is frequently drawn to the fact that medical side-
effects might endanger the well-being of the prospective mother or the future child (see 
PCB 2004). However, these arguments are not of central importance for the purpose of 
this chapter. 
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3.2.1. The well-being of the prospective parents 
When taking a closer look at the debate on prenatal testing and selection, there 
are lines of argumentation to be found which draw attention to the well-being 
of the potential parents, although this is not encompassed in the quote of the 
ESHRE. In order to shed light on the role which well-being plays in the debate 
on prenatal testing and selection, the subsequent section places these assertions 
under scrutiny and, above all, examines the character of well-being under con-
sideration.27  
The desire for a biological child 
An argument frequently encountered, primarily in the debates on the ethical 
acceptability of PGD, is the line of reasoning that PGD is said to provide cou-
ples who are ‘genetically at risk’ with the opportunity to conceive children who 
are biologically related to them and not affected by the disability or disease in 
question: ‘[w]omen or couples, the argument continues, in having recourse to 
PGD, wish to realize their legitimate desire for a biological child which is not 
genetically impaired’ (German Ethics Council 2012: 56). Sigrid Graumann also 
describes the fulfilment of a couple’s desire to have a biological child as one of 
the classic arguments in the debate on PGD: ‘PGD is a procedure which should 
help towards fulfilling the desire for a child of couples at risk’28 (Graumann 
2001: thesis 3). However, to her mind this line of reasoning does not constitute 
one of the pivotal arguments in the debate. It rather is of secondary importance. 
All in all, it becomes evident that especially the procedure of PGD appears to 
be viewed as a practice which enables parents to fulfil their dearest wish, pro-
vided that IVF and PGD lead to a pregnancy despite the risks linked to the 
technique of IVF and the low prospects of success. It is frequently pointed out 
that unwanted childlessness can diminish the well-being of those concerned. 
When dealing with the argument of parental reproductive freedom the German 
National Ethics Council, for instance, maintains: ‘an unfulfilled wish for a child 
can permanently impair people’s happiness’ (German National Ethics Council 
2003: 108). Thus, one common line of argumentation in the debate, which pri-
                                           
27  Some of the elaborations in the following section can also be found in Stroop 2013. 
28  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Die PID ist ein Verfahren, das dazu dienen soll, 
den Kinderwunsch von Risikopaaren zu erfüllen.‘ 
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marily concentrates on the technique PGD, is based upon the assumption that, 
in the case of a successful application, the administration of PGD preserves the 
well-being of the parents through sparing them the painful experience of un-
wanted childlessness or even promotes their well-being through providing them 
with the opportunity to have a biological child. This, in turn, is said to be an 
important part of their procreative autonomy.  
Nevertheless, opponents of this line of reasoning claim that this strong de-
sire for a biological child is a result of the broadened possibilities provided by 
the new reproductive technology (cf. Schräer 2009: 130).29 Ulrich Eibach main-
tains, that the broadened possibilities in terms of reproduction brought about by 
technological development have increased the psychological as well as social 
pressure on women or couples, respectively, to allow these new practices to be 
applied in cases in which natural procreation is not possible. Therefore, accord-
ing to him, the willingness declines ‘to accept such hard fate – as for instance 
childlessness or the birth of a disabled child – as a challenge of life’30 (Eibach 
2000). The use of the expression ‘hard fate’ illustrates that Eibach, too, appears 
to consider unwanted childlessness as a factor which has a negative impact on 
well-being. However, the fact that it is in the nature of a hard fate that it is not 
easy to accept makes his argument appear contradictory. Nonetheless, it can be 
observed that modern techniques of reproductive technology are not only con-
sidered to fulfil the desire for a biological child but also to generate it in its in-
tensity. 
The depicted arguments all focus on the relationship between well-being 
and unwanted childlessness or the realisation of the desire for a biological 
child, respectively. The conception of a healthy biological child is considered 
as having a tremendously positive impact on the well-being of the parents, 
whereas unwanted childlessness is viewed as leading to a drastic reduction with 
regard to well-being. Therefore, both positive as well as negative dimensions of 
well-being come into play. In addition, the desires of the couples and the fact 
that they should be provided with the opportunity to fulfil their desires is an 
important point of reference within these arguments. Nevertheless, the deliber-
ate application of the practices of prenatal testing and selection is said to pre-
                                           
29  See for instance the lines of argumentation put forward by Schockenhoff 2000: 101. 
30  Translation by author. Original quote: ’in schweres Geschick – z.B. Kinderlosigkeit und 
die Geburt eines behinderten Kindes – als Herausforderung des Lebens anzunehmen‘. 
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vent unreasonable burdens on parents – and therefore preserve their well-
being – in a second but different way.  
Avoiding the burdens of raising a disabled or an ill child 
In the debates it is frequently argued, that the birth of a child with a severe dis-
ease or disability puts a strain on the parents in psychological as well as physi-
cal terms. The President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB), for example, draws at-
tention to the fact that ‘PGD, when effective, enables parents to avoid the deep 
grief and hardship that accompany the birth of a child with dreaded and incura-
ble diseases such as cystic fibrosis and Tay Sachs’ (PCB 2004: 94).31 But what 
exactly are the strains and hardships which parents with disabled or ill children 
face, or rather prospective parents anticipate when they decide against having a 
child with a disability or disease? Bettina Schöne-Seifert and Lorenz Krüger 
list the following reasons parents might have for avoiding the procreation of a 
child likely to be disabled: disabled children require a greater amount of care 
and energy on the part of their parents. Furthermore, parents are afraid of the 
responsibility and of enormous burdens which might endanger their social and 
family life. Another reason might be the unsatisfied desire for a child which is 
in a position to translate the parental encouragement into action and to return 
the love which it has received in a ‘normal’ way. (cf. Schöne-Seifert and 
Krüger 1993: 259) 
While being concerned with the procreative liberty of potential parents, 
Jonathan Glover states that ‘where a child has a very severe disability, much of 
the parental burden may be empathy for the child’s own distress’ (Glover 2006: 
41). In order to give a more vivid picture of the emotional and physical burdens 
placed on the parents of disabled children, Glover refers to the case of Julia 
Hollander, a mother who describes her experiences of life with her daughter 
Imogen, who suffered significant brain damage. In her article Julia Hollander 
depicts her emotions as follows. ‘The future terrified me. Along with the prac-
tical toll Imogen’s condition would take, there was the enormity of the emo-
tional one – caring for a young child who should be smiling and running 
around, but instead would be suffering terribly because of what had happened 
to her inside my body.’ (Hollander 2010) Above all, Hollander stresses the fact 
                                           
31  It is important to note that, generally speaking, the PCB primarily deals with the ethical 
concerns linked to the new technologies such as PGD and takes a critical stance. 
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that social support in such cases is limited and hard to get. Further burdens im-
posed on the parents which are mentioned in the debate on prenatal testing and 
selection are, for instance, limited future prospects because of the unpredicta-
bility in terms of the development of the disease or disability, limited possibili-
ties to hold down a job and increased financial burdens. Thus, couples who 
seek prenatal testing and selection to avoid the birth of potentially ill or disa-
bled children are afraid of the excessive psychological as well as physical de-
mands which they might otherwise have to face. They fear that these demands 
might significantly diminish their well-being. It is argued that because of these 
fears, they should have the freedom to decide in favour of techniques such as 
PGD or PND followed by selective abortion. 
In addition, those who already have a severely disabled or ill child and are 
at high risk of this situation repeating itself are mentioned frequently in the de-
bate.32 As these parents already take care of a disabled or ill child it is main-
tained that they might be overtaxed if they have a second child which requires 
such intensive and extraordinary care. 
All these lines of reasoning refer to the various ways in which the birth of 
a child with a severe disease or disability might put a strain on the parents. Em-
phasis is placed on the subjective experience of the parents such as negative 
emotions through empathy for the child. In connection with the argument of 
procreative liberty, it is pointed out that parents should have the freedom of 
choice to avoid these hardships without the necessity of having to avoid having 
a biological child altogether. Again the desires of the future parents are central 
to the arguments and the subjective dimensions of well-being are placed in the 
foreground. 
Preventing PND followed by abortion 
A different line of argument which is especially linked to the well-being of the 
potential mother is that ‘by screening out embryos with genetic abnormalties 
before a pregnancy begins, [PGD] prevents many women from having to de-
cide whether to abort an abnormal fetus’ (PCB 2004: 94). Many couples with 
an increased risk have experienced the burden of selective abortions several 
times and could be spared the hardship of a further abortion through the appli-
                                           
32  See for instance Glover 2006: 28. 
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cation of PGD. In addition, the practice of PGD is said to prevent parents from 
being confronted with a stillbirth or the early death of their child, which might 
otherwise happen to them a second time. These are further ways in which pro-
cedures of prenatal testing and selection are depicted as means of protecting 
parental well-being. These arguments focus primarily on the protection of well-
being, stating that PGD avoids suffering and pain for the potential mother. 
Again it is pointed out that PGD provides opportunities to couples for conceiv-
ing a biological child without having to face major hardship. However, the pro-
cedures of prenatal testing and selection have also been subject to fierce criti-
cism and the depicted lines of reasoning which refer to the parental well-being 
have been highly contested. 
Criticism by the disability rights activists 
The various lines of argumentation portrayed above, which are mainly put for-
ward in order to approve practices such as PGD and PND followed by selective 
abortion, have been criticized especially by the so-called disability rights activ-
ists33. Generally speaking, they maintain that those parents who seek proce-
dures which select against disability and disease, because they fear that their 
well-being might diminish if they have to care for a disabled or ill child, are 
driven by misinformation. When portraying the stance of the disability rights 
activist, Eric Parens and Adrienne Asch describe their assertion the following 
way.  
The prospective parent who wants to avoid raising a child with a diag-
nosable disability forgets that along with disabling trait come other 
traits, many of which are likely to be enjoyable, pride-giving, positive 
(and as problematic, annoying, and complicated) as any other child’s 
trait. If prospective parents imagine that disability precludes everything 
else that could be wonderful about the child, they are likely acting on 
misinformation and stereotypes. (Parens and Asch 2000: 17) 
                                           
33  The disability rights activists argue for the equality of people with disabilities. They 
place emphasis on the negative impact of prenatal testing and selection. Many partici-
pants of this movement themselves live with a disability or have close relationships to 
disabled people. They claim that there are many clichés about disability and life with a 
disability to be found in our society which need to be eliminated (cf. Parens/Asch 2000: 
Introduction IV) 
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They draw attention to the fact that prospective parents are apt to change their 
attitude if they obtain information about what life with a disability is like and 
how parents who have disabled children enjoy caring for them just like parents 
with non-disabled children do (cf. Parens and Asch 2000: 8). Hence, critics 
such as the disability rights activists call in question the notion that caring for a 
disabled or severely ill child leads to major reduction of well-being on the part 
of the parents. Couples who seek procedures of prenatal testing and selection in 
order to avoid the birth of a disabled or ill child are considered to be driven by 
misinformation. Thus, the disability rights activists tie their argument to the as-
sumption that these couples are not able to anticipate their future well-being in 
the event that they conceive a disabled or ill child. Accordingly, they distance 
themselves indirectly from an utterly subjective stance in terms of the character 
of well-being. 
Interim results 
Returning to the quote of the ESHRE provided at the beginning of this chapter, 
which implies that the well-being of the future child and the reproductive au-
tonomy of prospective parents are the two central arguments brought forward 
in favour of prenatal testing and selection, we can now conclude that well-
being appears to play a more substantial role than suggested. 
The notion of well-being not only comes into play when the future child is 
concerned, it is also referred to when the potential parents are considered. As 
indicated in the above, many lines of argumentation allude to the various ways 
in which practices of prenatal testing and selection can be viewed as preserving 
or even promoting parental well-being. However, one is apt to overlook these 
lines of argumentation which are based upon the concept of parental well-being 
and they have not received a lot attention. But what is the reason for this?  
When taking a closer look at the context in which the well-being based 
lines of reasoning appear, one notices that they frequently – or even principal-
ly – occur when the notions of reproductive autonomy or reproductive freedom, 
respectively, are considered. When arguing that parental reproductive autono-
my should also, for instance, include the choice of having a child without a dis-
ability or disorder (cf. Glover 2006: 39) the underlying reasons and interest 
parents might have for this choice are addressed. The preservation or promotion 
of their well-being appears to constitute a central reason in this context. Thus, 
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failing to take into account the potential parents’ fear that caring for a disabled 
or ill child might diminish their well-being, would constitute an infringement of 
their autonomy. The argument of parental well-being is, therefore, not only 
linked to the reference to the principle of reproductive autonomy or freedom 
but also appears to be concealed behind it. The promotion or preservation of 
well-being is, for the most part, merely implicitly addressed. The overriding 
importance of reproductive autonomy and the resulting subliminal presence of 
the concept of parental well-being might explain why the latter has not received 
a lot of attention so far, and why parental well-being as an argument in favour 
of prenatal testing and selection is frequently overlooked.  
Nonetheless, the answer to the question as to what kind of character well-
being has when the prospective parents are concerned, proves to be difficult to 
pinpoint against the background of the framework for analysis which consists 
of the three alternative theories of well-being and was provided in chapter 2. 
The various lines of argumentation do not contain a lot of information about 
which of the three alternative theories is underlying. Broadly speaking, it can 
be maintained that the desires and interests of the parents appear to play a ma-
jor role within the arguments. This finding might indicate that the arguments 
are primarily based upon the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being. It should, 
however, also be noted that the mental state and the emotions of prospective 
parents are a consideration which could indicate that the arguments are tied to 
the hedonist doctrine. As a consequence it can be concluded that different sub-
jective concepts of well-being prevail if parental well-being is referred to, but 
that is about all which can be said when using the framework provided in chap-
ter 2 as a yardstick.  
It is often pointed out in the discussions that the potential parents should 
have the freedom to make procreative decisions in order to promote their well-
being in a way they see fit. This can be classified as the normative claim. The 
normative claim, above all, seems to result from the substantial weight given to 
reproductive autonomy in the context of prenatal testing and selection and has 
little to do with the question as to what is the essence of well-being. This find-
ing suggests that the weight given to autonomy might have an impact on the 
character of well-being under consideration (namely a subjective character) and 
that it is important to provide a detailed exploration of the relationship between 
the principles of respecting autonomy and promoting well-being within this 
book.  
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Arising from the above is the impression that the three alternative theories 
of well-being illustrated in chapter 2 do not suffice as a framework when classi-
fying the character of well-being in the various debates of biomedical ethics. At 
the moment there are no precise results which emerge with regard to the char-
acter of well-being suggesting the need for a more extensive framework when 
addressing the question as to the role of well-being in biomedical ethics.  
3.2.2. The well-being of the future child  
It has already received a short mention above that, in contrast to parental well-
being, the well-being of the future child is explicitly addressed in the debates 
on prenatal testing and selection. As Michael Parker illustrates, John Stuart 
Mill has already placed emphasis on the fact that the well-being of the future 
child and the responsibility linked to it constitute an important consideration in 
human reproduction (cf. Parker 2005: 13). ‘The fact itself, of causing the exist-
ence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of 
human life. To undertake this responsibility – to bestow a life which may be 
either a curse or a blessing – unless the being upon whom it is to be bestowed 
will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime 
against that being.’ (Mill 1859: Chapter 5) When writing these lines Mill obvi-
ously did not have in mind the various new procedures in the field of reproduc-
tion brought about by technological advances. Nevertheless, the more extensive 
possibilities provided by the new reproductive technology such as the possibil-
ity of selecting against disability and disease have made his statement of cur-
rent interest. There are a great number of arguments to be found in the debate 
on prenatal testing and selection which are formulated in a similar fashion and 
are thus based on the assumption that the well-being of the future child is to be 
protected or even promoted. On the one hand, the procedures of prenatal testing 
and selection are viewed as a means for protecting the well-being of the future 
child. On the other hand, critics consider them to be a danger to well-being as 
the estimation or anticipation of the well-being of future children should not be 
undertaken by third parties. The following provides a more detailed examina-
tion of various lines of argumentation which refer to the well-being of the fu-
ture child. 
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The zero-line stance  
In the debate attention is drawn to the fact that PGD as well as PND followed 
by selective abortion can protect the well-being of future children by avoiding 
the birth of children with severe disabilities or diseases. Thereby, assumptions 
are made about the well-being of the prospective children. The underlying sup-
position is that diseases or disabilities could have a negative impact on it. Pro-
ponents of this line of reasoning presuppose that embryos or foetuses respec-
tively do not have a full moral status. Therefore, in following their argumenta-
tion, aborting a foetus with a disability or discarding embryos with specific 
conditions cannot, in terms of moral acceptability be equated with killing a per-
son born with a similar disability (cf. Brock 2005: 77pp.). Brock refers to ‘the 
concept of personhood, or person, as a moral concept to designate a being who 
has the moral standing that persons are typically accorded in common moral 
theories’ (ibid.). Since, according to Brock and the like-minded, the embryo 
and foetus are not persons, they do not have a right to life. An instance of a 
well-being based line of reasoning in favour of prenatal testing and selection 
can be found in Jonathan Glover’s book Choosing Children. Under the heading 
What We Owe to Our Children Glover provides the following explanation. 
The case for optimism is not hard to see. Disabilities and disorders 
often (though not always) mean that people have less good lives than 
they would have had. They may have lives with more pain and more 
periods in hospital than others have. They may find many things 
harder to achieve than others do. These disadvantages can be seen as 
a huge natural injustice, affecting many people, which wherever pos-
sible should be removed. (Glover 2006: 1) 
He considers prenatal testing and selective abortion as a means to avoid the 
hardships caused by disability and disease. Glover appears to be representing a 
common opinion with this quote. Julian Savulescu also views the protection of 
well-being as the central aim when procedures of prenatal testing and selection 
are administered. ‘In the case of selection and reproductive decision-making, 
one important outcome of interest is how well a person’s whole life goes, that 
is, wellbeing. We use this approach often in our decision in a rough and ready 
way.’ (Savulescu 2008: 53) Thus, in following this line of reasoning, if chro-
mosomal or genetic abnormalities of the embryo or foetus are detected which 
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appear to preclude a life of reasonable well-being, it would be appropriate to 
discard the embryo or to abort the foetus respectively. Frances Kamm for in-
stance suggests that ‘[o]ut of concern for the person who have [sic!] to live with 
a clubfoot, [I] believe it would be permissible to abort the fetus that would de-
velop into a person’ (Kamm 2002: 384) because he/she would have an addi-
tional difficulty in life.34 Thereby, disability and disease appear to be viewed as 
conditions which, at least in many cases, diminish well-being. When dealing 
with the impact of serious disabilities such as blindness and serious mental re-
tardation on quality of life, Dan Brock states that a decrease in the quality of 
life of a disabled person could be possible even though the person him-/herself 
describes his/her life as being pleasant.  
Serious disabilities can have a negative impact on people’s lives by 
significantly restricting their opportunities even if, through adjust-
ment to their disability, their subjective satisfaction with their lives is 
undiminished. Thus, when I use the term “quality of life” in what fol-
lows, I refer to an overall assessment of how good a person’s life is, 
one that includes the person’s own subjective assessment of or [sic] 
happiness with his life as well as objective components such as ac-
complishments, personal relations, and self-determination, including 
having the reasonable array of opportunities that self-determination 
requires. (Brock 2005: 70) 
Glover also draws attention to the fact that the well-being of a person might be 
diminished through having to cope with a severe disability or illness even if the 
person experiences contentment that comes from adjustment to his/her condi-
tion (cf. Glover 2006: 52). In the last chapter of his book he maintains that he 
bases his arguments on a concept of well-being which takes into account two 
strands — in a similar fashion to Brock: 
The binocular vision we need corresponds to two strands of the good 
life. One strand is about the fit between what you want and value and 
what your life is like. Part of having a good life is being happy, in the 
                                           
34  The appropriateness of Kamm’s club foot example is highly debatable since one could 
argue that this disability should not be viewed as severe. Common examples of severe 
disabilities or diseases which are referred to in the debate are for example Huntington’s 
disease or Tay Sachs. Both cause a lot of suffering and an early death. 
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(limited) sense of being reasonably content with how your life is go-
ing. The second strand is about how rich your life is in human goods: 
what relationships you have with other people, your state of health, 
how much you are in charge of your own life, how much scope for 
creativity you have, and so on. (Glover 2006: 93) 
Thus, according to these lines of reasoning, although subjective dimensions 
constitute a component of well-being, there are for the most part objective di-
mensions important for it. Both Glover and Brock place emphasis on the objec-
tive measures such as individual functioning when stating that severe disability 
and disease diminish individual well-being. Due to the fact that they list specif-
ic components which they consider as important for individual well-being, they 
could possibly be classified as purporting an objective list theory against the 
background of the three alternative theories provided in chapter 2. Subjective 
satisfaction or subjective well-being constitutes one element among others on 
the list. It should, however, be noted that the depicted lines of reasoning occur 
for the most part within the Anglo-American debate on prenatal testing and se-
lection and are rarely to be found in the German debate. We will return to this 
matter in a later section of this chapter.  
In discussing arguments in favour of prenatal testing and selection which 
refer to the well-being of the future child, Wassermann maintains that this 
stance views the resulting responsibility of potential parents as the function of 
“gatekeepers” selecting against suffering and limitation caused by disability 
and disease (cf. Wassermann 2005: 133).35 Most of these lines of argumenta-
tion draw attention to the fact that ‘we ought to try to provide every child with 
something like a minimally satisfying life’ (Purdy 1996: 45). Glover calls this 
the zero-line stance as it refers to a level where the child’s life is just about 
worth living (cf. Glover 2006: 52). However, a closer look at the arguments 
present in the debate on prenatal testing and selection suggests that there are 
lines of reasoning to be found which go a step further, stating that we ought to 
provide children with the best opportunity of a good life. 
                                           
35  However, Wassermann questions this view. 
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Procreative perfectionism 
An instance of this can be found within the works of Julian Savulescu. He en-
dorses a stance which Glover terms ‘procreative perfectionism’ (Glover 2006: 
53).36 Savulescu’s elaborations are mainly, but not exclusively, concerned with 
PGD since ‘selection by abortion has greater psychological harms than selec-
tion by PGD and these need to be considered’ (Savulescu 2001: 421). Savules-
cu too appears to presuppose that embryos or foetuses respectively do not have 
a full moral status and that, consequently, procedures which involve the dis-
carding of the embryo or foetus are permissible and cannot be equated with 
killing a person who has already been born. But which notions of well-being 
does Savulescu’s stance encompass?  
When arguing for the principle of procreative beneficence, Savulescu 
maintains that potential parents have the duty to select the child with the best 
opportunity of a good life by means such as PGD. ‘Couples (or single repro-
ducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is 
expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on 
the relevant, available information.’ (Savulescu 2001: 415) He explains that by 
applying the expression ‘best life’ he is referring to the maximum of well-being 
possible. In addition to genetic dispositions for disease and disability, potential 
parents should also select for traits which could be considered as non patholog-
ical such as intelligence, memory and height. These traits are said to have a 
great impact on well-being just like disability and disease. Parents should opt 
for the most advantaged child, which is to say ‘the child, of those possible for 
the parents, whose life can be expected to go best’ (Savulescu and Kahane 
2009: 275). Thus, Savulescu can be considered a proponent of so-called ‘genet-
ic enhancement’, the improvement of the human body beyond the reduction or 
elimination of disabilities and diseases by means of reproductive technology.37 
According to Savulescu, the thesis that non-pathological genetic dispositions 
have an impact on the likelihood of leading a good life is compatible with all 
                                           
36  As explained in chapter 2, perfectionism is an ethical theory which endorses the view that 
a good life consists in the promotion of certain aspects of human nature, which should be 
cultivated in as far as possible (cf. Hurka 1996). For further examples of perfectionist 
theories see chapter 4. 
37  For a detailed analysis of the enhancement debate and the reference to well-being see 
chapter 4. 
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alternative theories of well-being.38 However, while arguing that there are spe-
cific human capacities which universally contribute to well-being, he presup-
poses a conception of well-being which can be classified as objective. Like 
Brock and Glover he lists specific goods which ought to be promoted in order 
to increase well-being. 
John Harris purports a similar argument when dealing with the subject of 
PGD stating that ‘she [a woman who seeks PGD] has a reason therefore to 
choose the embryo that is not already harmed in any particular way and that 
will have the best possible chance of a long and healthy life and the best possi-
ble chance of contributing positively to the world it will inhabit’ (Harris 2001: 
385). Also Harris appears to base his argument on the assumption that we are 
able to anticipate which condition will harm or benefit the future child and that 
the estimation of well-being is not an utterly subjective venture. He defines dis-
ability as a ‘harmed condition’ and provides the following elaborations: ‘a 
harmed condition is one which if a patient was brought unconscious into the 
accident and emergency department of a hospital in such a condition and it 
could be reversed or removed the medical staff would be negligent if they 
failed to reverse or remove it’ (ibid.: 384). Hence, he can be classified as taking 
an objective or at least intersubjective39 stance concerning the well-being or 
harm respectively of the future child.40 Both Harris and Savulescu presuppose 
that the embryo and foetus have not got a full moral status and that they can be 
subject to selection procedures which involve their discarding. Harris, for in-
                                           
38  Chapter 4 provides critical reflection of this claim illustrating that Savulescu implicitly 
ties his arguments to an objectivist concept of well-being. 
39  Intersubjective concepts of well-being are based on the assumption that there are certain 
components of well-being which can be considered trans-individual and can be classified 
as one form of objectivism. This is due to the fact that there are socially shared ideas of 
what promotes or diminishes our well-being. Intersubjective conceptions of well-being 
are, therefore, not linked to realism. 
40  Nevertheless, Harris appears to consider himself as moving in a subjective direction in 
terms of well-being when stating: ‘I have defined disability as a condition that someone 
has a strong rational preference not to be in and one that is in some sense a harmed con-
dition. For me then a harmed condition is defined relative both to one’s rational prefer-
ences and to conditions which might be described as harmful, not relative to normal spe-
cies functioning but relative to possible alternative.’ (Harris 2001: 384) However, alone 
the mere concept of rationality can be considered an objective dimension which enters 
Harris’s argument. In addition, Robert Sparrow maintains: ‘What is far less clear is 
whether we can in fact, as Harris intends, assess whether someone is in a harmed condi-
tion without making reference to an idea of the normal capacities of a human body’ 
(Sparrow 2011: 277). 
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stance, states that ‘none of the embryos has a right or an entitlement to be cho-
sen rather than the other, since none is a person, nor yet a moral agent’ (ibid.: 
385). He equates being a person with having full moral status. 
To conclude, we can observe that also proponents of ‘procreative perfec-
tionism’ are mainly to be found within the Anglo-American discussions on 
prenatal testing and selection and rarely in the German debate. Savulescu and 
Harris also appear to base their arguments on concepts of well-being which can 
be classified as objective with regard to the character. They presuppose that po-
tential parents are in a position to anticipate which traits will contribute or di-
minish well-being due to its objective nature. Owing to the fact that Savulescu 
lists specific components which he views as universally contributing to indi-
vidual well-being, he might also be classified as purporting an objective list 
theory. Again it is striking that arguments of this kind only appear to occur in 
the Anglo-American debate and rarely within the German discussions. 
In addition, Harris and Savulescu mention components of well-being 
which should be promoted by means of prenatal testing and selection which go 
beyond the preservation of health and the alleviation of pain and suffering. 
Hence, they can be said to refer to positive as well as negative dimensions of 
well-being, that is to say the protection as well as the promotion of well-being. 
They apply a comparatively broad conception of well-being within their argu-
ments which is not limited to health-related dimensions.  
Both Savulescu and Harris assume that the embryo and the foetus do not 
have the same moral status as a human being which has already been born.  
However, generally speaking, arguments in favour of prenatal testing and 
selection which refer to the well-being of the future child have been confronted 
with the charge that they lead to a paradox.  
The non-identity problem and different people choices 
Derek Parfit has drawn attention to the fact that in the debates on the moral ac-
ceptability of prenatal testing and selective abortion, it is important to be aware 
of the differentiation between same people choices and different people choices 
(cf. Parfit 1984). In same people choices there are two possible futures for the 
same child and the question to be asked, when considering the well-being of the 
child is: which possible future is better for the child? Different people choices, 
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in contrast, do not focus on two possible futures for one child.41 They are rather 
a choice between different possible children. According to Parfit, the choices 
which occur when procedures of prenatal testing and selective abortion are ad-
ministered constitute different people choices since the well-being of different 
children is concerned. In the case of prenatal diagnosis, for example, a preg-
nancy is terminated after the foetus has been diagnosed with a disabling condi-
tion. The woman might become pregnant again at a later point in time with the 
aim of conceiving a different child which has not got the disabling condition. 
Therefore, there is the choice between conceiving two different potential chil-
dren.  
Thus, the means for preventing the disability such as PND and selective 
abortion, do not promote or protect the well-being of the future child with the 
disability; instead they would prevent the existence of this child. In terms of the 
consideration of the well-being of the future child, therefore, Parfit states that 
apart from few extreme cases of exception (such as a case in which the life of 
an expected child is brief and painful), cases in which an individual is pre-
served from harm through an action which at the same time prevents its exist-
ence lead to a paradox (see Parfit 1987: 351pp.).  
This problem has received a lot of attention under the heading of ‘the non-
identity problem’. Thus, according to the non-identity problem, the considera-
tion of the well-being of the future child in the debate on the moral acceptabil-
ity of prenatal testing and selective abortion cannot be viewed as referring to 
the well-being of the child who would be born with the disability. After having 
dealt with the consequences of the non-identity problem, Brock claims that 
when applying means for preventing disability, prospective parents should act 
‘for the sake of a world with less diminishment of well-being or limitation in 
opportunity’ (Brock 2005: 87). This leads to the conclusion that it only makes 
sense to consider prenatal testing and selection as means for promoting well-
                                           
41  It is important to bear in mind that, as Wasserman puts it, ‘[t]ypically, the issue has been 
framed somewhat differently: should the presumed wrong in choosing to have or failing 
to avoid having an impaired child be understood in person-affecting or impersonal terms? 
If parents who make that choice act wrongly, do they wrong the child, giving him a com-
plaint, or do they commit only a more impersonal wrong? Philosophers who take the lat-
ter view argue that a parent violates an impersonal duty in creating a child significantly 
less happy than one she might have created with little additional burden’ (Wasserman 
2005:133). 
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being in the world and not the well-being of a future child.42 Since utilitarian-
ism maintains that the well-being in the world is to be maximized, this can be 
considered a utilitarian line of reasoning.43 However, the consideration of the 
well-being of the future child in debates on prenatal testing and selection has, 
above all, been confronted with much criticism of a different kind. 
The disability rights critique 
Here again the disability rights activists are among the fiercest critics. Accord-
ing to Eric Parens and Adrienne Asch, disability rights advocates criticize the 
fact that ‘using prenatal tests to prevent the birth of babies with disabilities 
seems to be self-evidently good to many people’ (Parens and Asch 2000: 4). 
However, for a number of reasons the disability advocates raise doubts about 
this widespread notion. They primarily refer to the so-called ‘expressivist cri-
tique’.44 As Sparrow points out this critique ‘derives from a concern that selec-
tion against embryos with genetic disorder, or terminating pregnancies on the 
basis that they are likely to result in the birth of a child with a disability, ex-
press morally reprehensible negative attitudes towards people with disabilities’ 
(Sparrow 2008: 112). Disability rights advocates also place emphasis on the 
fact that the degree to which specific traits are experienced as disabling factors 
which diminish well-being, depends on societal factors and organization such 
as education and employment (cf. idid: 6). ‘Many of the limits on quality of life 
come not from medical burdens, but from barriers set up by society, from stig-
matization to elevators that don’t work.’45 (Lehrman 2000) Thus, according to 
                                           
42  For a similar line of reasoning see John Harris 1998: ‘[d]eliberately choosing to increase 
suffering in the world when [one] could avoided so doing’ (ibid.: 91) is doing a moral 
wrong. 
43  For a critical perspective on Brock’s utilitarian line of reasoning see Siep 2003. 
44  Above all, the so-called ‘expressivist critique’ of members of the disability community 
has received a lot of attention. Due to the fact that within these lines of reasoning the 
well-being of the future child is not directly concerned, a close examination of the ex-
pressivist critique at this point would not serve our central aim in this section, namely the 
analysis of the role of the future child’s well-being in the debate on parental testing and 
selection. Nonetheless, we will come back to the espressivist critique in section 3.3.2.. 
45  This stance is frequently referred to as the ‘social model of disability’. The traditional 
model, in contrast, which considers disabilities as properties of individuals, is termed the 
‘medical model’ (cf. Amundson 2005: 102). 
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the disability rights activists, the prevention of a decrease in well-being due to 
disability and disease can best be accomplished through social changes. 
Furthermore, members of the disability community argue that underlying 
(mis)assumptions, misinformation and stereotypical thinking about disability 
influence proponents of procedures for prenatal testing and selection and the 
women who undergo these procedures. They claim that it is a mistake to be-
lieve that disability and disease inevitably diminish individual well-being by 
causing suffering. This is said to be a view that is primarily held by non-
disabled people who have no experience of what life with a disability is like 
(cf. Amundson 2005: 103) and are guided by misinformation. 
Many clinicians and bioethicists take it for granted that health status 
is mostly responsible for the reduced life chances of people with dis-
ability […]. [T]hese clinicians and bioethicists often discount data 
indicating that people with disabilities and their families do not view 
their lives in solely or even predominantly negative terms; instead, 
they may insist that such data reflect a denial of reality or an excep-
tional ability to cope with problems. (Parens and Asch 2000: 6) 
As the quote illustrates the disability advocates draw attention to a number of 
studies which have shown how well people with significant impairments can 
live and also that disabled or ill people rate their well-being higher than non-
disabled people would expect them to do. ‘When asked about the quality of 
their own lives, disabled people report a quality only slightly lower than that 
reported by nondisabled people, and much higher than projected by nondisa-
bled people.’ (Amundson 2005: 103) Furthermore, Ron Amundson states that 
‘the Standard View [that disabilities have very strong negative impacts on well-
being] is an expression of the stigma of disability. It is not (as it presents itself 
to be) an estimate of the objective consequences of impairments’ (ibid.: 104).  
Hence, critics seem to reject the objective stance with regard to well-being 
and the impact of disability taken by proponents of prenatal testing and selec-
tion. As illustrated in the above, proponents such as Brock and Harris presup-
pose that disability has a negative impact on well-being and should for this rea-
son be avoided by means of prenatal testing and selection. We can observe that 
the disability rights activists, above all, criticize the view that impairments and 
disabilities necessarily diminish the well-being of the persons affected by them. 
Nevertheless, they do not appear to imply that disabilities and impairments 
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never diminish individual well-being, rather they state that they do not neces-
sarily do so. When expressing their critical arguments, they appear to move 
more in a subjectivist direction in terms of the character of well-being stating 
that there are considerable differences as to how disability influences the well-
being of different persons and that these should be taken into account. Howev-
er, some disability rights activists cannot be considered as taking an utterly sub-
jectivist stance which would imply that we cannot make general statements 
such as: condition X often (though not always) has a negative impact on well-
being. Adrienne Asch for instance states:  
[y]es, disability might mean shorter-than-average life expectancies; 
might entail living with weakness, pain, or fatigue; might require 
more time than is typical for medical visits or hospital stays; might 
preclude seeing, hearing, or speaking; might require moving with 
wheelchairs, crutches, or braces; or might prevent some people from 
reading, writing, or participating in activities using numbers. (Asch 
2003: 319-20) 
Furthermore, she states ‘[i]t is possible to acknowledge that disabilities may 
preclude some activities that many people find worthwhile’ (ibid.: 324). As her 
quotation indicates she thereby affirms that there are some specific conditions 
which might be classified as often having a negative impact on well-being. 
Some of the disability activists explicitly point out that they do not fundamen-
tally reject procedures such as abortion, but rather their administration with the 
aim of selecting against disability: ‘women or couples should be free to reject 
becoming parents for whatever reason they wish, and thus they should be able 
to use techniques like abortion to fulfil their familial goals. The conviction that 
a life with a disabling trait is so distressing that it should not be undertaken if it 
can be avoided is quite different [...].’ (Asch 2000: 239) By providing these 
lines Asch intends to indicate that she does not generally reject procedures 
which involve the discarding of the embryo or foetus, but only if these are ap-
plied with the aim of selecting against disability. Hence, she does not appear to 
ascribe a full moral status to prenatal entities. As a consequence the impression 
arises that the argument of moral status is not the foundation of the stance 
which Asch takes. The plausibility of this will be placed under close scrutiny at 
a later point. 
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All in all, with regard to the character of well-being we can perceive that 
there appears to be tension between subjective and objective concepts where 
the well-being of the future child is concerned. Whereas proponents of prenatal 
testing and selection tie their arguments to objective concepts of well-being 
such as objective list accounts, the opponents of the procedures in question 
place emphasis on the subjective dimensions. This finding suggests that the 
tense relationship between proponents and opponents of prenatal testing and 
selection might also result from the fact that they purport rival concepts of 
well-being. We will place this hypothesis under scrutiny in the following. 
We are, nevertheless, not in a position to determine which of the two al-
ternative subjective theories (hedonism or desire theory) depicted in chapter 2 
is presupposed within the arguments by the disability rights advocates since 
these do not provide us with much information concerning this matter. Again 
the three-tiered framework provided in chapter 2 reaches its limits and the im-
pression seems to be reinforced that there is a need for supplementation. 
Nevertheless, the examination of the role of well-being in debates on pre-
natal testing and selection suggests that it is not solely the disability advocates 
who refer to the subjectivity of well-being in order to criticise arguments in fa-
vour of parental testing and selection. 
The impossibility of anticipating the well-being of a future child 
If one takes a closer look at the critical arguments put forward in the debate on 
the moral acceptability of procedures for prenatal testing and selection, one can 
find similar lines of reasoning to the above depicted arguments brought forward 
by the disability advocates. The lines of reasoning are, above all, purported by 
theologians such as Eberhard Schockenhoff and Peter Fonk in the German dis-
cussions. Before dealing with their well-being-based arguments, it should be 
noted that their theological background as well as the elaborations they provide 
clearly indicate that they ascribe a full moral status to the embryo and foetus. 
Fonk speaks repetitively of the ‘killing’ (Fonk 1999a: 36) carried out by the 
administration of PND and selective abortion which suggests that he considers 
the foetus to have the same moral status as a person who has already been born. 
He therefore considers procedures which involve the discarding of the embryo 
and foetus such as prenatal testing and selection as impermissible.  
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With regard to the future child’s well-being, Schockenhoff and Fonk 
maintain that the suffering caused by disease and disability and the resulting 
reduction of well-being are subjective quantities which should not and cannot 
be assessed from the outside. Like the disability advocates they refer to studies 
which illustrate that, where the well-being of people who live with a disease 
and disability is concerned, there is a large discrepancy between the first person 
perspective and the estimations of third parties. In order to provide an example, 
Schockenhoff refers to the differences in terms of well-being between physical 
and mental disabilities (cf. Schockenhoff 2000: 102-103 and also Fonk 1999b: 
153). Most people would evaluate life with a physical disability as being less 
burdensome in comparison to a life with a mental disability such as Down’s 
syndrome from the outward perspective. However, Schockenhoff claims that 
from the first person perspective it is exactly the opposite way around: in many 
cases of mental disability, contrary to common expectations, the subjective 
ability to experience well-being is not impaired (cf. ibid.). It is pointed out in 
the literature that there are also large discrepancies between the subjective es-
timation of the well-being of different individuals, who are affected by the 
same disease or disability. In addition, critics point out that experts of various 
disciplines come to a totally different evaluation in terms of the seriousness of 
certain disabilities (cf. Schockenhoff 2000: 98). In only a few cases are the de-
velopment of a disease and the impact of the symptoms predictable. Anticipa-
tions of well-being by third parties, therefore, run the risk of drawing false con-
clusions. This evaluation of the well-being of the future child is said to consti-
tute a paternalistic estimation of the worthwhileness of the life of a human be-
ing (cf. ibid.).  
Thus, in the debate on prenatal testing and selection other critics of the ar-
gument which is based upon the well-being of the future child apart from the 
disability advocates also draw attention to the fact that the objective scaling of 
the suffering and pain to be expected by certain disabilities and diseases is im-
possible. These critics, who often have a theological background, ascribe a full 
moral status to the embryo and the foetus. Like the disability advocates they 
move in a subjectivist direction with regard to the character of well-being with-
in their lines of reasoning. This observation merely strengthens the impression 
expounded above that there is tension between the subjective and objective 
concepts of well-being within the debate on prenatal testing and selection. We 
can conclude by saying that proponents of prenatal testing and selection, such 
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as Brock, Glover and the like-minded, base their lines of reasoning on objective 
concepts of well-being, whereas opponents such as the disability rights advo-
cates or thinkers with a theological background purport subjective conceptions. 
The phenomenon of adaptation 
The examination of the above depicted arguments in favour of and against pre-
natal testing and selection, which consider the well-being of the future child, 
illustrates that the process of adaptation is widely referred to. Generally speak-
ing, approaches to the phenomenon of adaptation deal with the ability of the 
human psyche to adjust to difficult circumstances in life and to withstand se-
vere personal tragedies successfully (cf. Taylor 1983: 1161). The mechanism of 
adaptation suggests that ‘people who lose functioning as a result of disease or 
accident typically report, despite initial disruption and feelings of loss, increas-
ing satisfaction and proficiency with the passage of time’ (Wasserman et al. 
2005: 11). This phenomenon is also known as the ‘disability paradox’. On 
closer scrutiny two ways can be identified in which the process of adaptation is 
applied in the debate on prenatal testing and selective abortion:  
On the one hand, as already suggested in their lines of argumentation por-
trayed above, the critics of procedures such as PGD and PND followed by 
abortion, such as some of the disability rights advocates or Schockenhoff and 
Fonk, place emphasis on this mechanism in order to strengthen their argument 
that disability does not necessarily lead to a diminishment of well-being. By 
referring to the phenomenon of adaptation they maintain that disabled or ill 
people often succeed in coping with their disability or illness after a period of 
time. According to Asch, this means that although affected by disability many 
individuals do not experience a diminishment in their well-being, at least not in 
the long run (cf. Asch 2003: 327). In addition, the disability advocates refer to 
studies which indicate that being able to cope with impairments might even 
strengthen the character of the person affected. They deal with the phenomenon 
of adaptation within their arguments to buttress the subjective stance they take 
with regard to the character of well-being and the impact of disability. 
On the other hand, Glover and Brock and like-minded thinkers who, as il-
lustrated, tie their arguments to the objective concepts of well-being, refer to 
the phenomenon of adaptation as evidence of the fact that the first person per-
spective is not an adequate measure when evaluating the well-being of persons 
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with disability. Brock, for instance, maintains: ‘[n]evertheless, if the disability 
substantially limits a major life activity, then it still limits or closes off an im-
portant area of functioning and the activities that such functioning makes pos-
sible, even if the person may not ‘miss’ them’ (Brock 2005: 75). According to 
Brock, subjective satisfaction constitutes only one aspect of quality of life. 
There are other important components of well-being and if these are missing 
due to disability or illness, we can determine from an external point of view 
that the well-being of the person concerned is diminished. When referring to 
the problem of scaled-down preferences46, which Amartya Sen has dealt with, 
Glover claims that ‘[g]etting what you want is not all there is to a good life. A 
lot depends on whether your preferences and hopes are themselves impover-
ished.’ (Glover 2006: 18) This impoverishment of preferences is viewed as re-
sulting from the mechanism of adaptation. Consequently, due to the possibly 
impoverished desires of persons who lead a life with a disability, their first-
hand experiences and evaluation of their well-being should be treated with cau-
tion. When dealing with this line of reasoning Wasserman summarises it as fol-
lows:  
[t]he lives of people with disabilities are assumed to be of low quali-
ty, whatever environmental factors mediate the impact of impair-
ments, and their own testimony to the contrary is seen as inherently 
unreliable. Their adaptations to their impairments appear not as in-
stances of the universal processes of adjustment to changed circum-
stances, but as disability-specific strategies for recovering the ground 
that has been lost, or for covering up its loss through benign self-
deception. (Wasserman et al. 2005: 11) 
For the time being it can be concluded that proponents of prenatal testing and 
selection consider the phenomenon of adaptation when they argue that we are 
in a position to anticipate the future child’s well-being in order to strengthen 
their objectivist stance with regard to well-being. The two different ways in 
which the critics and proponents of prenatal testing and selection refer to the 
phenomenon of adaptation illustrate precisely the above-mentioned tension 
                                           
46  Scaled-down preferences refer to preferences which are adjusted to the restricted options 
and deprived circumstances in which the individuals concerned find themselves. See Sen 
1993. 
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which appears to exist between subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of well-
being in the debate on prenatal testing and selection. 
Interim results  
The consideration of the well-being of the future child is a much more complex 
as well as controversial matter than one would assume at first glance. Firstly, 
the results of the analysis indicate that it is important to differentiate between 
the Anglo-American and the German debate on prenatal testing and selection: 
Whereas the well-being of the future child is overtly referred to in the Anglo-
American debate, thinkers in the German discussions exercise greater caution 
concerning this matter. In the German discourse the well-being of the prospec-
tive child is mainly considered within arguments which reject the procedures in 
question. It is pointed out that disability does not necessarily diminish well-
being and for this reason, we are not in a position to anticipate the well-being of 
future children on grounds of genetic testing. Schockenhoff and the like-
minded place much emphasis on the fact that one should refrain from passing 
judgement on the worthiness of life. This argument appears to be a line of rea-
soning which enjoys widespread popularity in the German debate on prenatal 
testing and selection. However, the opponents of these procedures, who criti-
cize the reference to the well-being of the future child, appear to attack a stance 
which is hardly ever to be found in the German debate since proponents of pre-
natal testing and selection mainly base their arguments on the procreative au-
tonomy of the parents. Thus, the discussion is at cross purposes. 
A finding of interest with regard to the character of well-being is the fact 
that there are various ways in which the concept is applied in order to argue in 
favour of prenatal testing and selection. On the one hand, PGD and PND fol-
lowed by selective abortion are considered as a means for protecting the well-
being of future children – the zero-line view. Within these arguments the con-
cept of well-being is applied with reference to its protection, namely the pre-
vention of pain and suffering. On the other hand, proponents of procreative per-
fectionism allude to the promotion of the well-being of future children by refer-
ring to our obligation to increase such traits as intelligence, memory and height. 
Consequently, positive dimensions of well-being also come into play, which go 
beyond the reduction of pain and suffering.  
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An additional observation to be made with regard to the character of well-
being is that proponents and critics of prenatal testing and selection appear to 
base their arguments on different concepts – that is to say subjectivist and ob-
jectivist concepts. When proponents of the procedures, such as Brock and 
Glover, argue that prenatal testing and selection provide means for preventing 
suffering and the diminishment of the well-being of a future child, they take it 
for granted that the well-being of a child which has not yet been born can be 
anticipated by third parties. They assume that the mere detection of a disposi-
tion for a severe disability or disease provides us with sufficient information to 
estimate that the future child will lead a life with diminished well-being. 
Savulescu and Harris even go a step further in stating that also non-disabling 
traits such as intelligence and height enable us to judge that the future child can 
be expected to experience a life with maximum well-being. Thus, in following 
the lines of reasoning of Brock, Glover, Savulescu, Harris and like-minded col-
leagues, well-being can be estimated by third parties on the grounds of objec-
tive criteria. The quotations of Brock and Glover provided in the above, how-
ever, illustrate that both maintain that there is a necessity to take the subjective 
as well as objective components of well-being into account.  
Nevertheless, the concept of well-being applied appears to be for the most 
part objective. According to the stance of the above thinkers, in the case of se-
vere disability or disease, the first person perspective is not an adequate meas-
ure for well-being. This is rendered particularly clearly by their remarks con-
cerning the phenomenon of adaptation. The character of the concept of well-
being on which proponents of prenatal testing and selection base their argument 
can therefore be considered as, for the most part, objective. As illustrated, there 
are some hints to suggest that the stance they take can be classified as an objec-
tive list account of well-being. However, there is a lack of further evidence to 
enable us to make a more valid classification. Furthermore, analysis indicates 
that when the well-being of the future child is considered by proponents of pre-
natal testing and selection the term quality of life is applied with a great fre-
quency. One attempt at an explanation might be that especially the term quality 
of life creates the impression that the notion of well-being can be applied as an 
objective operational measure in order to decide in which cases prenatal selec-
tion should be considered. This would contradict the thesis mentioned in the 
introduction that the terms well-being and quality of life are used interchangea-
bly. 
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Critics of the consideration of the well-being of the future child as an ar-
gument in favour of prenatal testing and selection, in contrast, maintain that the 
estimation of the harm and suffering (and therefore the diminishment of well-
being) caused by disability and disease is an exclusively subjective procedure 
which cannot, and therefore, should not be undertaken by third parties. Accord-
ingly, judgements concerning well-being can only be made from a first person 
perspective and not through anticipation by third parties. As illustrated, the dis-
ability advocates draw attention to the phenomenon of adaptation to illustrate 
that people who argue that disability and disease necessarily lead to a dimin-
ishment in well-being are wrong. Nonetheless, it is difficult to provide a clear 
testimony for the theory of well-being to which they tie their argument against 
the background of the three alternative theories since the critics’ arguments do 
not contain enough information concerning this matter. There are a few passag-
es to be found which hint that the critics might base their arguments on desire-
fulfilment theories, but that is the sum total of what they permit to be said about 
their stance.  
In summary, we can observe that there are tensions between objective and 
subjective concepts with regard to the character of well-being. Proponents of 
prenatal testing and selection often tie their argument to objective concepts 
whereas opponents presuppose subjective theories. The impression arises that 
the relationship of tension between proponents of prenatal testing and selection 
and opponents of these procedures appears to rest upon the rival concepts of 
well-being which underlie their arguments. This impression will be placed un-
der scrutiny in the following section. 
In addition, the results of the examination indicate that it is impossible to 
categorize all of the arguments illustrated above against the background of the 
three alternative theories (hedonisms, desire-fulfilment and objectivist list theo-
ries). This confirms the suspicion that the framework for the analysis provided 
in chapter 2 is not sufficient for the examination of the role of well-being in bi-
omedical ethics. There is a need for a more suitable and more differentiated 
framework for analysis.  
There remains one final observation which should receive attention: obvi-
ously the question as to whether or not the embryo and foetus have a full moral 
status is of major importance in the debate on prenatal testing and selection. 
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The results of the examination indicate that the notion of prenatal moral status47 
also plays a central role where the well-being of the future child is concerned. 
Objective accounts of well-being tend to be tied to the assumption that embryos 
or foetuses do not have a full moral status, whereas subjective concepts of well-
being, at least at a first glance, appear to be tied to no specific conception of 
moral status. Subjective approaches are referred to within arguments which are 
based on both kinds of assumption: either that the embryo and foetus have full 
moral status or that they do not. In order to attain a clearer picture of the role 
which well-being plays in discussions of prenatal testing and selection it seems 
to be fruitful to place the relationship of the notion of moral status and the con-
cept of well-being under scrutiny. This is done in the following section.  
3.3. Results arising from the analysis and the issues it 
raises 
The exploration of the role of well-being in discussions dealing with prenatal 
testing and selection suggests that the concept of well-being interacts with other 
predominant principles and notions, namely the principle of reproductive au-
tonomy where the well-being of the prospective parents is concerned and the 
notion of moral status where the well-being of the future child is considered. 
This indicates that it is important to examine more closely the presence which 
well-being has in the face of the principle of autonomy and the notion of prena-
tal moral status, respectively, in the debate. To begin with, the following sec-
tion provides a closer examination of the presence of well-being in the face of 
the notion of prenatal moral status within the discussions. Due to the fact that 
the principle of respecting autonomy also is predominant and influential in oth-
er debates such as the discourse on euthanasia, which we will examine with a 
little later, we return to the relationship of autonomy and well-being at a more 
suitable point.  
Another striking finding of the analysis with regard to the character of 
well-being is the existing tension between subjectivist and objectivist concepts 
in the debate. The idea has evolved in the above that we need a more suitable 
and differentiated framework for the analysis of the character of well-being in 
                                           
47  The expression ‘prenatal moral status’ is borrowed from DeGrazia 2012. In the following 
it is used to refer to the moral status of the embryo and foetus. 
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biomedical ethics since the framework provided in chapter 2 is not sufficient. 
Section 3.3.2. provides a finely differentiated framework based on the subjec-
tive/objective differentiation which complements the former scheme of exami-
nation during the analysis in the chapters to come.  
3.3.1. The presence of well-being in the face of the notion of 
moral status  
Generally speaking, if the concept of moral status is concerned in discussions 
on prenatal testing and selection, it refers to the question as to what kind of 
moral obligations we have with regard to the embryo or foetus for its own sake 
(cf. Ach, Schöne-Seifert and Siep 2006: 267; Schöne-Seifert 2007: 155). To put 
this more explicitly existing or non-existent protection claims which we con-
cede to the embryo or foetus are dealt with (cf. Ach, Schöne-Seifert and Siep 
2006: 267). With regard to the question of prenatal moral status various stances 
can be taken: it can, for instance, be argued that embryos and foetuses have a 
full moral status, a partial moral status or no moral status at all. Nevertheless, 
the embryo and foetus do not necessarily have the same moral status since both 
are at different developmental stages. In order to examine the presence of well-
being in the face of prenatal moral status in the above depicted arguments, it is 
worthwhile taking a closer look at existing alternative concepts of moral status; 
this then provides a foundation for classifying the specific stance in the previ-
ous well-being based arguments. In addition, it is illustrated how the alternative 
notions of moral status relate to the concept of well-being within the discus-
sions dealt with in this chapter. 
Three alternative stances with regard to prenatal moral status 
When dealing with the subject of abortion and moral status, Bonnie Steinbock 
(2008) distinguishes between three camps, namely the conservatives, the liber-
als, and the moderates (or gradualists).48 
The conservative stance: according to the conservative perspective, the 
embryo and foetus have a full moral status which means that, like human be-
                                           
48  In the following I apply her tripartite scheme to discussions dealing with the moral status 
of the embryos and the foetus and supplement some important points and advocates of 
the particular stances. 
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ings who have already been born, they have a right to life. Hence, the embryo 
and the foetus are on an equal footing with them regarding their dignity and 
claims of protection (cf. Schöne-Seifert 2007:157). Consequently it is morally 
impermissible to discard embryos and foetuses by means of PGD or abortion. 
The process of implantation in the uterus is viewed as the decisive stage for a 
full moral status. However, as Steinbock states, the Catholic Church considers 
an earlier phase of development important. ‘Conception is regarded as the sig-
nificant point because that is when the embryo develops its own unique genetic 
code, distinct from that of its mother or father, and thus from the egg or sperm.’ 
(Steinbock 2008: 1) Generally speaking, four different arguments are brought 
forward to justify that embryos and foetuses have a full (or at least a partial 
moral status), namely the arguments of species, of continuity, of identity and of 
potentiality (cf. Damschen and Schönecker 2003; Schöne-Seifert 2007: 157).49 
According to the conservative stance, prenatal entities such as the embryo and 
foetus have a full moral status and therefore are not permitted to be discarded. 
As a consequence of this, procedures which imply the discarding of these enti-
ties such as PGD and selective abortion are morally impermissible. For this 
reason the question as to whether or not well-being can be promoted or protect-
ed by these interventions does not, in fact, arise. The same holds true for the 
questions as to whether or not the well-being of the future child can be antici-
pated or whether the essence of well-being is objective or subjective. Hence, 
advocates of the conservative stance, who object to procedures of prenatal test-
ing and selection do not necessarily need to consider the notion of well-being 
and do not need to take a position with regard to alternative concepts. 
The liberal stance: the liberal approach does not view unborn life as hav-
ing a full moral status from the outset. Instead full moral status is attained at a 
specific point later during development. Hence, the embryo and, according to 
some approaches, also the foetus are not worthy of protection and do not have a 
right to life. As a consequence, a comparatively liberal attitude is taken towards 
procedures such as PGD and abortion (cf. DeGrazia 2012: 17). The specific 
stage of development at which entities are ascribed full moral status is depend-
ent upon the properties considered as the deciding factor. Various properties 
such as ‘sentience, rationality, or moral agency’ (Beauchamp and Childress 
                                           
49  Due to the limited scope of the book I cannot provide a more detailed presentation of the 
four alternative arguments. For a thorough discussion and criticism see Damschen and 
Schönecker 2003; Schöne-Seifert 2007: 157. 
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2013: 65) have been brought forward to confer moral status. There are advo-
cates of a liberal stance, such as Peter Singer (1979), who consider the posses-
sion of subjective interests as decisive, which in turn requires sentience. Due to 
the fact that embryos and foetuses do not have an interest in their future, ac-
cording to Singer’s stance, procedures such as abortion and PGD cannot be 
considered morally impermissible (cf. Singer 1979). In common with a few 
other thinkers, Singer links the attribution of a full moral status to the notion of 
personhood, which in turn is based on the requirement of certain properties. 
What are the implications of the liberal stance for the presence of well-
being? First of all, it should be noted that the answer to this question depends 
on when prenatal entities are said to have full moral status. If this point in de-
velopment is deemed to be in the foetal phase, this has different implications 
for the permissibility of PGD in contrast to PND followed by selective abor-
tion. Whereas the former is considered permissible the latter is classified as im-
permissible. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a full moral status is 
only attained at birth and that, as a consequence, procedures of PGD and abor-
tion are permissible since the discarding of the embryo and foetus is allowed. In 
this case the consideration of the well-being of future children is likely to play 
an important role since it could be argued that the procedures in question are in 
a position to protect or promote their well-being. If this is so, then the questions 
as to whether or not the well-being of future children can be anticipated or 
whether the essence of well-being is objective or subjective gain a great signifi-
cance. All things considered, it is possible to observe that the notion of well-
being becomes relevant in the context of prenatal testing and selective abortion 
since prenatal entities are not ascribed full moral status. 
The gradualist stance: in following the gradualist approach,50 the moral 
status of prenatal entities steadily increases during their development and there 
is no such thing as a specific point at which the embryo or foetus, respectively, 
is suddenly ascribed full moral status. The more advanced the developmental 
stage, the higher is its moral status and thus the claim of protection. As Stein-
bock points out, ‘the moderate, or gradualist, agrees with the liberal that a one-
celled zygote is not a human person, but agrees with the conservative that the 
late-gestation fetus is virtually identical to a born infant’ (Steinbock 2008: 3). 
Thus, according the gradualist view, PGD is better in moral terms than early 
                                           
50  See for instance Siep 2004. 
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abortion which in turn is better than an abortion at a later stage (cf. ibid.). The 
question as to whether PGD and PND followed by selective abortion can be 
considered morally permissible procedures on grounds of a gradualist perspec-
tive is difficult to answer since it depends on the degree of moral status as-
cribed to the various developmental phases and the stage at which the prenatal 
entity is ascribed a right to life. These matters, in turn, influence the answer to 
the question under consideration in this section: the presence of well-being in 
the face of the notion of moral status. If the right to life can be claimed at a 
comparatively early stage (similar to the conservative view), then well-being 
plays no role due to the prohibition of prenatal selection and discarding. Alter-
natively, if the right to life is not ascribed until a later stage of foetal develop-
ment, the concept of well-being becomes as significant as in the case of the lib-
eral stance. 
From these reflections it becomes evident that the question of moral status 
has priority over the consideration of the well-being of future children in the 
debate on prenatal testing and selection. 
If prenatal entities are ascribed a full moral status, then procedures such as 
PGD and abortion, which imply their discarding, are inadmissible and the con-
sideration of the well-being of future children is not of primary importance 
within the argumentation. In contrast, well-being is likely to constitute an im-
portant concern if prenatal entities are not attributed full moral status and there 
is no general prohibition on discarding the embryo or the foetus. We can ob-
serve that before participants in the debate address the topic of the well-being 
of future children, it is important that they explain the stance which they take in 
terms of moral status, so that one is in a position to grasp the implications of 
their well-being based arguments. Hence, the concept of well-being has a sub-
ordinate presence in the face of the notion of prenatal moral status. At this 
point the following now turns to the alternative considerations of the well-being 
of the future child in the above section and explores the stance regarding moral 
status which are contained therein. 
Classifying the well-being-based lines of reasoning 
Concerning the proponents of the zero-line stance and procreative perfection-
ism, lines of reasoning have been discovered which indicate that Brock, Glover, 
Savulescu, Harris and other like-minded thinkers do not ascribe a full moral 
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status to the embryo or foetus. References can frequently be found to the con-
cept of personhood and the statement that embryos and foetuses do not have the 
status of a person. Consequently, they consider interventions which entail the 
discarding of embryos and foetuses as morally permissible. We can, therefore, 
maintain that advocates of the zero-line stance and procreative perfectionism 
can be classified as liberals with regard to prenatal moral status. This opens the 
door for the question as to whether it is morally acceptable to administer PGD 
or PND followed by abortion with the aim of selecting against disease and dis-
ability and hence the deliberation about the well-being of the future child with 
or without disability. As illustrated, these liberal thinkers view procedures of 
prenatal testing and selective abortion as protecting and promoting well-being 
respectively. Their well-being based lines of reasoning are the decisive points 
within their argumentation in favour of prenatal testing and selection. 
We now come to those critics who have a theological background such as 
Schockenhoff and Fonk, who argue that we cannot anticipate the well-being of 
the future child. As already suggested in the above, they ascribe a full moral 
status to prenatal entities. This full moral status is conferred from conception 
onwards and rooted in the biblical belief that human beings are created in the 
image of God and as a result of the Divine will (cf. Siep 2003: 13). This renders 
the discarding of the embryo and foetus as impermissible and thus makes the 
question of the moral acceptability of prenatal testing and selection redundant. 
It goes without saying that this can be classified as a conservative stance and 
hence the consideration of the well-being of the future child is superfluous. 
Nonetheless, as indicated in the above, the conservative thinkers do address the 
question as to whether well-being can be anticipated, which they then negate. 
In the case of the well-being based arguments of the disability rights ad-
vocates, the classification proves to be more difficult. Asch and the like-minded 
state explicitly that they do not object in general to procedures which lead to 
the destruction of unborn life such as abortion. They therefore give the indica-
tion that they take a liberal stance but are opposed to prenatal testing and selec-
tion on other grounds. One of these reasons is their criticism of the view that 
well-being is necessarily diminished by the presence of disability. The follow-
ing section, however, questions whether or not their position in terms of prena-
tal moral status is really a liberal one. 
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3.3.2. Tension between objectivist and subjectivist concepts of 
well-being 
Results indicate that there is a need for a more suitable and more differentiated 
framework for the analysis of the role of well-being in biomedical ethics or, to 
be more precise, the character of well-being. In biomedical ethics (as in the tra-
ditional philosophical debate) the following questions with regard to the notion 
well-being are of central importance: What is the very essence of well-being? 
According to which criteria should it be evaluated? And who should have the 
ultimate authority to determine it? These issues have received various answers 
and competing concepts exist.  
As illustrated in chapter 2, a great deal of the tension rests upon the ques-
tion as to whether the notion of well-being is correctly captured by subjectivist 
or objectivist approaches. It has been extrapolated that the opposition of these 
two different approaches to the notion of well-being is central to the debate on 
prenatal testing and selection. This might well be the case in bioethical debates. 
Consequently, it appears to be fruitful to supplement the subjective/objective 
differentiation in our framework for analysis (provided in chapter 2) which is 
applied in order to attain our central aim. However, as mentioned in the above, 
the terms subjective and objective have various meanings and are apt to be 
vague. Chapter 2 has merely provided a preliminary approximation to the ob-
jective/subjective distinction. If it is to function as a yardstick for the analyses 
of the character of well-being provided in the subsequent chapters, both terms 
require a more precise definition and clarification of their different meanings. 
Various plausible attempts to systematize the different ways of understanding 
the subjective/objective distinction have been made.51 The subsequent section 
focuses on a scheme of classification as provided by Thomas Schramme (2008: 
1501). In following his endeavour there are three different levels to the objec-
tive/subjective differentiation. 1. the ontological, 2. the evaluative and 3. the 
epistemic level.  
1. On the ontological level the central question is: What is the essence of 
well-being? One might ask whether well-being is a specific mental state 
or rather some other condition such as being equipped with certain mate-
                                           
51  See for instance Sumner 1996; Kühler 2006; Birnbacher 2007; Schramme 2008 and 
Bayertz 2010. 
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rial goods. The ontological level refers to the source of value. It queries 
where the value comes from. Is the value intrinsic to what is being prized 
or does it depend on the person who values it (cf. Birnbacher 2007: 251)?  
2. What are appropriate criteria for estimating well-being? This is the ques-
tion with which the evaluative level is concerned. Should subjective es-
timations, intersubjective or objective determinants be decisive?  
3. The epistemic level deals with the question as to who has the best access 
to individual well-being – the individual him/herself or his/her social en-
vironment from an external point of view? Who can be considered the 
expert? Is it possible to have a false impression of one’s well-being? 
Whereas subjectivist conceptions represent the view that only the person 
him-/herself has access to his/her well-being, objectivist approaches are 
linked to the notion that it is possible to determine the well-being of a 
person from an external point of view and that the person concerned can 
indeed have a false impression of his/her well-being. 
However, all of these levels are interconnected and overlap to some degree: if 
one, for instance, presupposes a subjective concept of well-being with regard to 
the ontological level, this has implications on the evaluative and epistemic level 
and allows for subjective dimensions on these levels.  
As already mentioned, the scheme provided, based on the subjec-
tive/objective distinction with regard to well-being, appears for various reasons 
to be more appropriate and suitable for our aim in comparison to the framework 
furnished in chapter 2: Firstly, it is broader than the three-tiered framework and 
because of its alternative levels allows for a more precise classification of the 
well-being-based lines of reasoning. It permits us to ascertain directly which of 
the alternative levels is present when subjective or objective dimensions of 
well-being come into play. The three alternative theories, in contrast, do not 
amplify the alternative levels and provide a comparatively undifferentiated pic-
ture. In addition, it has been illustrated that they are rarely referred to within the 
arguments. The reference to objective as well as subjective dimensions of well-
being can easily be recognized within the arguments brought forward. Never-
theless, the three-tiered system will not completely lose its significance in the 
following chapters, but will be supplemented by the subjective/objective 
scheme provided.  
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Applying the scheme to the arguments which refer to the well-
being of the future child 
If one examines the various arguments which refer to the well-being of the fu-
ture child by means of the new framework, a number of further details with re-
gard to the character of well-being are provided: The opposition between objec-
tive and subjective concepts of well-being is mainly expressed by differing an-
swers to the question as to whether we can anticipate the well-being of the fu-
ture child, especially in the case of children with a disabling condition. This 
question can be categorized as operating on the epistemic level as it mainly 
deals with the query as to whether the well-being of disabled and ill individuals 
can be determined by outsiders who have no experience of life under such con-
ditions. This comes down to the question who has the best access to individual 
well-being. By taking an objective stance, proponents of prenatal testing and 
selection argue that a third party is able to determine the well-being of a (poten-
tial) individual. The above mentioned opponents of the procedures concerned, 
such as the disability rights advocates or Schockenhoff and the like-minded, 
move in a more subjective direction arguing that third parties are not able to 
anticipate or determine well-being. They appear to take the view that only the 
person him- or herself is able to express his/her level of well-being. Although 
the discussion principally takes place at the epistemic level the opposing views 
are also evident at the other two levels.  
At the ontological level, the advocates of the zero-line stance and procrea-
tive perfectionism tie their arguments to a concept of well-being which appears 
to be to a great extent objective as specific universal goods of well-being are 
listed. Nevertheless, their lines of reasoning are also linked to the notion that 
pleasurable experiences are one component on the list. The disability rights ad-
vocates and other critics such as Schockenhoff clearly take a more subjectivist 
stance with regard to the ontological level, placing emphasis on the various 
ways in which disability might influence well-being and the subjectivity of 
well-being.  
When the evaluative level is concerned, Brock, Glover, Savulescu, Harris 
and the like-minded can also be considered to move in an objectivist direction. 
This, above all, becomes clear by their elaborations concerning the phenome-
non of adaptation. The criterion which they implicitly apply when determining 
the impact of disability and illness on individual well-being focuses on objec-
tive determinants such as the provision of certain goods. The other camps, who 
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object to prenatal testing and selection, evaluate well-being by focusing on the 
first person perspective. Their stance in terms of the evaluative level also be-
comes obvious through the way they deal with the phenomenon of adaptation. 
Hence, the relationship of tension between subjectivist and objectivist concepts 
of well-being is, above all, present at the epistemic level. The impression is re-
inforced that the tense relationship between proponents of prenatal testing and 
selection and opponents of these procedures seems to rest upon the rival con-
cepts of well-being which underlie their arguments. But does this hypothesis 
indeed hold water? 
Putting the hypothesis to the test 
If one studies the results gained up to now concerning the opposition of subjec-
tivist and objectivist concepts of well-being and the presence of the concept of 
well-being in the face of the notion of moral status, certain inconsistencies and 
conspicuous findings become apparent. These could call into question the hy-
pothesis we have so far developed, namely that the tense relationship between 
proponents of prenatal testing and selection and opponents of these procedures 
appears to rest upon the rival concepts of well-being to which they tie their ar-
guments. The inconsistencies and conspicuous findings are chiefly to be found 
within the well-being based lines of reasoning which reject prenatal testing and 
selective abortion, that is to say the arguments put forward by the disability 
rights advocates as well as the critics with a theological background. 
First of all, the findings concerning the arguments given by Adrienne 
Asch as an eminent representative of the disability rights advocates are ana-
lysed in detail. In the above it has been illustrated that she claims to take a lib-
eral stance with regard to prenatal moral status since she maintains that she 
does not reject procedures such as abortion in general. Nonetheless, she consid-
ers techniques of prenatal testing and selection as impermissible on other 
grounds dealing with the selection against disability. As illustrated, one im-
portant reason which she provides is the fact that disability does not necessarily 
diminish individual well-being. It has been extrapolated that Asch can, thereby, 
be considered as moving in a subjectivist direction especially at the epistemic 
level in terms of well-being. As already mentioned in the above, however, she 
does not take an utterly subjectivist stance since she does indeed affirm that 
there are some specific disabling conditions which might be classified as fre-
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quently having a negative impact on well-being. This is precisely the point at 
which an inconsistency occurs: if Asch admits that there are disabling condi-
tions which often (although not always) diminish well-being, while at the same 
time taking a liberal stance with regard to prenatal moral status, one would ex-
pect her to argue that by means of prenatal testing and selection to prevent dis-
ability, the chances of a good life for the future child are definitely increased 
(but obviously not guaranteed). For this reason she ought to consider the proce-
dures in question permissible. However, as we have already seen this is not the 
case. Thus, the impression could arise that Asch does indeed acknowledge pre-
natal entities as having a right to life and thereby a higher moral status than she 
claims, otherwise this would render her argumentation against prenatal testing 
and selection against disability inconsistent.  
There is, however, still ‘one route of escape’ which Asch could take: she 
could maintain that this argument ‘from misinformation about disability’ (Asch 
2003: 316) is not her chief argument but that the so-called expressivist critique 
is her main concern with regard to prenatal testing and selection and that both 
arguments function in tandem when arguing for a prohibition of the procedures 
in question. As already mentioned, the expressivist critique considers prenatal 
testing and selection against disability as transmitting the message to individu-
als who live with the disability in question that they would have been better off 
if they had not been born. However, when dealing with this line of reasoning 
Bonnie Steinbock (2000) claims that prenatal testing and selection constitute 
simply one form of prevention of illness and disability. In this respect the pro-
cedures in question can be equated with taking folic acid and abstinence from 
smoking and alcohol during pregnancy to prevent disorders of the future child. 
Steinbock points out that these preventive actions are generally accepted and 
not criticized for their discriminatory impact on, or message to the disabled 
(ibid.: 117). In a next step she provides the following elaborations: 
[a]dmittedly, abortion prevents this outcome by terminating a preg-
nancy, by killing a fetus. In this respect, it differs from giving the 
pregnant women folic acid, which does not kill but rather promotes 
healthy development in, the fetus. Obviously, if the fetuses have the 
same moral status as born children, then this difference is crucial. It 
is permissible to reduce the incidence of disability by keeping people 
healthy; it is not permissible to reduce the incidence of disability by 
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killing people with disabilities. But if the embryos and foetuses are 
not people (something a pro-choicer like Asch concedes), then the 
impermissibilty of killing people to prevent or reduce the incidence 
of disability is irrelevant to the permissibility of abortion or embryo 
selection. (Steinbock 2000: 118) 
Hence, on the grounds of Steinbock’s argument it can be claimed that also the 
expressivist critique comes under suspicion of ultimately resting upon the as-
sumption that the embryo and foetus have a right to life and a moral status 
which is comparable to that of already born persons. If Asch claims to take a 
liberal stance with regard to prenatal moral status, her argument against the 
permissibility of prenatal testing and selection can be proven to be inconsistent. 
The impression that she does indeed presuppose a full (or at any rate a higher) 
moral status of the embryo or foetus is supported by other remarks of hers such 
as the following: ‘[p]renatal testing is a clear case of first impression [with re-
gard to disability], and as with any such impression, it is an incomplete impres-
sion; when followed by selective abortion or by discarding an otherwise im-
plantable embryo, that first impression includes a decision never to learn about 
the rest of who that embryo or fetus could become after its birth.’ (Asch 2000: 
235) Within these lines of reasoning Asch refers to the potential of the embryo 
and foetus to develop into an individual with a full range of character traits. It 
has already received a short mention in the above that arguments of potentiality 
are generally applied when taking a liberal or gradualist stance with regard to 
moral status. If Asch’s arguments do indeed implicitly rest upon the assump-
tion that the embryo and foetus have a full moral status, which appears to be the 
case, then her elaborations as to whether or not the well-being of future chil-
dren who have a disability can be anticipated, become redundant since foetuses 
and embryos are not permitted to be discarded. All in all, it can be concluded 
that there are several indications that Asch’s argumentation is more about a full 
prenatal moral status than about the well-being of future children. 
Now it is time to concentrate on the well-being-based lines of reasoning 
purported by the critics of prenatal testing and selection who have a theological 
background such as Schockenhoff and Fonk. They can be classified as taking a 
conservative stance with regard to prenatal moral status. This implies that any 
procedure which involves the discarding of the embryo or foetus is impermissi-
ble. It has already been illustrated that this directly provides a negative answer 
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to the question of the moral acceptability of prenatal testing and selection. 
Hence, the consideration of the well-being of the future child in this context is 
rendered obsolete. Nevertheless, Schockenhoff and the like-minded are at great 
pains to argue that we cannot anticipate the well-being of future children with a 
disability and tie their arguments to a subjective concept of well-being, as illus-
trated. Their well-being based lines of reasoning can, however, be considered 
superfluous in the light of the deliberations provided in the above. Thus, the 
suspicion arises that the well-being-based lines of reasoning are only an alleged 
argument contra prenatal testing and selection since the deciding factor within 
the argumentation is the full moral status ascribed to prenatal entities. As a con-
sequence, the depicted lines of reasoning which are based on a subjective no-
tion of well-being are of no significance within the theological arguments 
against prenatal testing and selection. One reason why Schockenhoff and Fonk 
still refer to the future child’s well-being might be that they want to create the 
impression that they can offer a variety of different arguments against the moral 
permissibility of prenatal testing and selection other than the conservative ar-
gument of prenatal moral status. By moving in a subjectivist direction in terms 
of well-being and opposing the objectivist stance taken by proponents, they 
provoke one to think that the fact that we are said not to be able to anticipate 
the well-being of future children with a disability constitutes a major reason as 
to why they reject the procedures in question. 
All in all, it has been shown that the well-being-based lines of reasoning 
brought forward by the disability advocates and critics with a theological back-
ground are based on the argument of prenatal moral status and, contrary to ex-
pectations, not on a subjective conception of well-being at the epistemic level. 
The critical arguments which refer to subjective dimensions of well-being have 
been proven to be specious. This has been indicated by the inconsistencies and 
conspicuous findings we have encountered after having carried out a more de-
tailed investigation of the well-being based lines of reasoning and their depend-
ence on alternative concepts of prenatal moral status.  
This finding refutes the initial hypothesis that the tense relationship be-
tween proponents of prenatal testing and selection and opponents of these pro-
cedures appears to rest upon the rival concepts of well-being to which they tie 
their arguments. With regard to the opponents of prenatal testing and selection 
such as Asch and Schockenhoff, the discussions implicitly restrict themselves 
to the matter of moral status. It can nonetheless be maintained that the well-
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being of future children plays a major role within the arguments brought for-
ward by the proponents of prenatal testing and selection such as Brock, Glover, 
Harris and Savulescu. Since they take a liberal stance with regard to prenatal 
moral status (and, therefore, generally allow the discarding of the embryo and 
foetus), their deliberations concerning the well-being of future children can be 
considered as having substance and great significance within their argumenta-
tions.  
The fact that the question of moral permissibility with regard to prenatal 
testing and selection is entwined with the moot point of the moral acceptability 
of discarding the embryo and the foetus is clearly reflected by our findings. 
Laura M. Purdy states that there is a risk present of falling ‘into the trap of let-
ting the abortion question swallow up all others’ (Purdy 1996: 40). On the basis 
of our results it can be claimed that opponents of prenatal testing such as the 
disability rights advocates and theological thinkers are caught in this trap. 
Nonetheless, they seek to conceal this by making constant reference to the fu-
ture child’s well-being and by emphasizing the subjective nature of this. Hence, 
subjective concepts of well-being appear to be instrumentalised within the ar-
gumentation of critics for the sake of the argument of moral status. In returning 
to our central question dealing with the role of well-being in biomedical ethics 
we can maintain that the notion of moral status has a strong impact on the pres-
ence of well-being as well as on its character within the debates on prenatal 
testing and selection. 
3.4. Findings: well-being in the debates concerning the 
beginning of life 
Generally speaking, the results of the examination provided in this chapter 
show that well-being plays a prominent role in the debate on prenatal testing 
and selection. There are many thinkers to be found (such as, for example, the 
members of the ESHRE, Glover and Savulescu), who view the future child’s 
well-being as belonging to the prevalent arguments in the debate alongside the 
reproductive autonomy of the prospective parents. Nonetheless, it is notewor-
thy that precisely the future child’s well-being tends to be circumnavigated 
within arguments in favour of prenatal testing and selection in the German dis-
cussions. One major underlying reason for this appears to be the fact that esti-
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mations of well-being by third parties in the case of illness and disability pro-
voke recollections of the classification of ‘worthless lives’ as against ‘worth-
while lives’ during the Nazi era. The differences between the German and An-
glo-American debate in terms of the application of concepts of well-being, mir-
ror the societal deviations in dealing with topics such as prenatal testing and 
selection. Whereas the Anglo-American debate takes, for the most part, a more 
liberal stance, the discussions in Germany are held in a comparatively cautious 
manner always drawing attention to human dignity and the danger of a slippery 
slope leading to eugenics. This is due to the circumstances during the Nazi era 
and the policy which selected against minority groups such as people with men-
tal or physical disabilities among others. 
The examination has furthermore illustrated that well-being also frequent-
ly comes into play where the prospective parents are concerned, notwithstand-
ing its, at times, subliminal presence. In this case it almost always occurs to-
gether with the argument of reproductive autonomy. This appears to be of such 
significance that it ‘obscures’ the reference to parental well-being. Whereas the 
notion of autonomy strongly influences the presence of well-being where the 
prospective parents are concerned, the concept of prenatal moral status has a 
strong impact on the presence of well-being where the future child is con-
cerned. It has been shown that before participants in the debate address the top-
ic of the well-being of future children, it is important that they expound the 
stance they take in terms of moral status. This is owing to the fact that the ques-
tion of prenatal moral status is of greater importance than the consideration of 
well-being and the specific stance adopted determines the implications of the 
well-being based arguments brought forward. It has, therefore, been concluded 
that the concept of well-being has a subordinate presence in the face of the no-
tion of moral status. Nonetheless, above all opponents of the procedures in 
question appear to ignore the subordinate presence of well-being based lines of 
reasoning and place them in the foreground in order to conceal the fact that at 
the heart of their arguments is the full moral status which they ascribe to prena-
tal entities. 
The analysis has also revealed another important aspect with regard to the 
character of well-being, namely that there is an opposition between subjective 
and objective approaches particularly where the future child’s well-being is 
concerned. We have ascertained that the three-tiered framework for analysis 
provided in chapter 2 rapidly reaches its limits. For this reason it has been sup-
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plemented by the subjective/objective scheme of alternative levels. Both 
schemes will be put to good use in the investigations of the character of well-
being in the following chapters. When applying the subjective/objective 
scheme to the lines of reasoning referring to the future child’s well-being, it be-
comes obvious that the identified antagonism of subjective and objective con-
cepts of well-being operates, for the most part, at the epistemic level. It has, 
however, been shown that appearances are deceptive especially where the op-
ponents of prenatal testing and selection are concerned since, at bottom, the ar-
gument is not about well-being but rather about prenatal moral status. Their 
lines of reasoning, which refer to subjective concepts of well-being, have been 
identified as alleged arguments which are directed against the objectivist stance 
of proponents of prenatal testing and selection. It has been shown that subjec-
tive concepts of well-being are instrumentalised in order to conceal lines of 
reasoning which are tied to the notion of a full prenatal moral status. All things 
considered, the findings illustrate that the notion of prenatal moral status has a 
major impact on the presence and character of well-being within the debate on 
prenatal testing and selection.  
A further important finding should receive a mention here: the term quali-
ty of life appears to take preference over the expression well-being when objec-
tive concepts of well-being are referred to. In the following chapters it will be 
investigated whether this is a mere coincidence or whether this is also a finding 
in the other debates and if so, whether there is a purpose behind it. 
The results of the analysis show that discussions on prenatal testing and 
selection are first and foremost concerned with the protection of well-being and 
the prevention of suffering. Nonetheless, the depicted arguments by the procre-
ative perfectionists such as Savulescu and Harris reveal that the consideration 
of well-being is not restricted to the realm of health and the prevention of suf-
fering. These dimensions of well-being will be thoroughly examined in the 
subsequent chapter dealing with the role of well-being in the debate on en-
hancement. 
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4. The role of well-being in the discussion 
on enhancement: the case of non 
therapeutic mood-improvement  
The previous chapter dealing with the role of well-being at the beginning of life 
has already hinted at the fact that discussions in the realm of biomedical ethics 
are not exclusively concerned with the restoration and protection of health. The 
targets sometimes extend beyond this scope especially (but obviously not sole-
ly) where the middle phase of life is concerned. This chapter sets out to analyse 
the role of well-being in the debate on so-called ‘enhancement’.  
During the last few decades man’s potential for the enhancement of hu-
man capacities and traits such as physical ability and appearance, cognitive ca-
pacity or mood has increased tremendously. Thus, more and more human de-
sires for improvement beyond ‘natural limits’ can be fulfilled with the help of 
advances in biotechnology: the desire for ‘ageless bodies’, ‘superior perfor-
mance’ and ‘happy souls’ are just some examples mentioned in the words of 
PCB (2003). The different procedures resulting from these developments, as for 
instance memory blunting through drugs or increasing height by growth hor-
mones, raise ethical and social questions which are discussed principally under 
the term ‘enhancement’. Recently the topic of enhancement has received a lot 
of attention and is in the focus of many works in the field of biomedical eth-
ics.52 As the concept of enhancement is very broad, there is much confusion in 
the literature with regard to a uniform definition of enhancement and the term 
is indeed applied in many different ways (cf. Parens 1998). However, in its 
broadest sense, enhancement means ‘increase’ or ‘improvement’ (cf. Savules-
cu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011: 6).  
It is visible at first glance, that the concept of well-being plays a major 
role where enhancement is concerned. The different human capacities and traits 
such as outward appearance, concentration, mood or physical ability, which are 
enhanced with the help of biotechnological procedures, are considered to con-
                                           
52  See for example Parens 1998; The President’s Council on Bioethics 2003; Schöne-Seifert 
and Talbot 2009; Nagel 2010; Suvulescu, ter Meulen and Kahane 2011; Buchanan 2011. 
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stitute important parameters for individual well-being. Proponents as well as 
opponents of enhancement refer to well-being in order to argue that the differ-
ent procedures in question are morally acceptable or unacceptable as the case 
may be. Broadly speaking, proponents argue that enhancement will promote 
individual well-being, whereas critics do not abide by the notion that the en-
hancement of the human body and mind will actually increase well-being. The 
PCB, whose attitude towards enhancement is critical, maintains that ‘in the end, 
it is happiness understood as complete and comprehensive well-being […] that 
we seek’ (PCB 2003: 270) when enhancing the human body. Thus, implicitly 
or explicitly it is frequently argued that traits such as beauty, high cognitive or 
physical abilities contribute to the overall goal, the promotion of well-being. 
Accordingly, the enhancement of outward appearance, physical or cognitive 
ability indirectly propagates the well-being of the individual concerned. The 
term ‘indirectly’ refers to the way in which the intervention affects well-being. 
In the case of enhancement through plastic surgery, for instance, interventions 
are viewed as enhancing outward appearance which in turn contributes to indi-
vidual well-being. Therefore, a connection between the improvement of beauty 
and an increase in well-being is assumed. Mood enhancement establishes a 
special case: apart from contributing indirectly to the pursuit of well-being, var-
ious mood-brightening technologies are frequently viewed as having a direct 
influence on individual well-being – as ‘a pharmaceutical shortcut to happi-
ness’ (Juengst 1998: 38).53 By utilizing pharmacological assistance some peo-
ple believe that they are in a position to regulate their emotions directly and 
thereby improve their well-being. The notion of well-being plays a major role 
in these discussions and specific concepts of well-being are applied with great 
awareness. As it is such a wide field the following analysis of the presence and 
character of well-being will be restricted to the debate on non therapeutic 
mood-improvement.54  
In a first step, a short introduction to the theme of mood enhancement as 
well as preliminary definitions are provided. The main part of this chapter fur-
                                           
53  Juengst applies this expression when depicting a line of argumentations put forward by 
critics of enhancement. This kind of view is based on a very narrow concept of well-
being, which is of a hedonist nature referring to the subjective experience of happiness 
and well-being. 
54  Sections 4.1. as well as 4.2.1. of this chapter provide information which overlaps to a 
certain degree with the content in the following article: Beck and Stroop 2015. 
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nishes an analysis of the role of well-being within opposing arguments in the 
debate on mood enhancement. On the one hand, the concepts of well-being 
which are the basis of arguments brought forward in order to criticize en-
hancement procedures are placed under scrutiny. The examination primarily 
concentrates on lines of reasoning brought forward by the so-called bio con-
servatives such as The President’s Council on Bioethics (2003). On the other 
hand, the role of well-being within contentions in favour of mood enhancement 
is examined. Here the exploration focuses on arguments purported by transhu-
manists55 such as Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu and by the American 
psychiatrist Peter D. Kramer.  
4.1. The subject of mood enhancement 
The so-called ‘mood enhancers’ were originally developed as antidepressants 
to treat recognized mental illnesses like major depression. Nonetheless, they are 
being taken increasingly for non-therapeutic purposes in order to promote feel-
ings ‘better than well’ (Kramer 1997: xii). Apart from being a common theme 
in science fiction, the use of mood-brightening technology for purposes of en-
hancement is said to be becoming a familiar aspect of contemporary life (cf. 
PCB 2003; Merkel et al. 2007). Due to various ethical concerns such as the 
problem of social conformity, distributive justice or the alleged personality 
changing effect of the substances (cf. Merkel et al. 2007) discussions have 
erupted as to whether there should be a moral or even legal ban on mood en-
hancement.  
Among the most common methods of enhancing mood is the taking of 
psychiatric drugs such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and 
recreational drugs. In addition, memory-blunting drugs have increasingly en-
tered the discussion (cf. PCB 2003). Other procedures, besides pharmacological 
interventions, which have a mood altering effect are, for instance, deep brain 
                                           
55  According to Dieter Birnbacher ‘[i]t should be borne in mind, however, that the terms 
“transhumanist” and “bioconservative” describe ideal types rather than the concrete reali-
ties. There is a broad range of positions between the extremes, and it will be no less hard 
to find a “bioconservative” opposed to literally any attempt to improve the human condi-
tion by medical and non-medical techniques than to find a “transhumanist” in favour of 
literally all such attempts. As it is usually the case with polar opposites, most people can 
be expected to adopt some kind of intermediate position.’ (Birnbacher 2008: 95) 
75 
stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation (cf. Schermer 2011).56 So 
far, these interventions have mainly been utilized for therapeutic purposes and 
not for enhancement. Looking into the future one can expect that ‘the existing 
repertoire of interventions will most likely be expanded by e.g. genetic engi-
neering, nanotechnologies, neural interfaces, rational drug design, trascranial 
magnetic stimulation, and “neuroceuticals”’ (Brülde 2011: 218). With the help 
of these advances mankind might be able to regulate mood more effectively, 
with fewer side effects and with greater precision (cf. Lynch 2004). These 
methods will then tend also to be used for purposes of enhancement. Although 
it is a matter of dispute as to how far the enhancement of mood beyond the res-
toration of health has been a common practice up till now, advances in technol-
ogy as well as changes in the attitude of society towards these technologies will 
most likely lead to a wider administration of mood enhancers. There is already 
significant evidence of a growth in the sales of SSRIs (cf. Pratt et al. 2011), for 
instance, and of the fact that gradually more and more people ingest SSRIs for 
less severe mental states than depression (cf. Farah 2002). Therefore, what are 
currently considered ‘normal’ emotions or moods might in future be treated as 
mental illnesses (cf. PCB 2003: 241).57 However, what exactly is mood en-
hancement? 
Two alternative definitions of enhancement  
First of all, in order to obtain a clearer picture of mood enhancement it would 
appear to be advantageous to approach the broader notion of enhancement. ‘The 
term enhancement is usually used in bioethics to characterize interventions de-
signed to improve human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to sus-
tain or restore good health.’ (Juengst 1998: 29) This treatment/enhancement-
approach distinguishes between therapeutic interventions, which sustain and re-
store health, and enhancement procedures which go beyond the restoration of 
health. But this differentiation in turn depends on concepts such as disease, 
health and normalcy which are equally broad and unspecified terms since they 
are strongly influenced by cultural, societal and historical factors (Merkel et al. 
                                           
56  These are different forms of neurostimulation. For deep brain stimulation and enhance-
ment see Schermer 2011. 
57  This development that conditions which previously were considered as ‘normal’ are 
gradually treated like illnesses is widely discussed under the title ‘medicalization’. 
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2007: 305).58 There have been criticisms that there is no clear line between inter-
ventions which count as treatment and those which should be considered as en-
hancement. For this reason, the treatment/enhancement distinction is highly con-
tested. Discussions dealing with this differentiation have developed into a specif-
ic debate of their own and much has been written on this topic.59 
Alternatively, participants in the enhancement debate, for the most part 
proponents of enhancement, have proposed the so-called ‘welfarist-definition’ 
of enhancement, clearly demarcating it from the treatment/enhancement-
distinction. According to the welfarist approach any improvement of the human 
body and mind constitutes a form of enhancement if it increases the well-being 
of the individual concerned. When arguing for medical interventions consid-
ered as enhancement, Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane give the following def-
inition of ‘human enhancement’60 from a welfarist perspective: ‘[a]ny change in 
biology or psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a 
good life in the relevant set of circumstances’ (Savulescu, Sandberg and Ka-
hane 2011: 7). A similar definition can be found within the works of John Har-
ris: ‘[i]f it wasn’t good for you it wouldn’t be enhancement’ (Harris 2009: 131). 
Thus, in following this definition if an intervention does not succeed in increas-
ing well-being, this would not be a case of enhancement. Nevertheless, this def-
inition appears to be too widely based and thus, does not allow for a concrete 
definition of what kind of interventions should count as enhancement. Whether 
or not something is considered as human enhancement depends on how we un-
derstand the notion of well-being. Alternative theories of well-being are likely 
to result in divergent classifications. Moreover, if all interventions which im-
prove the human body and mind and thereby promote individual well-being are 
considered as enhancement, then there can be no possible objection to proce-
dures of enhancement since they are per definition good (cf. Merkel 2009: 
                                           
58  For an overview of alternative concepts of health and disease see Schramme 2012. 
59  As this is not the debate this chapter aims to illustrate, further reference to this topic will 
not be pursued. For further details see for instance Parens 1998; Daniels 2000; Bostrom 
and Roache 2007; Heilinger 2010; Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011.  
60  Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane provide the following definition of the term ‘human 
enhancement’: ‘[b]ut when we are considering human enhancement, we are considering 
improvement of the person's life. The improvement is some change in state of the per-
son - biological or psychological - which is good. Which changes are good depends on 
the value we are seeking to promote or maximize. In the context of human enhancement, 
the value immediately in question is the goodness of a person's life, that is, his or her 
well-being.’ (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011: 7) 
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177). The welfarist definition of enhancement, therefore, already encompasses 
the value judgement that the enhancement procedure under consideration is 
good (cf. Heilinger 2010: 114). Hence, it does not allow for discussions con-
cerning the moral or legal legitimacy of these procedures. 
Although the treatment/enhancement distinction presents many problems 
and is highly contested, in the following elaborations the differentiation be-
tween therapy and enhancement beyond the restoration of health shall function 
as a preliminary definition. There are, indeed, borderline cases in which it is 
difficult to tell whether an intervention should be considered as therapy or as 
enhancement. However, this chapter acts on the assumption that the distinction, 
nonetheless, seems meaningful and compelling in most contexts as there are 
many cases which can be classified relatively clearly as therapy (such as chem-
otherapy for cancer) or enhancement (for instance botox treatment). The same 
holds true for the concepts disease and health: it is taken for granted that, alt-
hough there are no precise definitions and a grey area notwithstanding, we can 
generally speaking distinguish between disease and health.  
The various biotechnological interventions concerned in the enhancement 
debate can be used for different purposes. They can be utilized for purely ther-
apeutic purposes or for enhancing the human body beyond the restoration of 
health: ‘[t]hus, the same technology – [the antidepressant] Paxil, for example – 
will count as an enhancement technology in certain contexts (when used for 
enhancement purposes), but not in others (when used to treat a psychiatric ill-
ness)’ (DeGrazia 2005a: 262). Originally most of the technologies in question 
had actually been developed for the treatment of recognized diseases, before 
they were utilized for enhancement. 
Characterizing mood enhancement 
What exactly is meant by referring to the term “mood” and what characterizes 
interventions which are considered as mood enhancement? Guy Kahane (2011: 
167) provides the following definition of the term ‘mood’ when distinguishing 
it from the other two key notions ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’: ‘[moods are] disposi-
tions that govern one᾿s entire emotional orientation for a certain period’. Feel-
ings in contrast ‘are episodes of consciousness. There is something it feels like 
to feel angry or sad. Emotions are broader behavioural dispositions which in-
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clude dispositions to have certain feelings, as well as dispositions to behave, 
think, and attend in certain ways.’ (ibid.) 
The question as to what exactly characterizes interventions which are con-
sidered as mood-enhancement is, as in the case of enhancement in general, dif-
ficult to answer. If one takes the definition of enhancement given above, which 
focuses on the distinction between therapy and enhancement, as a starting point 
and applies it to the case of mood, it would be the improvement of mood be-
yond what is necessary to sustain or restore health. Following this definition, 
the ingestion of antidepressants in order to improve mood in a case of severe or 
persistent suicidal depression clearly is not an example of enhancement. In-
stances of this kind can be considered as straightforward therapeutic interven-
tion. In numerous other cases, however, it might not be so evident whether the 
improvement of mood has therapeutic purposes or can be considered as en-
hancement. Let us imagine in a case of fear of examinations that a person takes 
antidepressants in order to reduce his/her anxiety and feel better. Should one 
consider this as therapy or as an instance of enhancement? This, in turn, de-
pends on the degree of anxiety present and where one draws the line between a 
pathological anxiety and a common degree of apprehension before an exam. 
This case illustrates the importance of cultural and societal factors which 
strongly influence the conceptualization of psychiatric illness vs. a normal state 
of mind.  
An example to be found in the literature on mood enhancement is the case 
of a person who is too stressed about work to enjoy a friend’s wedding celebra-
tion (cf. Liao and Roache 2011; Wassermann and Liao 2008). In order to bring 
about the feelings appropriate for the wedding – feelings of joy and pleasure – 
she takes psychiatric drugs.61 Thus, a desired feeling which the person lacks in 
a specific situation because of her particular circumstances is induced artificial-
ly62. There are many occasions in everyday life in which people desire emo-
tions which seem appropriate and are not forthcoming naturally for a variety of 
different nonmedical reasons and might consider inducing them artificially. 
Cases of this kind are considered as examples of mood enhancement in the fol-
lowing. 
                                           
61  At this point it is important to note that most psychiatric drugs such as antidepressants do 
not have an immediate effect. They need to be taken for several weeks until the desired 
effects occur. Therefore, one might call this example into question. 
62  The term ‘artificially’ is applied in order to refer to things humanly contrived. 
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Frequently when giving examples of cases of mood enhancement, authors 
refer to instances described by the American psychiatrist Peter D. Kramer 
(1997). In these cases people, who are not considered to suffer from an illness 
but want to change specific habits and skills in order to lead a better life, seek a 
psychiatric medication. Examples are habitually timid people who want to gain 
social confidence, sensitive persons who want to become brash or introvert in-
dividuals who want to improve their social skills (cf. Kramer 1997: xii). Kra-
mer considers feelings resulting from mood enhancement as ‘better than well’ 
(ibid.). However, as DeGrazia points out, ‘one might argue that, since such pa-
tients struggle with psychological phenomena that can be ameliorated with 
medication, it means little to say that they are not ill whereas someone who, 
say, barely qualifies as having depression or clinical anxiety is ill’ (DeGrazia 
2005a: 263). 
Certainly, it remains a matter of dispute whether the depicted examples 
are cases of enhancement since, as illustrated, the treatment/enhancement dis-
tinction does not provide a concept with clear boundaries. Nevertheless, these 
cases shall function as examples of mood enhancement for the following. 
4.2. The role of well-being in the debate on mood 
enhancement – an analysis 
On taking a closer look at the arguments in the debate on mood enhancement, it 
becomes obvious that the reference to well-being and the question of what con-
stitutes a good life play a major role in these discussions. Many authors point 
out explicitly that the question as to whether or not mood enhancement is a 
morally justified procedure relates directly to the question about the essence of 
well-being and the existing alternative concepts.63 Furthermore, Nagel points 
out that ‘people seek to achieve more well-being by using enhancement inter-
ventions’ (Nagel 2010: 72). However, emphasis is placed on the fact that it is 
the well-being of the individual concerned (as opposed to overall well-being) 
which plays a central role in the discussions on enhancement (cf. Mieth 2011: 
370). It has already been mentioned briefly in the introduction to this chapter 
                                           
63  See for instance PCB 2003: 210; Brülde 2007; Berghmans et al. 2011: 161; Kipke 2011: 
18; Schermer 2011. 
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that proponents as well as opponents of enhancement refer to well-being in 
their arguments. Savulescu et al. provide the following précis. 
Proponents of enhancement see these [technological advances] as 
positive developments. They argue that it is high time that we used 
biomedical science, not only to fight disease, but also to positively 
enhance human capacities and well-being. But opponents of en-
hancement see these developments as a grave threat to what is most 
dear in human life. These contrasting hopes and fears have already 
generated intense controversy. (Savulescu et al. 2011: preface) 
The tension between rival lines of argumentation which refer to well-being is 
clearly perceptible in the debate on mood enhancement. There are two oppos-
ing camps: on the one hand, the bio conservatives64 (as they are called by their 
critics) who state that enhancement procedures do not promote and even en-
danger our well-being and on the other hand, the proponents, who claim that 
mood enhancers, or enhancement in general, constitute a new way for promot-
ing well-being. Among them are the so-called transhumanists. 
The following section depicts the different lines of argumentation put for-
ward by the opposing camps and analyses the way in which the notion of well-
being is applied in their arguments.65  
4.2.1. Critical attitudes towards mood enhancement 
Generally speaking, the various procedures for mood enhancement have en-
countered much criticism. Many objections refer directly to the well-being of 
the persons who consume mood enhancers. If one takes a closer look at the crit-
ical lines of argumentation, they generally maintain that mood enhancement 
                                           
64  The term ‘bio-conservatives’ usually is applied to refer to the PCB (2003) and thinkers 
such as the chairman of the PCB Leon R. Kass (2003), Francis Fukuyama (2002), Jürgen 
Habermas (2003) and Michael Sandel (2007), who are considered as moral conservatives 
where procedures such as enhancement are concerned. Due to the fact that the PCB has 
provided a detailed discussion and study of the subject of mood enhancement the follow-
ing primarily focuses on their arguments. 
65  In the following I will not concentrate on arguments referring to medical side-effects or 
long term safety as these arguments are of lesser interest to the central question of this 
chapter. 
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does not promote individual well-being as we are ‘missing something im-
portant’ (Cole-Turner 1998: 153). This appears to be a common line of argu-
mentation. The assumed elements of well-being which are said to be missing 
are different in nature. In order to examine what exactly is said to be missing, 
the following section focuses primarily on the argumentation as represented by 
the PCB (2003) but also refers to critical lines of reasoning brought forward by 
other participants in the debate.66 Attention is, above all, paid to the specific 
concepts of well-being underlying the various objections. 
Mood enhancement as an alleged ‘shortcut’ to well-being 
In their report the PCB state first of all that the development of mood enhanc-
ing technologies is apt to provoke the following question, provided that the 
pursuit of well-being constitutes the overarching interest of mankind. ‘Indeed, 
why would one need to discipline one’s passions, refine one’s sentiments, and 
cultivate one’s virtues, in short, to organize one’s soul for action in the world, 
when one’s aspiration to happiness67 could be satisfied by drugs in a quick, 
consistent, and cost-effective manner?’ (PCB 2003: 208) According to the 
PCB, some people are likely to view mood enhancing technologies as a useful 
means for directly increasing well-being with lesser effort compared to tradi-
tional means. Cole-Turner expounds a similar idea when maintaining that it is a 
common belief on the part of proponents of mood-enhancement that ‘the new 
means seek the same goals [as the old means], but they achieve them more 
quickly or efficiently; therefore, the new means are good, perhaps even better 
than the old means’ (Cole-Turner 1998: 153). Hence, mood enhancement is of-
ten related to the notion of a ‘shortcut’ to happiness providing a quick way to 
well-being which requires less effort. However, this notion has been strongly 
opposed, above all, by critics of mood enhancement such as the PCB.68 The 
criticism is that this notion of a shortcut reduces the concept of well-being to its 
hedonic content, namely pleasure and pain. This notion is based on the assump-
tion that well-being is merely the product of our present mood, which can be 
                                           
66  The differentiations provided in this section have arisen in the course of discussions with 
Birgit Beck to whom I owe my sincere thanks. 
67  It is important to note here that the PCB uses the terms ‘well-being’ and ‘happiness’ in-
terchangeably. Happiness is therefore applied in a broader sense. 
68  For a more detailed and critical discussion of the objection that enhancement does not 
provide an ‘easy shortcut’ see Schermer 2008. 
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directly increased through mood enhancing interventions. The PCB classifies 
this as a common misconception since well-being is more than ‘good mood’ 
(cf. PCB 2003: 235). Hence, good mood in itself is not a sufficient condition 
for well-being. Therefore, according to the PCB, if we try to increase our well-
being through mood brighteners something important is missing since well-
being encompasses far more than hedonic components. So what exactly is 
missing according to the PCB? 
Missing components of well-being where mood enhancement is 
concerned 
Critics frequently maintain that we desire other goods than mere pleasure and 
that often we strive for things even though we do not expect them to give us 
pleasure. Thus, there appear to be other important components of well-being 
apart from good mood. The PCB states that ‘we desire not simply to be satis-
fied with ourselves and the world, but to have this satisfaction as a result of 
deeds and loves and lives worthy of such self-satisfaction’ (PCB 2003: 251) 
and that ‘the happiness of the soul is inseparable from the pleasure that comes 
from perfecting our natures and living fruitfully with our families, friends, and 
fellow citizens’ (ibid.: 270). The PCB places emphasis on the fact that, due to 
our human nature69, the listed aspects are important components of individual 
well-being. By applying enhancement procedures we run the risk of losing 
what it means to be human. This notion, that the listed aspects are important for 
the pursuit of well-being, can also be found in the arguments of other authors in 
the literature on mood enhancement such as Berghmans et al. (2011: 161). 
They maintain that individual well-being depends on factors such as ‘individual 
striving’ and ‘effort’, ‘being connected to other people by way of social rela-
tionships and interactions’. Furthermore, Berghmans et al. state that as mood 
brighteners do not depend on these important factors, consuming them is apt to 
result ultimately in a ‘shallower life, instead of a richer life’ (ibid.). As Dan W. 
Brock maintains ‘[t]here is a widespread popular conception that using drugs 
for pleasure interferes with developing each of these components [such as 
friendship, love, intellectual capacities, activities and autonomy] of our good’ 
                                           
69  See also PCB 2003: 7 and 289 f. on the importance of the concept of human nature. 
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(Brock 1983: 33).70 Hence, in the discussion of mood enhancement these com-
ponents are widely considered as important factors which influence individual 
well-being. According to the critics, these aspects are not promoted when mood 
enhancers are applied. Therefore, mood enhancing procedures are not in a posi-
tion to increase individual well-being. 
All things considered, we can observe that some critics stress the im-
portance of other components apart from pleasure when the character of well-
being is concerned. They list specific components which are of importance for 
individual well-being and stress the fact that these are missing when mood en-
hancement is applied. Their argumentation appears to be based upon the as-
sumption that the nature of well-being is not entirely subjective. There are im-
portant objective components which set limits to the promotion of well-being 
by means of mood enhancers. As illustrated, they explicitly list these compo-
nents. 
The following question seems to be of central importance for the analysis: 
what is the relationship between pleasure and well-being? Critics point out that 
there are other important aspects of well-being apart from pleasure which pro-
ponents of mood enhancement ignore. Moreover, critics might even go as far as 
to dispute the fact that pleasure is of importance for well-being. As Brock 
points out ‘[w]hen disapproval of the use of drugs for pleasure derives from a 
general disapproval of pleasure, it often takes some form of the “swine objec-
tion”. That is, people are capable of many higher activities, and to view them as 
merely pleasure-seeking beings is to debase their nature.’ (Brock 1983: 31) 
Furthermore, it is claimed that if one recognizes the fact that pleasure is a com-
ponent of wellbeing, there appear to be qualitative differences in terms of 
pleasure which depend on whether or not our emotions are connected to reality 
and that pleasure induced by means of mood enhancement is of a lesser quality 
due to the fact that we have no contact to reality.  
                                           
70  Note that Dan W. Brock is concerned with the legal prohibition on the use of drugs mere-
ly for pleasure and does not directly address the broader subject of mood enhancement. 
At the time his paper was published enhancement had not yet developed into a major de-
bate. Nonetheless, his discussion of drug induced pleasure can fruitfully be transferred to 
the subject of mood enhancement. 
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Mood enhancers and the danger of losing contact to reality 
It is frequently maintained that apart from the fact that other components of 
well-being are missing, the pleasure resulting from mood enhancement is no 
real pleasure but rather a ‘fraudulent happiness’ (PCB 2003: 212): according to 
the PCB, we desire our experiences of pleasure to be real. It is a widespread 
concern that mood enhancers might distort our feelings and that there is a risk 
of ‘mistaking some lesser substitute for real happiness’ (PCB 2003: 252). 
Mood enhancers are said to be not in a position to induce real happiness, rather 
they provoke an illusion of it. The connection is frequently made to a common 
objection against ethical hedonism71 which we already encountered in chapter 
2, namely Robert Nozick’s thought experiment known as the ‘Experience Ma-
chine’. When referring to this thought experiment it is maintained that ‘real 
well-being is not only “in the mind” but also “in the world”’ (Schermer 2013: 
441). Soma, the pleasure drug in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), 
which creates a spurious happy and superficial environment, also constitutes a 
familiar point of reference in the debate. The analogy is applied in order to il-
lustrate what kind of impact mood enhancement might have.72 As Roland Kip-
ke maintains, the central concern is the absence of the connection between the 
emotion and reality (cf. Kipke 2011: 265). If this connection is missing, our 
emotional experiences cannot be considered authentic. Such kinds of emotions 
which lack contact to reality run the risk of leading to solipsism in terms of 
happiness: the happy individual being remote from the external world outside 
of her mind. But, according to some critics ‘we not only want to be happy, ra-
ther happy in an authentic way’73 (ibid.). Since this cannot be accomplished by 
mood enhancers they are viewed as leading to ‘fraudulent happiness’. 
If we compare this objection with the criticism directed against hedonism 
illustrated in chapter 2 we can observe that there are many similarities. These 
critical lines of reasoning rely upon the assumption that being connected to re-
ality is an objective requirement for ‘real’ pleasure. Thus, once again some crit-
ics distance themselves from a subjectivist conception referring to objective 
dimensions with respect to the character of well-being. Furthermore, they cre-
                                           
71  See for instance Schermer 2011. 
72  See for instance PCB 2003; Merkel et al. 2007 and Roache 2007. 
73  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Wir wollen nicht nur glücklich, sondern authen-
tisch glücklich sein.‘ 
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ate the impression that proponents of well-being do not attach any importance 
to being connected to reality. 
Pleasure derived from a false origin 
The charge of a ‘fraudulent happiness’, however, refers to another objection to 
mood-enhancement: the pleasure resulting from mood enhancement is no ‘real 
pleasure’ since it is artificially induced and for this reason not authentic. Ac-
cording to the critics of mood enhancement it is important to distinguish be-
tween the natural as opposed to the artificial origin of an emotion. ‘In their 
eyes, those who take psychotropic drugs and employ other technical devices 
necessarily end up in an inauthentic emotional state.’ (Krämer 2011: 54) Thus, 
the pleasure resulting from mood enhancement has a ‘false’ origin since it is 
artificially induced and not naturally produced. Frequently the term ‘natural’ is 
equated with ‘authentic’ and ‘artificial’ with ‘inauthentic’. However, the critics 
are not very explicit about what exactly they mean when distinguishing the nat-
ural from the artificial and also the concept of authenticity, which is often re-
ferred to, is far too vague and, therefore, does not contribute to comprehensibil-
ity. Thus, the question remains open as to why exactly naturally produced 
pleasure is to be preferred in the face of artificially induced pleasure.74 We will 
come back to the concept of the natural and the value which is attributed to it in 
due course. 
Another reason which is brought forward in order to argue that mood en-
hancers lead to pleasure which has a ‘false’ origin is the fact that ‘real’ pleasure 
results from efforts, deeds and actions. The notion is criticised that pleasure is 
‘logically detachable from the activities that produce it. It is the pleasurable 
sensations or feelings that are liked for their own sake, and the activities that 
produce the pleasure are only contingently necessary to the pleasure’. (Brock 
1983: 31) The PCB envisages a risk that mood enhancers ‘create the possibility 
of severing the link between feelings of happiness75 and our actions […]’ (PCB 
2003: 207-8) and a risk of a ‘fraudulent happiness’ (ibid.: 212). This line of ar-
                                           
74  For a more detailed and critical discussion of causal connection between the artificiality 
of the means and the inauthenticity of the resulting emotions see Krämer 2009 and 2011. 
75  In this quotation the term happiness seems to refer to pleasure and not to the broader 
concept of well-being. However, the PCB acknowledges that in cases of therapeutic use 
mood enhancers might, on the contrary, re-link feelings and activities (cf. PCB 2003: 
260). 
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gumentation implies that feelings of pleasure without the activities which usu-
ally arouse this pleasure are not considered ‘real’ pleasures. ‘Real pleasures’ 
need to result from actions and activities: ‘[w]e do not want the pleasure of 
playing baseball without playing baseball, the pleasure of listening to music 
without the music, the satisfaction of having learned something without know-
ing anything’ (ibid: 265). Once again the PCB appeals to human nature when 
stating that there is a ‘danger of violating or deforming the nature of human 
agency and the dignity of the naturally human way of activity’ (ibid.: 292). 
Furthermore, the critics mentioned suggest that we do not mind making 
efforts in order to experience pleasure and that we should earn the pleasure we 
feel from our actions. As Martha J. Farah maintains ‘[m]ost people in our so-
ciety feel there is value to earning one’s happiness, success, and so on’ (Farah 
2002: 1125). Directly inducing pleasure by means of mood enhancement with-
out having earned it and thereby taking the ‘easy shortcut’ is considered cheat-
ing. Mood enhancers ‘estrange us from the forms of pleasure that depend upon 
discipline and devotion’ (PCB 2003: 208). This objection is discussed under 
the title no pain, no gain-argument. Schermer points out ‘“no pain, no gain” 
implies that one ought not to have any gains without having worked or suffered 
for them’ (Schermer 2008: 358). Thus, the happiness resulting from mood en-
hancement is considered ‘fraudulent’ as it is neither deserved nor linked to spe-
cific deeds or actions. 
In summary, according to critical lines of reasoning, the origin of pleasure 
appears to have an impact on the quality of that pleasure and whether or not it 
is considered ‘fraudulent’ or ‘real pleasure’. Since mood enhancement induces 
pleasure with the help of artificial means and, as critics claim, thereby detaches 
it from any activity it leads to fraudulent happiness. Thus, there are some fur-
ther objective requirements at stake which ‘real pleasure’ needs to fulfil: it 
needs to have the right origin which means that it should have a natural source 
such as activities, actions and hard work. These requirements operate on the 
ontological level. Pleasure is not considered as ‘real’ pleasure if these require-
ments are not fulfilled. The PCB appeals to nature and ‘our human nature’ 
when justifying these requirements for real happiness. All in all, even though it 
is recognized that pleasure constitutes a component of well-being it is does not 
have an utterly subjective essence. The arguments depicted are based on the 
underlying assumption that there are important objective dimensions where the 
character of well-being is concerned. 
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The importance of sorrow and sadness  
Another objection to mood enhancement, which has received attention in the 
literature, is the concern that mood brighteners might undermine character for-
mation and thereby our ability to cope with difficult or more challenging phases 
in life.76 The PCB, for instance, states that sorrow ‘courageously confronted, 
can make us stronger, wiser, and more compassionate’ (PCB 2003: 293). When 
critically examining this argument Schermer states it is a common view that 
suffering ‘can … enable learning, personal growth, or the development of wis-
dom and life-experience’ (Schermer 2008: 359). Experiences of coping and 
struggling with the darker aspects of life are said to be especially important for 
character formation. In a nutshell: ‘struggling with pain builds character, and 
eliminating that pain undermines good character’ (Chatterjee 2004: 971). The 
formation of a strong and good character in turn is considered as a precondition 
for individual well-being. People need to develop character traits and coping 
mechanisms which are important for their future well-being. The reliance on 
mood enhancers in difficult situations in life does not provide an alternative 
since they impede character formation. Hence, it is maintained that mood en-
hancers are frequently considered ‘the easy way out’ in difficult situations in 
life and that this notion might, in the long run, lead to a decrease in well-being 
as learning how to struggle and cope with pain and sorrow is important for the 
promotion of well-being. Furthermore, the PCB places emphasis on the fact 
that ‘distress, anxiety, and sorrow [are] appropriate reflections of the fragility 
of human life and inseparable from the setbacks and heartbreaks that accompa-
ny the pursuit of happiness and the love of fellow mortals’ (PCB 2003: 213). 
Instead of trying to eliminate these feelings we should recognize that they are 
part of our human nature. 
In addition, the so-called ‘contrast experiences’ are said to enable individ-
uals to appreciate positive feelings of happiness and contentment more fully. 
When referring to this objection Berghmans et al. give the following argument:  
[...] leading a good life and being happy seems to depend also on so-
called contrast experiences. Sadness, grief, and suffering are inher-
ently part of human life, as much as feelings of joy, happiness, and 
elevated mood are. They are like two sides of a coin. Trying to elimi-
                                           
76  For a critical discussion of this argument see Chatterjee 2004: 971. 
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nate negatively valued experiences may ultimately and paradoxically 
lead to a lower level of well-being. (Berghmans et al. 2011: 161) 
Hence, for two reasons states of mood such as sorrow and sadness are viewed 
as important components of individual well-being: firstly, they foster character 
formation which is important for individual well-being and secondly, they pro-
vide contrast experiences which are also said to be important for well-being. 
Since mood enhancement aims at alleviating these states of mood they are 
viewed as endangering the pursuit of well-being in the long run. 
The examination of these arguments once again illustrates that the critical 
lines of reasoning place emphasis on objective dimensions of the character of 
well-being. Sorrow and sadness are considered universally important elements 
since ultimately they help to promote well-being and are inevitable and ulti-
mately helpful emotions resulting from the characteristics of human nature. 
Interim results 
All things considered, we can observe that there is a variety of arguments 
against mood enhancement in which well-being plays a prominent role and has 
an overt presence. However, although not explicitly stated, the critical argu-
ments are based upon a specific notion of the character of well-being, namely 
objectivist conceptions. Within the arguments it is assumed that there are some 
objective goods such as social relationships and a number of objective require-
ments, such as having contact to reality, which need to be involved if well-
being is to be promoted since they are tied to our human nature. Due to the fact 
that mood enhancement does not incorporate these goods and since the result-
ing pleasure does not fulfil the listed requirement, it is alleged not to be in a po-
sition to promote well-being. These assumptions operate on the ontological 
level since it is presupposed that certain goods constitute the essence of well-
being independent of whether or not the subjects concerned desire them. Since 
these goods encompass a broad variety of different things such as friendship or 
love relationships which are important for well-being, we can conclude regard-
ing the character of well-being that they presuppose a broad objective concept 
similar to an objective list theory when propounding their critical lines of rea-
soning. 
Although critics might not reject the importance of pleasure, which is gen-
erally considered a subjective dimension of well-being, they state that ‘real 
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pleasure’ is connected to objective requirements such as being connected to re-
ality. Thus, they move the generally subjective notion of pleasure into a more 
objectivist direction binding objective requirements to it. Furthermore, we can 
ascertain that throughout the various well-being-based arguments the concept 
of human nature or the value of the natural is referred to. Human nature is seen 
as setting limits to our abilities to control our well-being. Factors such as social 
relationships and ‘real’ activities are considered to be integral parts of well-
being by our very nature. Hence, the well-being based arguments appear to be 
tied to a specific normative conception of human nature. All things considered 
it might be fruitful to pay more attention to this relationship of the concept of 
well-being and the notion of human nature in the debate on mood enhancement.  
There is, moreover, another interesting observation to be made: the critical 
arguments towards mood enhancement rest upon the assumption that mood 
brighteners cannot function as a direct shortcut to well-being mainly for two 
reasons:  
1a: Well-being consists of more than ‘good mood’. Important aspects 
such as social relationships, real deeds, activities and contrast ex-
periences are missing if mood brighteners are administered. 
2a: The pleasure produced through mood enhancement is no ‘real’ 
pleasure as it does not result from contact with the ‘real’ world 
and has a false origin. This ‘fraudulent’ pleasure does not con-
tribute to individual well-being. 
These two central arguments put forward contra mood enhancement are di-
rected towards proponents of these interventions who argue that mood en-
hancement gives people the opportunity to increase their well-being. Against 
the background of these two central critical arguments outlined above, critics 
seem to imply that authors arguing for the enhancement of mood take a directly 
opposite stance stating that  
1b: ‘good mood’ is the one and only component of individual well-
being  
and  
2b: that it does not make a difference whether the pleasure results 
from activities and interaction with the ‘real’ world or whether it 
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is directly produced through artificial means such as mood 
brighteners.  
Taken together, these two assumptions can be classified as representing the 
core thesis of the hedonist doctrine. Therefore, it appears as if critics accredit a 
hedonist stance to proponents of mood enhancement. The opposing lines of ar-
gumentation applied closely resemble the disapproval directed towards the he-
donist doctrine. Instances of this are the criticism that pleasure and pain is not 
of primary importance to well-being since well-being is dependent upon vari-
ous other factors. Also, the objection that experiences of pleasure must essen-
tially be real, emphasized by the reference to Nozick’s experience machine, is a 
classical line of argumentation contra hedonism. Thus, according to critics, 
proponents of mood enhancement are apt to take a hedonist stance in questions 
as to what constitutes the character of well-being. This alleged link between a 
favourable attitude towards mood enhancement and a hedonist stance is also 
explicitly pointed out: ‘[m]any supporters of the biomedical enhancement of 
mood explicitly or implicitly base their case on such appeal to hedonic reasons’ 
(Kahane 2011: 167).  
Having ascertained this perspective, one would imagine that rival lines of 
argumentation in the debate on mood enhancement rest in their core upon rival 
concepts of well-being, that is to say subjective hedonist concepts and objectiv-
ist approaches. But does this hold water? Are the lines of argumentation in fa-
vour of mood brightening procedures really based on a purely hedonist concept 
of well-being which views mood enhancement as a direct shortcut to well-
being?  
4.2.2. Argumentations in favour of mood enhancement 
After having dealt with the objections with which mood enhancing procedures 
have been confronted, it is now time to turn to the arguments of the other camp, 
of the proponents of mood enhancement. When doing so, first of all, it is im-
portant to point out that the literature on the ethics of mood enhancement is, for 
the most part, critical. There do not appear to be very many supporters of these 
kinds of intervention. Among the most eminent of the proponents of mood en-
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hancement are the so-called ‘transhumanists’77, who argue that recent enhanc-
ing technologies offer new or even easier opportunities for enhancing well-
being than the usual means. Therefore, according to them there should not be a 
ban on such new technologies. Julian Savulescu (2005; Savulescu and Kahane 
2009) and John Harris (2007 and 2009) even go as far as to argue for a moral 
obligation to pursue enhancement. Another eminent proponent of mood en-
hancement is the American psychiatrist Peter D. Kramer. As will be illustrated 
in the ensuing section, he argues that mood enhancers indirectly promote indi-
vidual well-being. The following analysis of well-being-based arguments in 
favour of mood enhancement primarily concentrates on the lines of reasoning 
brought forward by the transhumanists and by Peter D. Kramer. Special atten-
tion is paid to the character of well-being considered in their arguments in order 
to examine whether proponents really do take a hedonist stance, which the crit-
ics of mood enhancement accredit to them.  
Pleasure as one among other important components of well-
being  
To begin with when dealing with the assertions of the transhumanists, it is im-
portant to point out that it is difficult to find detailed lines of argumentation re-
garding the specific case of mood enhancement. Most of their works deal with 
the general theme of enhancement ethics and provide general lines of argumen-
tation which are to be applied to specific cases such as the procedure of enhanc-
ing mood.78 Nevertheless, there are a few lines of argumentation to be found 
which clearly illustrate that members of the group such as Julian Savulescu and 
Nick Bostrom do indeed argue in favour of mood enhancement.79 In order to 
elucidate this, the following, first of all, depicts the argument for human en-
hancement in general proposed by Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane (2011) and 
will then apply it to the case of mood brighteners. 
                                           
77  Hughes defines the movement of transhumanism as ‘the idea of using reason to transcend 
the limitations of the human condition’ (Hughes 2004: 155). Among the members of this 
group are Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu. John Harris is also frequently considered 
to be a member of the group as he takes a similar stance. However, he distances himself 
from the transhumanist programme. The following focuses mainly on the works of 
Savulescu and Bostrom where the transhumanists are concerned.  
78  See for instance Savulescu 2005; Bostrom 2008; Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011. 
79  See for instance Ranisch and Savulescu 2007: 49; Bostrom 2008: 12. 
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Savulescu et al. take the welfarist definition as their starting point, which 
has already been portrayed above. According to this account, enhancement pro-
cedures do by definition increase the chances of leading a good life. Interven-
tions, in contrast, which raise the person to a level beyond normal functioning, 
but are not beneficial to the person concerned should not be considered as en-
hancement. Hence, whether or not specific procedures are viewed as human 
enhancement depends on the empirical question as to what impact they have on 
well-being. Savulescu et al. conclude: ‘[b]y accepting the welfarist definition of 
enhancement, the question of when should we enhance becomes: when should 
we increase human well-being?’ (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011: 8).  
If one applies the welfarist account to the case of mood brighteners the 
central question is: are individuals who apply mood brighteners likely to lead a 
better life? Are they likely to lead a life with more well-being (cf. Ibid.: 10)? 
Paragraphs to be found in other works by the authors illustrate that they consid-
er the application of mood brighteners as interventions which enable people to 
brighten their mood and foster their subjective well-being (see Ranisch and 
Savulescu 2007: 49 and Bostrom 2008: 12). However, the question as to how 
they define the relationship of subjective well-being and the more broader con-
cept of well-being then arises. Savulescu et al. explicitly point out that ‘wheth-
er, on the welfarist account, something counts as a human enhancement de-
pends on how we understand the notion of well-being’ (Savulescu, Sandberg 
and Kahane 2011: 10). They depict the three alternative theories of well-being 
and the specific aspects on which they lay emphasis. Concerning the role which 
subjective well-being plays in each of the alternative theories they state: ‘sub-
jective well-being is the whole of well-being only on hedonist theories, alt-
hough it is a significant component of well-being on all plausible views’ (ibid.: 
11). Hence, subjective well-being is used to refer to the hedonic quality of ex-
periences and viewed as having a positive impact on overall well-being irre-
spective of which of the alternative theories is endorsed. Elsewhere one can 
find a similar line of argumentation put forward by Savulescu and Kahane.  
But although there is this philosophical disagreement [concerning the 
concept of well-being], there is considerable consensus about the par-
ticular traits or states that make life better or worse […]. Few if any 
would deny that chronic pain tends to make a life worse or that joy 
makes a life better. All plausible moral theories have to make such 
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judgments – judgments about harms and benefits, or things that make 
a life go better or worse. (Savulescu and Kahane 2009: 279) 
Thus, according to Savulescu and Kahane pleasure and joy are important as-
pects in each of the three alternative theories (hedonism, desire-fulfilment and 
objective list theories). There are also other authors to be found in the debate on 
mood enhancement who point out that even if one maintains that well-being 
consists of more than good mood it is beyond doubt that the experience of 
pleasure is an important component of individual well-being. If one presuppos-
es that mood brighteners are indeed in a position to elevate subjective well-
being, as the transhumanists appear to suggest, then they should be considered 
as promoting well-being in all three alternative theories. Therefore, in follow-
ing the welfarist definition of enhancement they should be classified as inter-
ventions of human enhancement. Nick Bostrom demonstrates a similar line of 
contention when arguing for the enhancement of the emotional capacity. ‘One 
dimension of emotional capacity that we can imagine enhanced is subjective 
well-being and its various flavors: joy, comfort, sensual pleasure, fun, positive 
interest and excitement. Hedonists claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic 
good, but one need not be a hedonist to appreciate pleasure as important com-
ponent of the good.’ (Bostrom 2008: 11-2) In summary, we learn that propo-
nents of mood enhancement such as Bostrom and Savulescu argue that mood 
brighteners promote pleasure and joy. Due to the fact that these are important 
components of individual well-being according to all three alternative theories, 
administering mood brighteners promotes well-being and for this reason can be 
considered as human enhancement.  
Furthermore, Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane state that there are a num-
ber of traits such as ‘memory’, ‘self-discipline’, ‘patience’ and ‘having a sunny 
temperament’ which are ‘valuable on all plausible conceptions of well-being’ 
(Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011: 11) and due to this fact their promo-
tion always has a positive impact on well-being. Bostrom provides a similar 
line of reasoning when referring to the promotion of our basic human capacities 
such as healthspan, cognition and emotion (cf. Bostrom 2008). Since ‘[a]ll of 
these characteristics ... may have some biological and psychological basis ca-
pable of manipulation with technology’ (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 
2011: 11) they can be modified and thereby promote individual well-being. 
Bostrom states that ‘[t]ranshumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, 
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a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways’ (Bostrom 
2005: 4) or in the words of Savulescu ‘to choose to be better is to be human’ 
(Savulescu, Foddy and Clayton 2004: 670). Although the transhumanists criti-
cize the opponents of mood enhancement for tying their arguments to old-
fashioned concepts of human nature and allegedly reject the moral relevance of 
the notion, they themselves make reference to human nature within the argu-
mentation. In following the transhumanists, the ingestion of mood brightening 
pills to increase our well-being can be considered part of our human nature 
which aims at progress and improvement. The various procedures of enhance-
ment are viewed as enabling us to improve ourselves and, above all, our well-
being. When applying enhancement procedures we are considered to live in ac-
cordance with our human nature. Hence, as in the case of the critics of mood 
enhancement the impression arises that the well-being-based lines of reasoning 
are tied to a normative concept of human nature. 
It has been argued above that critics seem to presuppose that authors argu-
ing for the enhancement of mood would take a hedonist stance basing their ar-
guments on the following assumptions: 1b’good mood’ is the one and only 
component of individual well-being and 2b that it does not make a difference 
whether the pleasure results from activities and interaction with the ‘real’ 
world or whether it is produced artificially through mood brighteners. In fact, 
the arguments presented so far in favour of mood enhancement do not support 
these assumptions. In the case of 1b transhumanists such as Savulescu and 
Bostrom do not argue that ‘good mood’ is the one and only component of well-
being. Instead they take a different stance stating that ‘good mood’ is an im-
portant factor for well-being in all alternative theories of well-being. Thereby, 
it can be just one component among many others contributing to well-being. 
Assumption 2b, on the other hand, is difficult to prove as Savulescu et al. 
as well as Bostrom do not deal with the specific kind of pleasure (or subjective 
well-being as they call it) resulting from mood brighteners and allegedly do not 
take a specific stance concerning the three alternative theories of well-being. 
Since they relate to the notion that mood enhancers do in fact promote pleasure, 
they would possibly support the view that it does not make a difference wheth-
er the pleasure results from activities and interaction with the ‘real’ world or 
whether it is produced ‘artificially’ through mood brighteners. 
All in all, the transhumanist approach to the character of well-being ap-
pears in no way to be a purely hedonist or an utterly subjectivist stance. In con-
95 
trast, even though they themselves maintain that their arguments are not based 
upon any specific conceptions of well-being their considerations suggest that 
they adopt an approach which tends towards objectivism. They list specific 
goods – among them subjective well-being – which are viewed as universally 
having a positive impact on individual well-being and these do not depend on 
the specific individual concerned. Hence, they appear to make commitments on 
the ontological level with regard to the character of well-being which tend to-
wards objectivism. Furthermore, our findings indicate that also within the 
transhumanist well-being-based lines of reasoning the concept of human nature 
is implicitly and sometimes explicitly addressed. It is argued that our human 
nature forces us in the direction of improvement with regard to our human ca-
pacities which in turn is considered promoting our well-being. This is an inter-
esting observation since the transhumanists claim that their arguments are not 
based on a normative conception of human nature. After having dealt with the 
transhumanist assertions, the subsequent section now takes a closer look at the 
arguments in favour of mood enhancement as provided by Kramer. 
Indirect promotion of well-being through mood enhancement 
In his book Listening to Prozac (1997) the American psychiatrist Peter D. 
Kramer deals with the effects of psychiatric medications which were new at the 
time. His description of the story of Tess, a woman who starts to take Prozac, 
has received a lot of attention. Through telling her story, Kramer wants to illus-
trate the positive impact the ingestion of Prozac has and the changes it brings 
about. The following will also concentrate on Kramer’s example of Tess (1997: 
7-8) and the way he applies her story as an argument in favour of mood en-
hancement. But before doing so, it is important to point out that it is open to 
dispute whether the case of Tess does in fact provide an example of enhance-
ment. According to the definition of enhancement given above, Tess’s case 
would not be an instance of enhancement since she contacted Kramer for the 
treatment of her clinical depression. Nevertheless, Kramer himself maintains 
that he does not deal with the impact of Prozac on major mental illnesses; ra-
ther he focuses on ‘fairly healthy people who show dramatically good respons-
es to Prozac, people who are not so much cured of illness as transformed’ 
(ibid.: xvi). He uses the term ‘better than well’ (ibid.: vii) to describe the state 
which Prozac brought about. 
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Kramer describes Tess’s childhood as difficult since she took over the re-
sponsibility for her nine younger siblings and was physically and sexually 
abused as a child. Her mother suffered from clinical depression and her father, 
who died when Tess was twelve, was an alcoholic. At the age of seventeen 
Tess got married in order provide a family environment for her siblings. Her 
marriage was very problematic as her husband was abusive. Kramer illustrates 
that although there were these huge challenges Tess coped amazingly well. She 
managed to achieve a highly responsible position in a large corporation and 
cared for her mother. Although she appeared to be coping well and seemed be a 
successful person, Tess did not consider her life in that way. She was suffering 
from a clinical depression. After two weeks of treatment with Prozac Kramer 
observed remarkable changes. Tess’s improved mental state had a great impact 
on many other aspects of her life. She gained confidence, started dating men 
and experienced the fact that people approached her more readily. Also, she 
was able to handle stress and conflict more easily which made her working life 
easier for her. The application of Prozac made her feel more energetic. Kramer 
describes the transformation the following way: ‘I had never seen a patient’s 
social life reshape so rapidly and dramatically. Low self-worth, competitive-
ness, jealousy, poor inter-personal skills, shyness, fear of intimacy – the usual 
causes of social awkwardness – are so deeply ingrained and so difficult to in-
fluence that ordinarily change comes gradually if at all. But Tess blossomed all 
at once.’ (ibid: 7-8) He stresses the fact that Prozac not only brought Tess out 
of her depression, but is also in a position to change people’s habits and social 
skills. ‘Prozac seemed to give social confidence to the habitually timid, to make 
the sensitive brash, to lend the introvert social skills of salesman’ (ibid.: xii). 
His argumentation suggests that he implicitly considers people’s habits and so-
cial skills as having great impact on individual well-being and flourishing. 
Concerning this matter Stefan Schleim places emphasis on the importance of 
distinguishing between a direct and an indirect way in which pharmaceuticals 
influence well-being: ‘When we discuss the possibility of pharmaceuticals, the 
means in question can directly or indirectly aim at increasing happiness. The 
latter is achieved by influencing other dimensions which in turn increase well-
being’80 (Schleim 2011: 384). According to Kramer, rather than directly influ-
                                           
80  Translation by author. Original quote: ‚Wenn wir die Möglichkeiten von Psychopharma-
ka diskutieren, dann kann das Mittel direkt auf eine Steigerung des Glücks zielen oder 
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encing people’s happiness Prozac indirectly promotes their well-being by mod-
ifying their habits and social skills. Thus, by changing character traits mood 
enhancers indirectly lead to a state which Kramer considers ‘better than well’. 
He does not appear to view Prozac as a ‘pharmaceutical shortcut’ to happiness 
but rather as an indirect way of promoting well-being. Kramer’s lines of argu-
mentation are compared with the assumptions 1b and 2b of the critics, namely: 
1b:’good mood’ is the one and only component of individual well-being, and 
2b: that it does not make a difference whether the pleasure results from activi-
ties and interaction with the ‘real’ world or whether it is directly produced 
through artificial means such as mood brighteners. With regard to 1b, Kramer 
mainly stresses the fact that the ingestion of Prozac and the resulting improve-
ment of mood change individual habits and skills such as social abilities. His 
reflections illustrate that he presupposes that these skills and abilities have an 
impact on individual well-being. Therefore, the underlying assumption of his 
argument seems to be that factors such as social relations, love attachments and 
career are important factors for well-being. Rather than maintaining that ‘good 
mood’ or pleasure is the one and only component of individual well-being, 
Kramer appears to presuppose that there are various factors. Hence, he would 
not agree with assumption 1b. 
Concerning 2b, Kramer’s argumentation also points in a different direc-
tion: As illustrated, his main thesis is that the ingestion of Prozac has a positive 
impact on social interactions and the way certain activities are performed. 
These, in turn, have a positive effect on individual well-being. Thus, according 
to Kramer the increase of well-being results from activities and interactions 
with the ‘real’ world. Kramer’s stance does not necessarily imply assumption 
2b that it does not make a difference whether the pleasure results from activi-
ties and interaction with the ‘real’ world or whether it is produced artificially 
through mood brighteners. 
Furthermore, Kramer does not take a hedonist stance in terms of the char-
acter of well-being. There are some lines of reasoning to be found in which he 
appears to refer to the desires which people have and things which persons 
strive for. This suggests that he bases his argument on a subjective conception 
such as desire fulfilment theory. However, he does not bind his argument to an 
                                                                                                                                  
indirekt Glück versprechen, indem es eine andere Größe beeinflusst, die wiederum zu 
mehr Glück führt‘. 
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utterly subjectivist conception of well-being since he also refers to goods such 
as social relationships, love attachments and career fulfilment which people de-
sire and strive for. For this reason we can observe that he appears to move in an 
intersubjective direction in terms of well-being. Although Kramer’s well-being-
based arguments are not explicitly based upon a specific conception of human 
nature, he also pays attention to the concept: ‘I have focused on this phenome-
non because I find it intriguing and because I believe it has power to influence 
the way we understand human nature’ (Kramer 1997: xvi). He appears to pre-
suppose a more flexible and not rigid concept of human nature which allows 
for transformations by Prozac as in the case of Tess. 
Interim Results  
In conclusion, it can be stated that, as in the opposing arguments brought for-
ward by the critics of mood enhancement, well-being plays a prominent role 
and has an overt presence within the lines of reasoning in favour of these pro-
cedures. Especially the argument of the transhumanists, in which they claim 
that mood enhancement is a legitimate procedure, is directly tied to the value 
they ascribe to the promotion of well-being. Although Kramer refers to well-
being in a comparatively more subtle way, the concept nonetheless is of major 
importance within his lines of reasoning. This is chiefly suggested by the fact 
that he considers pharmaceuticals as means which elevate persons to a state 
‘better than well’. 
In the section dealing with the objection to mood enhancement it was 
made plain with regard to the character of well-being that critics ascribe a he-
donist and utterly subjective stance to proponents of the interventions in ques-
tion. They themselves tie their arguments to objectivist conceptions of well-
being, as illustrated. One would imagine that rival lines of argumentation in the 
debate on mood enhancement rest in their core upon rival concepts of well-
being (objective list concepts versus hedonism). However, the analysis of the 
arguments advanced by proponents of mood brightening procedures proves that 
this is not the case. First of all, it can be extrapolated that the two contentions 
1b and 2b are not to be found in the argumentation in favour of mood en-
hancement. Neither the transhumanists nor Kramer state that 1b ‘good mood’ is 
the one and only component of individual well-being and 2b that it does not 
make a difference whether the pleasure results from activities and interaction 
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with the ‘real’ world or whether it is produced artificially through mood 
brighteners. It must, however, be mentioned that it is in the nature of the trans-
humanists’ argument for it to remain vague especially with regard to 2b. Never-
theless, it is evident that the lines of argumentation in favour of mood brighten-
ing procedures are not based on a purely hedonist and utterly subjectivist con-
cept of the character of well-being.  
The transhumanists expressly do not limit themselves to a specific concept 
of well-being when stating that the improvement of mood should be undertaken 
which ever concept of well-being is applied. However, it has been illustrated 
that their considerations on the issue of enhancement suggest that the approach 
they adopt in terms of the character of well-being, especially with regard to the 
ontological level, tends towards objectivism since they list goods which they 
view as universally important for well-being. Hence, although they state explic-
itly that their argument is not tied to any specific concept of well-being, the 
transhumanists make conceptual commitments which enter through the back-
door, so to speak. Based on the assumption that striving for improvement and 
perfection of these goods in order to increase well-being is part of our human 
nature, they can be considered to take a perfectionist stance regarding the char-
acter of well-being. Moreover, we can observe that they refer to broad concep-
tions of well-being which encompass a variety of different things. These things 
which are considered important for well-being are not limited to health and 
medical matters. 
Peter Kramer, in contrast, cannot be straightforwardly classified as a pro-
ponent of a specific conception of well-being. There are lines of reasoning 
which suggest that the concept of well-being underlying his arguments is a de-
sire-fulfilment theory. Nonetheless, due to the fact that he refers to goods such 
as social relationships, love attachments and career fulfilment which he consid-
ers as intersubjectively shared values he seems to base his argument on an in-
tersubjective concept of well-being in ontological terms. Kramer does not tie 
his arguments to the view that well-being has an utterly subjective nature. Ra-
ther, in his assertions he presupposes that there is a set of important compo-
nents of well-being which can be promoted by administering mood enhancers. 
As illustrated above, he claims that mood enhancers indirectly have a positive 
impact on the promotion of well-being since these components in turn influ-
ence individual well-being. 
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All in all, hedonism does not seem to be represented within the arguments 
in favour of mood enhancement in any great measure. The case is rather that 
supportive lines of argumentation also appear to be founded on broad objective 
(and intersubjective) concepts for the main part. Therefore, contrary to expecta-
tions, opponents and proponents of mood enhancement do not base their con-
tentions on rival concepts of well-being. They are, in fact, more or less of one 
opinion if one considers the PCB and the transhumanists. Hence, critics appear 
to refute a line of argumentation and linked to it a specific concept of the char-
acter of well-being, namely hedonism, which seems to be non-existent in the 
debate and are therefore, found to be ‘attacking a hedonist straw man’.  
In addition, the results of the examination of the role of well-being in the 
debate on mood enhancement suggest that both opponents and proponents of 
mood enhancement frequently appeal to human nature when dealing with the 
essence of individual well-being in the enhancement debate. They both appear 
to apply this concept in a normative fashion. This is an interesting finding 
since the transhumanists themselves claim to reject normative conceptions of 
human nature. However, the impression arises that proponents and opponents 
of mood enhancement presuppose alternative notions when using the term 
‘human nature’. Furthermore, the underlying notion of what it means to be 
human seems to be tied to the specific stance taken as to whether or not mood 
enhancers are in a position to promote well-being. Hence, the relationship of 
the notion of human nature and the concept of well-being appear to require 
further examination.  
4.3. Results arising from the analysis and the issues it 
raises 
The analysis provided in the above has shown that the notion of human nature 
is not only central to the debate on mood enhancement but also appears to be 
closely involved with the arguments (pro as well as con) which relate to indi-
vidual well-being. However, the critics and proponents of mood enhancement 
seem to have diverging ideas of what is meant by the term human nature and 
the impact it has on promoting well-being by means of enhancement. As in the 
previous chapter dealing with the role of well-being in debates at the beginning 
of life, it appears to be worthwhile analysing more closely the presence of well-
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being in the face of the other major concept with which well-being occurs. This 
will help clarifying the role which well-being plays in the debate on mood en-
hancement. How exactly is the concept of human nature applied in the respec-
tive arguments and in what way does this relate to the notion of well-being?  
Moreover, the analysis has shown with respect to the character of well-
being that there is a predominance of broad objective concepts and that subjec-
tive notions are only peripheral in the debate on mood enhancement. The sub-
sequent section also sets out to explore the underlying reasons of the predomi-
nance of broad objective concepts of well-being in the debate on mood en-
hancement.  
4.3.1. The value of (human) nature and the notion of well-
being 
In order to have a starting point when dealing with the relationship between the 
notion of human nature and the concept of well-being, it is necessary to illus-
trate the meaning and the notions tied to the term human nature. This also pro-
vides a background for classifying the alternative conceptions of human nature 
purported by critics and proponents of mood enhancement. Nevertheless, the 
term human nature is highly ambiguous and can refer to a variety of different 
things (cf. Bayertz 2003). With regard to the application in the enhancement 
debate, Lisbeth Witthoff Nielsen maintains that ‘[t]he problem, however, is that 
“nature” and/or “human nature” is referred to as if it were a clearly defined 
concept, and not a nebulous concept that embraces a host of meanings’ 
(Witthoff Nielsen 2011: 22). In order to get a clearer picture of what is at stake 
when the notion of human nature is referred to in the debate of mood enhance-
ment, it is necessary to take a closer look at its various meanings. 
Material versus formal sense of the concept 
When dealing with the notion of human nature, according to Dieter Birnbacher 
(2008), it is important to distinguish between two principal meanings which are 
above all present in the debate on enhancement: 1. human nature is used to re-
fer to the natural side of mankind and to purely biological aspects. In this sense 
the concept of human nature is applied in a material way (cf. ibid.: 100). 
Thereby, the ‘natural’ is often viewed as the opposite concept of the artificial 
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(cf. Bayertz 2003: 134). 2. However, human nature can also refer to the charac-
teristics which humans share. ‘In this sense, “nature” refers to the essential, 
necessary or constitutive features of a thing’ (Birnbacher 2008: 101). Dieter 
Birnbacher refers to the formal sense of the term human nature. ‘Taken in this 
sense, the “nature of man”, even on a minimalistic understanding, involves a 
number of non-biological factors such as the ability to make and to use tools, to 
use language, to build complex social structures and to regulate his behavior by 
a system of internalized norms’. (ibid.) If we recall the above depicted argu-
ments by the critics and proponents of mood enhancement and classify them 
against the background of these two principal meanings, we can, first of all, ob-
serve that both opponents and proponents apply the terms ‘human nature’ and 
‘nature’ with a material and a formal sense. Nonetheless, they do so in a differ-
ent manner. When referring to the material sense critics such as the PCB distin-
guish between natural and artificial means for promoting well-being and as-
cribe different values to them. Only natural means are in a position to promote 
well-being. Nevertheless, as the arguments depicted in the above illustrate, they 
also constantly use the term ‘human nature’ to allude to the essence of what it 
means to be human. Hence, the concept is also applied in a formal sense by the 
critics of mood enhancement. In following the above-mentioned lines of rea-
soning of the PCB, our human nature has an intrinsic value and needs to be 
protected. Enhancement procedures are considered as constituting a threat to 
our human nature.  
It is important to take a look at the arguments of the proponents in order to 
see in which way they apply the terms ‘human nature’ and ‘nature’. Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to assign a specific stance to Peter Kramer since he barely 
refers to the concept of human nature and his arguments do not provide enough 
information to function as a basis for classification. For this reason the follow-
ing, for the most part, refers to the transhumanists when the proponents of 
mood enhancement are concerned. The arguments of proponents of mood en-
hancement provided in the above suggest that they apply the term in its materi-
al sense when illustrating which conditions have to be overcome by means of 
enhancement. ‘The rise of modern science and technology has radically trans-
formed the relation between human beings and nature. Nature, which for mil-
lennia had seemed all powerful and immutable, has suddenly become an object 
for control and manipulation, something that can be systematically shaped to 
human ends.’ (Savulescu et al. 2011: preface) Nature applied in its material 
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sense is viewed as setting limits which ought to be conquered. The transhuman-
ists thereby explicitly reject arguments which ascribe value to human nature or 
nature in terms of the material sense. However, they also apply the term human 
nature in order to refer to its formal dimension stating that improvement, de-
velopment and progress are a fundamental element of our human nature. Alt-
hough not always explicitly mentioned, choosing to be better is considered a 
constitutive element of our human nature. Hence, we can ascertain that both the 
critics and the proponents apply the concept of human nature in order to refer to 
its formal sense. However, this merely provides a first imprecise answer to the 
question as to what proponents and opponents of enhancement mean exactly 
when they refer to the concepts of human nature. It appears to be helpful to take 
a closer look at the alternative ways in which they deal with ‘what it means to 
be human’ within their arguments.  
The gratitude and the creativity framework 
Eric Parens (2005, 2006) differentiates between two divergent ethical frame-
works which underlie the arguments in favour of and against enhancement and 
might help to clarify the specific concepts of human nature to which the alter-
native arguments are tied. Parens distinguishes between the gratitude and the 
creativity framework. The gratitude framework ‘emphazises our obligation to 
remember that life is a gift and that we need to learn to let things be’ (Parens 
2005: 38). Parens points out that this stance is often taken by critics of en-
hancement. Proponents, in contrast, frequently base their arguments on the cre-
ativity model which ‘emphasizes our obligation to transform that gift and to 
exhibit our creativity’ (ibid.).  
The above-depicted arguments of the critics and proponents of mood en-
hancement can easily be assigned to the two alternative frameworks. Critics 
such as the PCB, who view mood enhancement as an intrusion upon human na-
ture, clearly adhere to the gratitude framework. Thereby, they ‘tend to indirect-
ly presume that there is a certain state of “naturalness”, or a “human nature” 
essence, which can be applied as a reference state in the assessment of the use 
of a particular technology’ (Witthoefft Nielsen 2011: 26). They ascribe intrinsic 
value to this state of naturalness implying ‘that [the value] is inherent to human 
nature “in itself”, independent of what any individual or all humans accept as 
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valuable’ (Bayertz 2003: 143). Due to its intrinsic value critics place emphasis 
on the importance of protecting human nature from intrusions.  
Proponents such as the transhumanists, in contrast, tie their arguments to 
conceptions of human nature as an evolutionary process. Their stance can be 
classified as a creativity approach stating that we have the obligation to trans-
form our human capacities by means of enhancement. Thus, when propounding 
their arguments, the transhumanists presuppose a dynamic concept of human 
nature. Proponents such as Savulescu and Bostrom consider the improvement 
of our body as resulting from our reason which is directed to self-improvement 
and part of our human nature (cf. Hauskeller 2009: 11). However, ‘the idea [of 
this kind of] inherent value of nature is not a new invention’ (Bayertz 2003: 
144). By referring to the telos of rationality and our obligation to develop and 
exercise it, the proponents of enhancement allude to the ancient argument of 
ergon, ‘according to which a human being can only lead a good life if he real-
izes and cultivates his own specific potentials – his rationality – in the best pos-
sible way’ (ibid.: 145). Hence, in following the transhumanists the promotion 
of our human capacities by means such as mood enhancers results from our ra-
tionality and, thus, can be considered part of our human nature. Due to this fact 
the ingestion of mood enhancers cannot be classified as artificial. In following 
the creativity stance the differentiation between the natural and the artificial 
loses credibility. 
For the time being we can conclude that both critics and proponents of 
mood enhancement apply normative concepts of human nature, but these, how-
ever, are of a different kind. Michael Hauskeller points out that ‘[t]hey assign 
moral authority to different conceptions of human nature and see different 
things as valuable’ (Hauskeller 2009: 5). Whereas critics such as the PCB ad-
here to the gratitude framework, proponents of mood enhancement tie their ar-
guments to the creativity approach. In both approaches ‘nature’ or ‘human na-
ture’ is considered an objective point of reference for normative claims with 
regard to the legitimacy of the application of enhancement procedures.  
Moreover, a closer scrutiny reveals that the alternative concepts of human 
nature purported by critics and proponents determine what is considered to be 
the essence of well-being. Whereas critics of enhancement view the constitu-
ents of well-being as static and worthy of protection, the proponents maintain 
that the continuous improvement of our human capacities constitutes a basic 
requisite of well-being. In a nutshell: we can increase well-being by sustaining 
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our human nature versus we can increase well-being by transforming our-
selves. The alternative notions of the essence of well-being mirror the above 
depicted two different approaches to human nature, the gratitude and the crea-
tivity framework. Thus, both critics and proponents of mood enhancement con-
sider human nature as a guide telling us what we need to do in order to promote 
our well-being. But what precisely does this imply with regard to the relation-
ship of the concept of human nature and well-being within the arguments of 
critics and proponents? 
The alternative concepts of human nature and their 
relationship to well-being 
The concept of human nature can relate in different ways to the notion of well-
being. The presence of well-being when occurring with the notion of human 
nature depends on the kind of value which is attributed to both human nature 
and well-being. To begin with we take a cursory glance at the different values 
which can be ascribed to human nature and the impact this has on its relation-
ship to well-being.  
1. The intrinsic value of human nature: As hinted above, human nature 
can be considered to have an intrinsic value. That is to say, human nature has a 
value ‘in itself’ and for its own sake. Thus, it is not valuable for the sake of an-
ything else and its value does not depend on individual preferences. If the in-
trinsic value of human nature is presupposed and the striving to promote our 
well-being is considered part of human nature then the promotion of well-being 
ultimately has instrumental value for the sake of the realization of human na-
ture. In this case individual well-being can only be promoted if we comply with 
our human nature. There are specific values embedded in human nature which 
need to be promoted if well-being is to be increased. Hence, whatever has a 
positive influence on our well-being can be directly derived from our human 
nature. In turn, human nature is viewed as an objective yardstick for what will 
promote our well-being.  
2. The derivative value of human nature: If a derivative value is attributed 
to human nature, the latter is only of value in as far as it succeeds in promoting 
something else. Specific dimensions of human nature could be valued for the 
sake of increasing our well-being: ‘[i]t would show certain intuitive, well-
founded ideals of “naturalness” to be elements of a good life and a prerequisite 
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of human flourishing’ (Bayertz 2003: 148). In following this notion, well-being 
is attributed intrinsic value, whereas human nature has a derivate value. The 
concept of well-being thereby is not completely determined by our human na-
ture since it consists of further dimensions. Human nature only has a prima fa-
cie value which can be outweighed by other aspects of well-being. Therefore, it 
cannot function as a yardstick for our well-being. 
Having contemplated these two different values which can be attributed to 
human nature, and the resultant alternative ways in which human nature and 
well-being can relate to each other, it is now time to establish the notions to 
which proponents and opponents of mood enhancement adhere. When investi-
gating the lines of reasoning purported by the critics of mood enhancement one 
can easily ascertain that they attribute an intrinsic value to the notion of human 
nature. Striving to promote our well-being is considered part of our human na-
ture and, furthermore, our human nature determines what promotes our well-
being. We can, thus, conclude that the notion of well-being is attributed deriva-
tive value within the arguments of opponents of mood enhancement. Well-
being, therefore, has a subordinate presence in the face of human nature where 
the opponents of mood enhancement are concerned. 
It has been illustrated that the transhumanists place emphasis on the fact 
that the promotion of well-being is their central argument in favour of en-
hancement. At first sight, one therefore gets the impression that the notion of 
human nature is of lesser relevance to their argumentation or even of no im-
portance at all, since the transhumanists explicitly distance themselves from a 
normative conception of human nature. The promotion of well-being, in con-
trast, appears to be at the heart of their argument. Nonetheless, the analysis in 
the above has indicated that the notion of human nature is of greater importance 
within their arguments than the transhumanists might want to admit. As we 
have seen, closer inspection shows that it even determines what is considered 
as promoting our well-being, namely the improvement of our human capacities. 
Thus, it can be concluded that, contrary to what the transhumanists assert, they 
also ascribe intrinsic value to the concept of human nature and instrumental 
value to the notion of well-being. Proponents of enhancement consider human 
nature to be continually evolving and, therefore, self-improvement by means of 
enhancement is deemed promoting our well-being. Although not immediately 
visible, well-being also has a subordinate presence within the arguments of the 
transhumanists whereas the notion of human nature enjoys an intrinsic value 
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and is of primary importance. Hence, both proponents and opponents of mood 
enhancement explicitly or implicitly attribute intrinsic value to the notion of 
human nature and merely instrumental value to the notion of well-being. On the 
grounds of this finding, it can even be conclude that the transhumanists seek to 
conceal the major importance which they ascribe to the notion of human nature 
by constantly placing the promotion of well-being in the foreground. These re-
sults concerning the relationship between human nature and well-being within 
the arguments of the opposing camps already hint at possible reasons why 
broad objective concepts of well-being prevail in the debate on mood en-
hancement.  
4.3.2. The prevalence of broad objective conceptions of well-
being 
In the above analysis it has been observed that critics of mood enhancement 
intimate that the proponents of these procedures take a subjective stance with 
regard to well-being. It has been shown, however, that the approaches to well-
being of critics and proponents of mood enhancement are actually not worlds 
apart as they both tend towards an objective direction. Where the ontological 
level is concerned, both appear to presuppose broad objective conceptions of 
the character of well-being. But what is the reason for this tendency?  
Bare versus explanatory objectivism 
Generally speaking, there are various explanations for the adherence to objec-
tive concepts of well-being. In order to shed some light on this issue, Philipp 
Kitcher (1999) distinguishes between bare and explanatory objectivism. 
Whereas the latter explains and justifies the specific goods which are consid-
ered components of well-being by referring to a theory which unifies the differ-
ent elements, the former merely provides lists of goods which contribute to 
well-being without justifying them. Concerning the presence of bare objectivist 
theories Wayne Sumner offers the following comment: ‘[a]lthough it is easy to 
find philosophers who count themselves as objectivist about welfare, it is sur-
prising how few of them have anything like a genuine theory to offer’ (Sumner 
2003: 45). Hence, it frequently appears to be the case that objectivists do not 
provide us with explanations as to why the specific goods they list should be 
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considered as components of well-being. But what about the opponents and 
proponents of mood enhancement? Do they provide explanations for their ob-
jectivist conceptions? The analysis has shown that proponents as well as oppo-
nents continuously refer to human nature when maintaining that specific ele-
ments promote individual well-being. Our human nature is the explanation 
which they offer when claiming that specific goods constitute well-being. It 
should, however, be recalled that the transhumanists do not explicitly take an 
objectivist stance and also do not explicitly tie their arguments to the notion of 
human nature. As illustrated, this is often conveyed indirectly in the course of 
their argumentation. Nonetheless, we can conclude that both proponents as well 
as opponents adhere to explanatory objectivism since they give human nature 
as an explanation. But what is the relationship between objectivist concepts of 
well-being and the notion of human nature? 
Objective concepts of well-being and essentialism 
It has been shown that both proponents and critics of mood enhancement pre-
suppose within their arguments that our human nature has a specific underlying 
essence and specific features. For this reason, they can both be considered to 
take an essentialist stance. Martha C. Nussbaum claims essentialism is ‘the 
view that human life has certain central defining features’ (Nussbaum 1992: 
205).81 Essentialist approaches often presuppose that there is a link between the 
essence of human nature and the components which promote our well-being. A 
well-known representative of this stance, which is based on the assumption that 
our human nature specifies what a good life consists of, is Aristotle. ‘On one 
interpretation of his writings, Aristotle supplied the model for this type of theo-
ry, proposing that the human species has an essence and that this essence de-
termines what contributes to the goodness of a human life.’ (Kitcher 1999: 60) 
Contemporary accounts of this kind are to be found within the works of Thom-
as Hurka (1996). In following these approaches, well-being is promoted when 
we live according to our human nature and realize those capacities which are 
                                           
81  Nonetheless, the essentialist stance which opponents and proponents of mood enhance-
ment take is of a different kind. Whereas the biconservatives make substantial commit-
ments with regard to the concept of human nature, the transhumanist commitments, for 
the most part, refer to the superordinate level describing formal features of human nature. 
Nonetheless, also the transhumanists list specific capacities and features which they ap-
pear to consider part of human nature. 
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part of the essence of human nature. Human nature is considered a given fact 
which constitutes an objective point of reference when determining what pro-
motes our well-being. This means also the constituents of well-being are objec-
tive and, therefore, not subject to our individual preferences and desires. We 
can ascertain that there is a strong connection between essentialist concepts of 
human nature and objective conceptions of well-being. Especially with regard 
to the ontological level what constitutes well-being is viewed as being deter-
mined by our human nature.  
Transposing the insights to the case of mood enhancement 
By bringing together these elaborations with the results obtained so far con-
cerning the relationship of well-being and the notion of human nature within 
the arguments of opponents and proponents of mood enhancement, we can 
clearly ascertain the possible underlying reason for the predominance of objec-
tive dimensions of well-being in the discussions. The overriding importance 
given to the concept of human nature by proponents as well as opponents of 
mood enhancement and their essentialist stance provide us with a convincing 
explanation with regard to the prevalence of objective conceptions. Within the 
arguments of both camps, human nature is attributed an intrinsic value and the 
specific concept of human nature under consideration determines in each case 
what is to be understood as the essence of well-being. Both critics and propo-
nents list specific goods, human traits or capacities which they consider as im-
portant for individual well-being. Their alternative concepts of human nature, 
above all, lead to different ideas as to how we should treat these elements of 
our human nature. As already mentioned, critics state that we increase well-
being by sustaining our human traits and characteristics, whereas proponents of 
enhancement maintain that we promote well-being by transforming and per-
fecting our human capacities. This indicates that transhumanists take a perfec-
tionist stance with regard to well-being, as already suggested. This is in keeping 
with the evidence that within their arguments the transhumanists frequently al-
lude to the teaching of Aristotle, who also establishes a link between essence 
and perfection. They appear to establish a connection with Aristotle’s contem-
plations to give their arguments, as Bostrom terms it ‘a distinguished pedigree’ 
(Bostrom 2008: 19). All in all, we can conclude by saying that objective con-
cepts of well-being prevail in the debate on mood enhancement because of the 
110 
substantial weight given to human nature. The character of well-being can, 
therefore, be considered as being subject to the influence of the notion of hu-
man nature within the debate on mood enhancement. The essentialist concepts 
of human nature, which are ascribed intrinsic value, appear to require objective 
concepts of well-being. 
Nonetheless, one issue remains to be resolved – why are the concepts of 
well-being which are applied in the enhancement debate comparatively broad? 
The prevalence of broad conceptions of well-being 
Apart from the fact that objective concepts of well-being prevail in the debate 
on mood enhancement, we have also observed that where well-being is referred 
to, a variety of aspects are concerned which are not limited to health-related 
well-being. In addition, they extend beyond the reduction of pain and suffering 
since they refer to positive dimensions of well-being such as pleasure. The 
quality of pleasure is an important issue and alleged components of well-being 
such as social relationships, love attachments and career fulfilment are also of 
relevance. The listed elements of well-being exceed the realm of health and ap-
parent medical need. This is not surprising, however, since, as we have already 
shown, the core definition of enhancement is that it is concerned with ‘inter-
ventions designed to improve human form or functioning beyond what is nec-
essary to sustain or restore good health’ (Juengst 1998: 29). Hence, enhance-
ment is also aimed at other components of a good life apart from merely health, 
health-related well-being and the reduction of pain and suffering. It is often 
classified as ‘wish-fulfilling medicine’ as opposed to traditional curative medi-
cine which is primarily concerned with the sustainment and restoration of 
health (cf. Kettner 2006). Obviously our wishes and desires go beyond the res-
toration of our health and demand various components of well-being some of 
which are a central theme in the enhancement debate such as pleasure and good 
mood. For this reason, broad concepts of well-being are applied in the debate. 
Nonetheless, due to the fact that enhancement interventions are concerned with 
matters other than health, they have received a lot of criticism and the question 
is frequently raised whether or not enhancement should be included in the tar-
gets of medicine.  
111 
4.4. Drawing conclusions with regard to the role of 
well-being in the debate on mood enhancement 
It is now time to take a look at what results emerge from the analysis of the 
consideration of well-being in the debate on mood enhancement. What do our 
present findings contribute to our central theme of rethinking well-being in bi-
omedical ethics? 
It is directly noticeable, even at first glance, that the concept of well-being 
plays a prominent role in the current debate. Both proponents as well as oppo-
nents make frequent reference to the concept in order to support their argumen-
tation concerning mood enhancement. Contrary to the debate on prenatal test-
ing and selective abortion, well-being is almost always explicitly cited. Conse-
quently, it can be considered to have an overt presence. In addition, it has been 
extrapolated that the concept of well-being has a subordinate presence in the 
face of the notion of human nature. Although proponents and opponents of en-
hancement frequently refer to the concept of well-being they both ascribe a de-
rivative value to it whereas human nature enjoys an intrinsic value. Nonethe-
less, the transhumanists try to conceal the value they ascribe to human nature 
by placing well-being in the foreground of their argumentation. 
In the debate on mood enhancement the discussions revolve around the 
question: What is the essence of well-being? Hence, it is possible to observe 
against the background of the subjective/objective scheme of alternative levels 
provided in the previous chapter, that in the debate on mood enhancement the 
ontological level in terms of well-being is primarily involved and that the epis-
temic and evaluative levels are of secondary importance. Moreover, the inves-
tigation of the arguments of both critics and proponents of mood enhancement 
reveals that the three alternative theories from chapter two, namely hedonism, 
desire-fulfilment theories and objective list theories are indeed present. Never-
theless, the differentiation between the three alternative levels introduced at the 
end of chapter 3 provides a helpful means of gaining a clearer insight into the 
specific concept of well-being applied in the discussions.  
It became evident in the analysis of the character of well-being within de-
bates on prenatal testing and selective abortion that there is tension between 
subjectivist and objectivist notions of well-being. We can also recognise this 
clearly in the debate on mood enhancement. It is interesting to note that oppo-
nents of mood enhancement actually criticise subjectivist theories of well-
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being, that is to say hedonist theories, within their arguments contra enhance-
ment while purporting an objectivist stance. However, this has been proved to 
be ‘attacking a hedonist straw man’ since proponents of mood enhancement do 
not take the alleged subjectivist stance. It could, therefore, almost be main-
tained that critics specifically make use of the tension between subjective and 
objective concepts of well-being for their own arguments.  
Another striking result of the analysis of the character of well-being in the 
context of mood enhancement is the prevalence of broad objective conceptions 
of well-being. The broadness of the conception of well-being has been shown 
as resulting from the fact that enhancement targets a broad variety of compo-
nents of well-being which are not directly related to health. Furthermore, 
whereas the debates dealing with the beginning of life were found to be primar-
ily concerned with the protection of well-being by the prevention of pain and 
suffering, the enhancement debate clearly focuses on the promotion of well-
being beyond the restoration and protection of health.  
Concerning the predominance of objective concepts, it has been concluded 
that this is a consequence of the weight and value given to the notion of human 
nature by both proponents and opponents of mood enhancement. There are in-
fluences from the notion of human nature on the concept of well-being: both 
critics and proponents of mood enhancement bind their arguments to essential-
ist concepts of human nature. These determine in each case that there are spe-
cific objective components of well-being and what these are. Thus, in the de-
bate on mood enhancement the essentialist concepts of human nature require 
the character of well-being to be objective. On a more general level, the im-
pression becomes strengthened that the concept of well-being is vulnerable to 
influences by other notions dominant in the respective debates. The fact there 
appears to be an impact from the other prevalent notions on the concept of 
well-being has already been suggested by the findings in chapter 3 dealing with 
debates concerning prenatal testing and selection.  
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5. The reference to well-being in debates 
on the allocation of scarce goods within 
medicine: the example of kidney 
allocation 
The previous chapter dealing with the role of well-being within the discussion 
on enhancement has, for the most part, focused on the effect of enhancement 
procedures on the well-being of the specific individual concerned. In medicine 
and healthcare, however, decisions often have to be taken which have an im-
pact on various persons and their well-being. This is, for example, the case 
when scarce resources have to be allocated. Problems arising from the alloca-
tion of scarce resources appear in various ways and on various levels: the ques-
tion arises, for instance, whether financial resources should be spent on preven-
tive medicine or rather on the care of patients who are already ill. At a lower 
level, the question might also arise as to which specific institutes such as cardi-
ac or obstetric units should receive financial support if only one can be sup-
ported. Priority setting in the case of funding alternative forms of treatment 
such as kidney transplantation or renal dialysis might also represent a challenge 
if there are not enough financial resources to fully fund both. These are all ex-
amples of problems on the so-called level of macroallocation and priority set-
ting decisions concerning these matters always affect the well-being of patients 
who depend on the specific forms of treatment under consideration. The level 
of microallocation82 is concerned with dilemmas in which medical resources 
which are scarce, because of limitations in natural supply or economic con-
straints, have to be distributed among patients who need them but will inevita-
bly not all receive them. A case in which treatment is not readily available to all 
patients in need means that decisions have to be taken about which patients 
should be given priority provides an example of this.83  
                                           
82  The differentiation between macro- and microallocation stems from Engelhardt 1996. 
83  Beauchamp and Childress furnish a more detailed picture of the various allocation forms 
distinguishing between four types: 1. partitioning the comprehensive social budget, 2. al-
locating with the health budget, 3. allocating within targeted budgets and 4. allocating 
scarce treatments for patients (see Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 279-80). 
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Irrespective of whether they occur on the level of micro- or macroalloca-
tion, priority setting choices always and unavoidably constitute decisions which 
directly or indirectly influence the well-being of the individuals who are in 
need of the specific treatments or resources concerned. These decisions have 
far-reaching implications and can, of course, constitute ‘tragic choices’ (Cala-
bresi and Bobbitt 1978) of life or death such as in the case of organ allocation 
or the allocation of beds in an intensive care unit. The question arises as to who 
should receive priority and which standards would be appropriate for priority 
setting in the first place. A wide range of differing criteria exist or have been 
proposed for this matter.  
There is a common reflex reaction to the problem of resource allocation in 
healthcare both on the macro- as well as on the micro level. Lockwood de-
scribes this the following way: ‘[it is frequently argued that] one should put 
one’s resources where they do the most good’ (Lockwood 1988: 34). At a first 
glance, this utilitarian line of reasoning might, indeed, appear to be quite com-
pelling and justified in the process of allocating scarce goods (cf. Gutmann and 
Land 1997: 193). In the case of scarcity why not try to achieve the most good? 
Veatch maintains with a focus on organ transplantation that ‘[i]t is obvious that 
we are interested in organ transplant because we are convinced that it can be 
beneficial to those in need of organs’ (Veatch 2000: 288). In following this ar-
gument, clearly the saving of lives is viewed as an important good and as effec-
tive when allocating scarce medical resources. 
Nonetheless, it is also a widely held view that resources should be distrib-
uted in such a way that they, in addition to prolonging life, should also promote 
the well-being of the persons concerned. In many cases of health care an exten-
sion of life is not accompanied by an improvement of well-being. Sometimes it 
might even decrease the well-being of the person concerned. Consequently, 
both the anticipated quantity and quality of life should be considered and are 
said to be relevant factors in setting priority. Thus, at a first glance the ‘simple 
strategy’ of putting one’s resources where they do the most good in terms of 
longevity and well-being has a lot of intuitive appeal. Hence, the notion of 
well-being appears to play a major role. Nonetheless, we need to examine in 
depth whether or not the ‘simple strategy’ is indeed applied in practice and 
whether or not this is all to be said about the role played by well-being in de-
bates on the allocation of scarce goods in health care. 
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This chapter attempts to provide a detailed picture of the presence and 
character of well-being in debates on microallocation. A prominent case has 
been singled out: the subsequent analysis places a focus on the subject of organ 
allocation as this matter often serves as a paradigm case at hand in academic 
and public discussions about resource allocation in healthcare (cf. Childress 
1991: 182). The focus is set on kidney allocation. After a short introduction to 
the quandary of organ allocation this chapter considers the criteria and concepts 
applied in practice as an initial approximation to the role of well-being in the 
allocation of kidneys. In a second step, the chapter focuses on an examination 
of well-being as a consideration in the broader academic debate on appropriate 
standards for organ allocation. Two specific criteria in which the concept well-
being appears to be an important consideration fall under scrutiny, namely the 
criteria of outcome and patient need.  
5.1. The quandary of organ allocation 
Since the 1960s organ transplantations have become common practice (cf. 
Schöne-Seifert 2007: 137). The list of organs which can be transplanted in-
cludes kidneys, lungs, intestines, the liver, the heart and the pancreas. These are 
transferred as a matter of routine practice and with increasing success nowa-
days. Apart from being life saving interventions, transplantations improve the 
quality of life of the patients concerned. This is especially the case with kidney 
transplantations which provide a better alternative to renal dialysis. Further-
more, tissue, bone marrow and corneas are transplanted. However, ‘because 
they are not functional wholes, they are not considered organs’ (Munson 2009: 
211). Living donors are only eligible for regenerative tissue such as bone mar-
row, paired organs such as kidneys or organs which can be transplanted in sec-
tions like the liver. Most grafts are procured from deceased donors who have 
been diagnosed as brain dead84, this refers to the irreversible loss of brain func-
tion, including the brainstem (cf. American Academy of Neurology 1994). Due 
to the growing discrepancy between the demand for organs and their availabil-
                                           
84  However, the criterion of ‘brain death’ as an indicator for death has received fierce criti-
cism from many sides (see for instance Veatch 1993; Shewmon 1992). Deviating from 
the standard definition, irreversible brain stem dysfunction is considered the indicator of 
death in the United Kingdom.  
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ity, in many countries (with the exception of Germany) transplants are also in-
creasingly taken from non-heart-beating-donors (donors after circulatory 
death).  
Transplants are ‘by their nature a scarce commodity’85 (Ach 1997 and 
Fuchs 1993). There are not enough organs available to fully supply all persons 
waiting for a transplant since the number of patients in need by far exceeds the 
number of organs available for transplantation.86 ‘Every year nearly 10,000 
people on the United States’ United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) na-
tional waiting list die without getting the organ they need to survive’ (Munson 
2009: 212). Thus, as already mentioned in the above, the allocation decisions 
which have to be taken are, because of their existential importance for the po-
tential recipients, ‘tragic choices’ or even a ‘fatal decision’87 as Weyma Lübbe 
(2004) terms them. We are facing a moral dilemma since we are not in a posi-
tion to provide all persons with a transplant who need one (cf. Gutmann and 
Fateh-Moghadam 2002). Furthermore, it can be assumed that as a result of our 
ageing population the list of people waiting to receive an implant will grow 
even longer. Other procedures such as xenotransplantation (the transplantation 
of organs from one species to another) or the use of artificial organs for trans-
plantation have, because of their early developmental stage, not been in a posi-
tion to provide a viable alternative so far and thus, at the moment there remains 
no solution to the ongoing problem of scarcity. The demand for transplants by 
far exceeds the supply. 
All in all, there are two central questions especially arising from the prob-
lem of scarcity which receive society’s attention: ‘(1) how can the organ supply 
be increased, and (2) how should the available organs be allocated?’ (Childress 
1996: 397). 
Specifically the question as to how the limited number of organs available 
for transplantation should be allocated among the many patients in need consti-
tutes a normative problem rather than being a medical question (cf. Gutmann 
                                           
85  Translation by author. Original title of the article: ‘Von Natur aus knapp’. 
86  Nevertheless, the scarcity of organs does not present such a great problem in countries 
such as Spain or Austria in which the opt-out legislative system for organ donation is op-
erated. In following this system, anyone who has not declined is considered a donor. It is 
said to increase rates of consent for donation. Thus, the scarcity of donor organs repre-
sents a problem especially in countries such as Germany, in which only those who have 
given explicit consent to donation are considered donors (the opt-in legislative system). 
87  Translation by author. Original title of the book:‘Tödliche Entscheidung‘. 
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and Land 1997: 192). Dan Brock states that ‘[it] is important to emphasize that 
there are no value-neutral selection criteria that could permit bypassing the 
need to make ethical judgements in the recipient selection process’ (Brock 
1988: 88). There is no such thing as objective medical criteria to tackle the 
problem of priority setting since value judgements are always implicitly pre-
sent.88 Thus, physicians, as such, have no special competence in providing an 
answer to the question of appropriate criteria for allocation (cf. Veatch 1991b). 
Instead, it is pointed out by many participants in the debate on organ allocation 
that the donated organs should be viewed as public property and a matter of 
public responsibility and that the public should formulate criteria for allocation 
(see for instance Childress 1991; Land and Dossetor 1991; Veatch 1991a). At 
this point the question arises: What are the criteria according to which organs 
should be allocated? This presents a significant problem since, as Thomas 
Gutmann states ‘some norms for distribution are less unfair than others and 
some might have more and stronger moral conviction in a coherent entirety 
than others’89 (Gutmann 1998: 64). Various proposals for appropriate criteria 
have been made, some of which have attracted a great deal of interest and have 
been implemented in allocation practice, while others have been duly rejected 
for a number of reasons such as unfair consequences or because they are based 
on non-compelling premises.  
In order to map out the terrain for our central aim of analysing what kind 
of role well-being might play in the process of organ allocation and the way the 
concept is considered in the criteria for allocation, let us first of all consider the 
criteria which are applied in practice.  
5.2. Criteria used in allocation practice: Eurotransplant 
and United Network of Organ Sharing 
Various networks have been set up for the mediation and allocation of organs 
in different parts of the world. They operate according to different criteria and 
have differing practices for allocation. The following provides an illustration of 
                                           
88  One instance of this is the value judgment about what should be considered good out-
come (cf. Brock 1988: 89). 
89  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Doch manche Verteilungsnormen sind weniger 
ungerecht, manche bringen mehr und stärkere moralische Überzeugungen in ein kohären-
tes Ganzes als andere’. 
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the actual allocation practices as carried out by the two major organisations: 
Eurotransplant International Foundation (hereafter ET) and United Network of 
Organ Sharing (hereafter UNOS). In the above it has been pointed out that one 
would expect the ‘simple strategy’ of maximizing good in terms of longevity 
and well-being to be commonplace in allocation practice and one would there-
fore assume that well-being is to play a major role. The following aims to dis-
cover whether or not this is indeed the case. Whenever the concept ‘well-being’ 
is referred to, we will pay attention to the context and the criteria within which 
it constitutes a consideration. This could provide a first idea of where the notion 
of well-being comes into play and the way it might be linked to specific criteria 
applied in practice. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the various organs are allo-
cated according to alternative criteria. Owing to the vast scope of this field, the 
following concentrates on the allocation of kidneys. 
Eurotransplant International Foundation  
ET constitutes an international non-profit making organization, which was es-
tablished in 1967 and is situated in Leiden in the Netherlands. The foundation 
is responsible for the allocation of organs in its member states ‘Austria, Bel-
gium, Croatia, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia’ (ET 
2015).90 With the aim of distributing all donated organs among a pool of recipi-
ents as broad as possible, these countries have agreed by treaty to register all 
patients in need of transplant as well as all cases of organ donation at ET via 
their transplantation centres (cf. Conrads 1996: 300). In order to generate a 
waiting list of potential recipients, ET provides a central computer database to 
which the transplantation centres within the member states have access. The 
profile supplying general and medical information about patients in need, such 
as the organ required, status of urgency, blood group and tissue characteristics 
is transferred onto the data base by the respective transplantation centres. The 
data base also contains the profile of donors so that, according to the ET, the 
‘best match’ between donor organs and potential recipients can be ascertained 
(cf. ET 2015). For each donor organ a so-called match list is generated by a 
specific computer algorithm (cf. ibid.). But what exactly are the relevant crite-
                                           
90  Similar networks for other countries are Scandiatransplant for Iceland, Norway, Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden, and Balttransplant for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
119 
ria for the selection of the recipients of donated organs? The foundation itself 
only provides brief information about its general aims and relevant criteria for 
allocation. ET places emphasis on the fact that ‘[i]n all deliberations and rec-
ommendations of the Ethics Committee the need and well-being of the patient 
(as well as the donor) is a key focus’ (ET 2011: 3). 
On their website ET state that generally speaking ‘[t]he match is based 
upon two general principles: 
1. Expected outcome 
2. Urgency (as determined by experts in an objective and trans-
parent way) 
Furthermore, the following is taken into account: 
1. National organ balance - for Eurotransplant pursuits a reasona-
ble balance in the exchange of organs between countries 
2. Waiting time’ 
(ET 2015) 
 
According to the German Medical Association the criterion of expected out-
come refers to the long-term functioning of the graft and the thereby ensured 
survival of the recipient with an improved quality of life (cf. Bundesärztekam-
mer 2010: 1533). Urgency, in contrast, focuses on the damage to health which 
is to be avoided by means of the transplantation (cf. ibid.). It has already been 
mentioned briefly in the above that the criteria for allocation are organ-specific. 
Each type of organ has a special set of criteria tailored to its specific properties. 
In order to obtain a more detailed picture of how these general factors are taken 
into account, let us take a look at a more concrete example: the case of kidney 
allocation.91 ET’s rules which are currently in use for kidney allocation are in-
tegrated into a model called the Eurotransplant Kidney Allocation System (ET-
KAS). After having been implemented in 1996, ETKAS has been continuously 
refined and operates now according to a point system. The total amount of 
                                           
91  As already mentioned, there are striking differences between the sets of criteria applied 
for the various organs. The analysis of the relevance of well-being focuses on criteria ap-
plied for the allocation of kidneys. Nonetheless, priority setting decisions in the case of 
kidney allocation are not representative for all grafts since (in contrast to heart and liver 
transplants) they involve decisions of life and death to a lesser degree. There is always 
the alternative of renal dialysis.  
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points a potential recipient receives is the decisive factor for priority-setting 
among all candidates. The following provides a simplified outline92 of the order 
of allocation and the criteria in operation: 
 
Order of allocation in the case of kidneys 
- Acceptable mismatch-patients (highly immunized patients)93 
- High HLA-match94 (“full house”- compatibility) 
- All other patients 
 
ETKAS point score system 
- Tissue matching (HLA-Match grade) (max. 400 points) 
- Low probability of ever finding a suitable HLA-Match (Mismatch Prob-
ability95) (max. 100 points) 
- Waiting time for renal transplantation (33.33 points/year, max. 200 
points, bonus to children96) 
- Distance between donor and recipient centre (max. 260 points) 
- National Import/Export Balance (max. 200 points) 
 
With reference to the order of allocation, highly immunized patients and those 
with a high HLA-match are given priority over all other patients on the waiting 
list who are in the ETKAS point score system. Furthermore, the so-called high 
                                           
92  This outline is based upon a model provided by Johann Ach (Ach 1997: 35) and recent 
refinements as portrayed in Bundesärztekammer (2010) and Mayer and Persijn (2006). 
93  Highly sensitized patients have a low chance of finding a compatible donor organ since 
they have developed antibodies against various HLA antigens. Because of their low 
chance of transplantation they are treated in separate program called the ‘acceptable 
mismatch program’.  
94  Human leukocyte antigens (HLA) are proteins which the immune system uses to recog-
nize which cells belong to the body and which do not. HLAs are an indicator of tissue 
compatibility between a donor and a potential recipient. A close match between HLA 
markers of the recipient and the donor reduces the likelihood that the transplant will be 
rejected. It is an important factor in kidney and pancreas allocation. (cf. Davis and Wolitz 
2006). Patients with a high HLA-match receive priority. 
95  There are potential recipients with a lower probability of receiving a suitable organ due 
to rare tissue types or their blood group (Type O), for instance. This problem frequently 
occurs with first and second generation immigrants from a different ethnic background. 
Thus, in following ETKAS these low probability-recipients should be taken into account 
in a special way. 
96  Children who are over the age of 16 at the time of registration receive a bonus. 
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urgency patients whose life is in danger are treated preferentially by receiving 
500 additional points.  
In taking a look at the various criteria applied one can recognize that there 
are two central principles underlying them: the principle of maximizing utility 
and the principle of justice (Ach 1997: 36; Gutmann and Land 1997: 193-6; ET 
2010: 1). 
The principle of maximizing utility97 stresses the importance of using the 
transplants as effectively and efficiently98 as possible focusing on the prospec-
tive medical benefit. This is, above all, expressed by the application of the cri-
terion of HLA-matching, which reduces the risk of rejection of the transplant 
and, therefore, increases the likelihood of medical benefit to the patient. Ac-
cording to ET the medical benefit ‘might include preserving life, reduction in 
morbidity, relief of pain and relief of suffering caused by illness’ (ET 2010). A 
‘full house match’ constitutes a case for mandatory exchange since it is consid-
ered as an indicator for high medical benefit. The factor of distance between 
donor and recipient centre aims at lowering the risk of graft quality loss by 
long transportation times. Here again the underlying principle is gaining the 
most positive outcome and thus, maximizing utility.  
The other three criteria as well as the rule of giving priority in cases of 
high urgency, in contrast, are linked to the principle of justice. High Urgency 
cases concentrate on patients with special neediness99. The term ‘special needi-
ness’ is often used to indicate the patients in danger of losing their lives. None-
                                           
97  However, the notion of utility maximizing encompasses various notions: It can refer to 
social utility, which is the social usefulness of the person receiving benefits or medical 
utility referring to the medical benefit (cf. Veatch 2004: 59). Especially the first notion 
has received fierce criticism for having unfair consequences. Therefore, the prevailing 
opinion continues to be that in the process of organ allocation only the concept of medi-
cal utility should be applied. 
98  The term ‘efficiency’ is primarily used in economy to refer to the relation of the use of 
resources and the extent to which the objectives can be attained. 
99  It should be taken into account, however, that there are different interpretations of the 
term ‘need’ in the debate on organ allocation. Kamm, for example, differentiates between 
‘urgency’ and ‘need’. The neediest person is the one who has had the least adequate con-
scious life. Urgency, in contrast, is more focused on the person’s medical future such as 
the question ‘how soon someone will die without a transplant’ (Kamm 1993: 234). How-
ever, her definition of need diverges from the standard usage in which the terms urgency 
and need are used interchangeably. Gutmann and Land also point out that the criterion of 
high urgency can also be characterized by a line of reasoning which is based upon the 
principle of utility (cf. Gutmann and Land 1997: 194). 
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theless, as Frances Kamm points out it can also be used to indicate that a person 
needs an organ because she has very low quality of life (hereafter QoL) or to 
avoid a grossly diminished QoL in future (cf. Kamm 1993: 234). Especially in 
the case of renal transplantation, urgency in terms of QoL might be concerned 
since there is always the possibility of dialysis which means it is not necessarily 
a life or death decision. The elaborations of the German Medical Association 
indicate, however, that the criterion of high urgency refers to patients with a 
high likelihood of death (cf. Bundesärtzekammer 2010: 1536). As is illustrated 
in the following, giving priority to the most urgent cases or neediest patients 
frequently conflicts with the principle of utility since taking care of patients 
with urgent need might not result in the most favourable outcome possible.  
The consideration of the factor of a low probability of ever finding a suit-
able HLA-Match aims at increasing the equality of opportunity in the process of 
allocation. African Americans and Hispanics or patients with the blood group 
O, for instance, are difficult to match (cf. Veatch 1991c: 211). The criterion of 
waiting time implies that the notion of deserving something after a long period 
of waiting plays an important role and is taken into account in the process of 
allocation (cf. Gutmann and Land 1997: 195). The standard of National Im-
port/Export Balance is taken as a guideline by ET in order to secure a balance 
in the exchange of organs between the various countries. 
 
As we have shown, ET maintains that in the process of deliberation and rec-
ommendation, the well-being of the patient constitutes their key focus. At a 
first glance this statement suggests that the concept of well-being (or quality of 
life, the term which is more widely applied in the debate) is to play a major role 
within the criteria for allocation as applied by ET. This would fit with the intui-
tion mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. However, as elucidated, the cri-
teria take into account a variety of factors which ultimately come down to the 
two central principles: utility and justice. Thus, the ‘simple strategy’ of maxim-
izing good in terms of longevity and well-being rather is one principle among 
others applied in allocation practice. What remains of the claim by ET that 
well-being should constitute the key focus in the criteria for allocation is, above 
all, the consideration of maximizing the outcome in terms of prospects of indi-
vidual benefit. The grade of HLA-match is taken as an indicator for the proba-
bility of realizing the aim of maximizing the outcome in terms of medical bene-
fit. ET is not precise concerning the question as to what exactly the term medi-
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cal benefit encompasses and how it is estimated. According to them, apart from 
the prolongation of life, medical benefit also refers to the reduction of pain, suf-
fering and illness. Thus, the health-related QoL appears to be a matter of con-
cern. In this way, the protection and promotion of well-being through ET is for 
the most part spelled out as the reduction of illness and suffering through a suc-
cessful transplantation. However, we do not learn according to which standards 
and in what ratio the expected quantity and quality of life are calculated. 
In summary, it can be said that the examination of the criteria for organ al-
location as applied by ET illustrates that a comparatively narrow concept of 
well-being is used which refers to the health-related QoL of the patients. It 
comes into play when the principle of utility is concerned. Nevertheless, in con-
trast to notions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, well-being does not 
appear to be a major consideration in the process of allocation. Let us see if we 
reach a different conclusion in the case of the criteria as applied in practice by 
UNOS. 
United Network of Organ Sharing 
UNOS is a private, non-profit-making organization that manages the organ 
transplant system in the United States. It administers the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which in turn is responsible for the de-
velopment of the criteria for allocation. UNOS maintains the database which 
contains information about all patients waiting for a graft as well as information 
on the organs donated for transplantation. It generates a national waiting list of 
all patients in need. The best match between donor organs and potential recipi-
ents is ascertained by a procedure similar to that of ET. Independent Organ 
Procurements Organisations provide the information (such as medical history, 
physical measurements and blood type) of donors in their service areas and lists 
of potential recipients with the best match are generated. The system also oper-
ates on point-based criteria. Generally speaking, the standards which are ap-
plied by UNOS are based upon three principles: 1. patient need, 2. probability 
of a successful outcome and 3. time on the waiting list (cf. Childress 2001: 
368). The way in which they are specified and the weight given to each of them 
depends on the organ distributed. Thus, as in the case of ET, for each type of 
organ, there is a specific set of criteria setting different priorities. These might 
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change over time since they are always modified according to the current cut-
ting edge of science and technology:  
Kidneys [, for instance,] are currently allocated based primarily on 
how long a candidate has been waiting. This is not how the kidney al-
location system was initially designed. Initially, allocation priority 
was heavily weighted based on closely a candidate ‘matched’ a kid-
ney by tissue type testing. In the past, closer matching was necessary 
for acceptable results. With improvement in anti-rejection medica-
tions, the priority for tissue typing has been decreased greatly over 
the last several decades. (OPTN 2011: 6) 
OPTN Board of Directors has approved a new system in June 2013 which 
ought to improve kidney allocation (cf. OPTN 2014: 1). This system was im-
plemented in December 2014 and has the following key features: 
• Individual calculations of the likely length of function of a donor kid-
ney and of the expected length of time an adult candidate may need a 
kidney transplant 
• Priority matching of kidneys likely to function the longest with candi-
dates likely to need a kidney for the longest amount of time 
• Revisions to blood type matching to provide more opportunities to can-
didates with more rare types 
• Increased priority for candidates whose immune system is not compati-
ble with most donor kidneys 
• Calculation of transplant waiting time (a key factor in allocation priori-
ty) from the date a patient begins dialysis, even if he or she started dial-
ysis before being accepted for listing at a transplant center 
• Elimination of kidney payback offers and local logistical exceptions to 
the national system 
(UNOS Transplant Pro 2014) 
Based on the principle of utility this new model takes greater account of the 
number of years a patient is expected to live after transplantation. ‘The alloca-
tion rules are designed to promote better longevity matching between donor 
and recipient in order to utilize the maximum amount of graft years through an 
estimated post transplant survival or EPTS score’ (OPTN 2014: 6). Two new 
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standards for allocation have been introduced. A Kidney Donor Profile Index 
(KDPI) is applied in order to rank donor kidneys according to the length of 
time that they are expected to function in an average transplant recipient. The 
index is combined with a calculated Estimated Post-Transplant Survival Score 
(EPTSS) of the potential recipients. The top quintile of donor kidneys with the 
best expected graft survival is allocated to the top quintile of potential recipi-
ents with the highest Estimated Post-Transplant Survival score. 
 
Two rules are based on different forms of equity (Veatch and Ross 2015: 347). 
Highly sensitized patients have improved access, a change which is based on 
the principle of equal opportunity. Also ‘[b]oth wait list time and dialysis time 
can be considered to be grounded in equity’ (ibid.). Nonetheless, the kidney al-
location system of the OPTN pays lesser attention to equity/justice aspects and 
gives prominence to the probability of a successful outcome. Hence, it appears 
as if the principle of justice takes a back seat in favour of the principle of utili-
ty. Priority is given to those patients who have a high probability of benefit. 
Although utility in terms of potential outcome plays the major role in this allo-
cation system, the expected well-being or QoL after the transplantation appears 
to be of minor relevance within the criteria for kidney allocation. Utility is 
merely spelled out in terms of overall survival of patients after kidney trans-
plantation by improved matching of donor longevity with recipient’s longevity. 
Thus, in the allocation system as implemented by OPTN well-being appears to 
be of minimal importance. This result again conflicts with our initial intuition. 
 
All things considered, the analysis of the criteria for kidney allocation as ap-
plied by ET and the criteria as developed by the OPTN demonstrate that the 
notion of well-being does, to varying degrees, represent a concern. However, it 
appears to be of considerably lesser importance than we expected. Within ET-
KAS well-being plays a role (although not a major one) especially when the 
criterion of potential outcome is applied. Since the allocation system of the 
OPTN focuses on the standard of maximizing the potential outcome, one would 
expect that well-being is to be of major importance. However, the OPTN main-
ly refers to longevity and well-being appears to be of less importance. This 
lesser role of well-being contradicts the idea formulated in the introduction to 
this chapter. Especially in the case of kidney allocation this is an astounding 
finding, since as there is the possibility of renal dialysis, renal transplantations 
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are primarily aimed at improving the quality of life of patients rather than sav-
ing their lives. For this reason, one would expect the promotion of well-being 
to constitute an important consideration in the process of allocation.  
Furthermore, the first examination of the criteria as applied in practice has 
shown that where the character of well-being is concerned, comparatively nar-
row concepts are applied. These basically refer to an adequate life in medical 
terms, such as a life without severe pain, suffering and illness, not taking into 
account any further aspects. 
5.3. Well-being as a consideration in debates on organ 
allocation 
The examination of the criteria applied in practice for organ allocation could 
create the impression that the concept is of little relevance when allocation de-
cisions are being taken. However, well-being (or the notion of QoL) might not 
constitute a major consideration at a first glance, but it does come into play es-
pecially if the standards potential outcome and need (or urgency) are referred 
to. Although only sporadically applied in the current systems for allocation, 
QoL100 has received more attention in the academic reflections on appropriate 
standards for organ allocation (see for instance: Ach 1997; Ach and Quante 
1994; AMA 1993; Bullinger 1993). This chapter now moves away from the 
systems applied in practice, changing its focus to the academic debate in which 
well-being constitutes a consideration. When dealing with the concept of QoL 
as a rationale for organ allocation, Johann S. Ach and Monika Bullinger stress 
the moral importance of differentiating between various points of reference 
when estimating QoL (Ach 1998 and 1997; Bullinger 1993). Estimations can 
refer (1) to the present QoL of a potential recipient before the process of trans-
plantation, (2) to the QoL of the patient after the transplantation or (3) the dif-
ference in terms of QoL before and after the transplantation – the ‘surplus’ of 
QoL as Ach calls it (cf. Ach 1997: 44). Estimates of the first kind (the present 
QoL) are to be found in the context of the criteria urgency and need. The last 
                                           
100  Since the expression ‘well-being’ is rarely applied and quality of life plays a pivotal role 
in the debate in the following, the term ‘quality of life’ is mainly used. If not explicitly 
otherwise indicated, the terms well-being and quality of life are applied interchangeably. 
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two (QoL after transplantation and surplus), in contrast are potential candidates 
for standards when dealing with outcome.  
The concept of QoL has, on the one hand, received a lot of attention as a 
potential measure when evaluating the outcome or benefit in the process of or-
gan allocation. On the other hand, its consideration within the criterion of need 
has kindled intense discussions. For this reason the following focuses first of all 
on QoL as a potential measure for outcome and then, in a second step, takes 
into account its role where the criterion of need is concerned. It is examined in 
which way the notion of QoL is referred to in the alternative criteria and what 
kind of concepts are applied.  
5.3.1. Quality of life as a rationale for outcome in organ 
allocation 
As James F. Childress points out even if the successful outcome constitutes the 
central criterion for allocating scarce goods, ‘there is debate about what will 
count as success – such as length of graft survival, length of patient survival, 
quality of life, rehabilitation – and about the factors that influence the probabil-
ity of success’ (Childress 1991: 188). The concept of QoL is among the con-
tenders as an essential measure for successful outcome. This has already been 
indicated by the examination of ET’s criteria for allocation. Concerning the role 
that QoL plays where outcome is concerned, Kamm states that ‘emphasis on 
outcome indicates a concern for the best possible future state of affairs where 
the standard for judging states of affairs is narrow, i.e., how many additionally 
medically adequate life years can we produce’ (Kamm 1993: 257). Thus, apart 
from the quantity of life, its quality is also taken into account, although, as 
Kamm points out, it is applied in a narrow sense referring merely to its medical 
adequacy. The notion that apart from the quantity of life also its quality should 
be taken into account has received a lot of attention – above all in the shape of 
quality-adjusted life-years, the so-called QALY (cf. for example Zeckhauser 
and Shepard 1976; Waring 2005; Broome 2008).  
The QALY approach to allocation 
When the outcome or productivity is concerned in health care, it has been ar-
gued that not only the gained quantity of life but also its quality ought to be 
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taken into account since the prolongation of life is not the sole aim of medicine 
(Hanson and Callahan 1999: 60). ‘A person’s quality-adjusted life years are the 
number of years she lives, adjusted for their quality’ (Broome 2008: 261). The 
concept of QALY constitutes a metric which combines both expected years of 
life as well as the expected quality. Broome states that the fundamental precept 
that guides the practical use of QALYs is the following: ‘[o]ne action is better 
than another if and only if it leads to more qalys’ (Broome 1993: 160). This 
particular view is called the ‘principle of QALY maximization’ (Cubbon 1991). 
The QALY101 calculus is applied above all in the field of health economics. It 
primarily serves on the macro level of allocation but is also considered on the 
micro level: on the one hand, QALYs are applied to determine what kind of 
treatment to give a patient with a specific disease in order to achieve the best 
outcome. Thereby, the QALY calculus is also used to determine the cost-
effectiveness of various forms of treatment. On the other hand, QALYs are em-
ployed for priority-setting in the allocation of health care resources with the 
aim of obtaining as many QALYS as possible in the process of allocation. In 
the debate on organ allocation the QALY calculus has been proposed as a way 
of deciding how organs should be distributed and as a better alternative to the 
current system (cf. Veatch 2004). A QALY-based system would allocate the 
organ to the patient on the waiting list who would gain the largest number of 
QALYs by the transplantation. ‘[QALYs] acquire plausibility on the assump-
tion that any rational person would prefer a shorter, healthier life to a longer 
life of severe discomfort and disability’ (Waring 2005: 100). The QALY calcu-
lus considers QoL in terms of the person’s health status and links it to questions 
such as whether or not the patient is in pain or what degree of mobility he/she 
has, or the capacity to perform social interactions and actions of daily life (cf. 
Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 239). Hence, rather than concentrating on the 
broad concept of QoL, the QALY measure for the most part is concerned with 
health-related QoL. The central idea is that ‘for all alike a year of healthy life is 
                                           
101  QALYs must be distinguished from the metric of disability-adjusted life years, the so-
called DALY. The DALY calculus focuses on the overall disease burden combining mor-
tality and morbidity. ‘DALYs for a disease or health condition are calculated as the sum 
of the Years of Life Lost (YLL) due to premature mortality in the population and the 
Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for incident cases of the health condition’ (WHO 
2012b). Since these are of lesser importance in the context of organ allocation the follow-
ing deals primarily with the metric of QALYs. For a comparison of the QALY and the 
DALY metric see Brock 2006: 191. 
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equally valuable’ (Menzel 1990: 79). One QALY is attributed to a year of good 
health whereas a year of less good health receives less than one QALY (cf. 
ibid). The state of death has a QALY of 0. A ‘quality-adjustment factor’ is used 
to calculate the QALY score. Thus, ‘[v]arious states of illness or disability bet-
ter than death but short of full health receive a value between zero and one. 
Health conditions assessed as worse than death receive a negative value.’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 239) 
Generally speaking, it is left open to conjecture on which basis the QALY 
system assigns value to various states of health (cf. Broome 1993: 159). It is 
not pre-defined ‘whether these values are determined by how people feel when 
they are in these states, by their preferences about them, or perhaps by some 
objective principles’ (Broome 1993: 159).  
Michael Lockwood maintains that some factors are based on empirical 
findings which analyse how people view the severity of various states of health. 
When dealing with the example of the Rosser distress and disability index102 he 
states that ‘the factors and their associated weightings are mostly so chosen as 
to reflect the feelings and considered judgments which the average or repre-
sentative patient is likely to evince in practice, when faced with various forms 
of disability or discomfort, either in prospect or, better, having actually experi-
enced them’. (Lockwood 1988: 37) 
Thus, the criteria that are used in practice for calculating QALYS might, 
for instance, be grounded in people’s expressed values and preferences. Both 
Broome and Lockwood state that, notwithstanding the various ways in which 
the QALY is put into practice, the criterion is based upon a very narrow con-
cept considering QoL simply as it is affected by health status. Lockwood sug-
gests that ‘this at any rate makes it something relatively objective, and some-
thing regarding which the doctor may at least claim some professional exper-
tise’ (Lockwood 1988: 44). 
QALYs and the problem of unjust discrimination 
One of the main objections to the use of the QALY measure (as well as the 
standard of QoL) as a criterion for priority-setting and interpersonal compari-
                                           
102  The Rosser distress and disability index was developed for the qualitative patient-derived 
classification of health states. For further information on the Rosser distress and disabil-
ity index see Rosser and Watts 1972. 
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sons in the process of organ allocation (and microallocation in general) has 
been formulated by John Harris (1987). He criticizes the fact that a system 
based on the QALY calculus does not properly take justice into account since it 
is indefensibly discriminatory. ‘The idea, which is at the root of both democrat-
ic theory and of most conceptions of justice, that each person is as morally im-
portant as any other and hence, that the life and interests of each is to be given 
equal weight, [...] plays no part at all in the theory of QALYS.’ (Harris 1987: 
118) One of the discriminatory features which the QALY criterion is accused 
of possessing is an inclination to ageism, as Harris puts it: available resources 
are allocated to those who will gain the greatest amount of QALYS, which are 
primarily the young and not the elderly since young people generally have bet-
ter prospects for QoL and longevity (cf. ibid.). Hence, in many cases the in-
creased age of the patient correlates negatively with expected QALY outcome. 
In following Harris, transferring the QALY measure to the problem of organ 
allocation would lead to a situation in which young people receive most of the 
grafts and the elderly are left empty-handed. Furthermore, Harris maintains that 
a QALY based allocation system might lead to racial discrimination (cf. ibid. 
119). The various races have a different genetic make-up and medical charac-
teristics which have an impact on the estimated QALY outcome after medical 
interventions. African Americans and Hispanics, for instance, often have anti-
gens that are very difficult to match (cf. Veatch 1991c: 211) and thus, addition-
al criteria, apart from the QALY calculus, are needed to ensure a fair distribu-
tion of organs in their case.  
Another associated problem has received attention under the label of 
‘double jeopardy’ (Harris 1987: 119): if a heart transplant could be given to ei-
ther a blind person or a sighted person (all else being equal) the QALY ra-
tionale would clearly imply that it should be allocated to the latter (cf. Nord 
2005: 131). Harris asks: ‘[i]s it clear that the candidate with most QALYs on 
offer should always and inevitably be the one to have priority?’ (Harris 1987: 
120). According to the objection, the QALY rationale does not give equal 
weight to preferences of all the individuals concerned and puts disabled or ill 
people at a disadvantage. Individuals who have been unfortunate (because of 
being blind, for instance, or being disabled in some other way) are, on the 
strength of this, ill-fated for a second time in a QALY based system. Harris 
elaborates: ‘[h]er first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life and when 
she presents herself for help, along come QALYs and finish her off!’ (ibid.). 
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Thus, according to Harris QALYs should not be considered an appropriate ba-
sis for priority-setting when allocating scarce goods since they involve pro-
found injustice. The following also depicts the criticism levelled at QoL as a 
consideration in organ allocation since this might draw the attention to prob-
lems connected to the application of the concept. 
Conflicts with the principle of need 
Another respect in which the QALY system can be viewed as unjust is pointed 
out by Lockwood (1988). By focusing on the aggregation of QALYs, the ap-
proach frequently comes into conflict with the principle of need. The principle 
of need ‘represents concern for fairness as taking care of the worst off overall’ 
(Kamm 1993: 255). However, in many cases giving preference to patients in 
need does not lead to the greatest QALY outcome. As patients with urgent need 
are commonly more ill they are likely to score significantly lower on the scale 
than others. Thus, the QALY criterion ‘is inherently insensitive to differences 
in degree of need’ (Lockwood 1988: 46) and can therefore, result in processes 
of allocation which appear intuitively to be unjust. Whether or not a person has 
greater or lesser need for a scarce medical resource such as an organ is not mir-
rored by the QALYs assigned to her. The QALY system has inherent problems 
in accounting for the fact that someone who will die without a transplant has a 
stronger claim than someone else who is not in danger of losing his/her life. As 
Lockwood points out, there is, however, a way in which a QALY based system 
and the principle of need do not conflict. This is the case when a person’s need 
for something is viewed as a limitation to his/her well-being or QoL. ‘Some-
one, then, who will die without some particular treatment needs it in the strong-
est possible sense; for one cannot flourish at all if one is dead’ (Lockwood 
1988: 45). 
Life-saving should have priority over life-enhancement 
A further objection formulated by Harris, among others, refers to the assertion 
that life-saving should have priority over the promotion of QoL (or life-
enhancement103 as Harris terms it) in resource allocation. Harris states: ‘[m]ost 
                                           
103  Harris applies the term ‘enhancement’ in a way which differs from its typical definition 
and usage (the improvement of the human body and mind beyond what is necessary to 
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people think, and for good as well as for prudential reasons, that life-saving has 
priority over life-enhancement and that we should first allocate resources to 
those areas where they are immediately needed to save life and only when this 
has been done should the remainder be allocated to alleviate non-fatal condi-
tions’ (Harris 1987: 120). 
As Thomas Nagel points out, it is a common conception ‘that life is all we 
have and the loss of it is the greatest loss we can sustain’ (Nagel 1979: 1). 
Therefore, saving life104 appears to be the most obvious medical benefit in the 
process of organ allocation (cf. Veatch 2000: 289). In addition, the life of an 
individual can be said to constitute the precondition of his/her experience of 
well-being and QoL and patient survival should thus have highest priority. The 
QALY calculus and other systems which are grounded in the notion of maxim-
izing QoL are not in a position to take into account the greater importance of 
the gain of life. However, Harris allows for the fact that there might be excep-
tions in which a person is in such poor health that he/she suffers to such a de-
gree that he/she should be given priority (cf. Harris 1987: 120). 
The problem of measuring QoL  
The QALY measure as well as the consideration of QoL in general in organ 
allocation are based on the assumption that we can estimate the (future) well-
being of a person and make comparisons between different individuals. Gener-
ally speaking, this notion of measuring (or anticipating) the QoL of a person 
and comparing it with the QoL of another has received a lot of criticism (cf. 
Gutmann 2006: 36). Lockwood depicts this scepticism in the following way: 
‘[f]rom a certain point of view, the idea of putting a yardstick up against a life, 
whether real or hypothetical, and reading off some numerical value represent-
ing its quality or degree of worthwhileness, may seem simply preposterous’ 
(Lockwood 1988:40). One reason for the lack of conviction is the fundamental 
problem that there is no standard definition for QoL when it is used for compar-
ing the potential benefit different patients would have from a specific form of 
treatment (cf. AMA 1993; Edlund and Tancredi 1985). Since the concept QoL 
                                                                                                                                  
restore and sustain health). He uses the term in order to refer to the promotion of QoL in 
general. 
104  Note that it is a further point of controversy ‘whether it is lives saved or years of life add-
ed that should be counted’ (Veatch 2000: 289). 
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is used in a similar fashion to the term well-being it also has no clearly defined 
meaning and different things are meant when it is applied. ‘Quality of life has 
many other components: enjoyment derived from one's customary activities, 
relationships with others, protection from the elements, and so on. It would 
have to be measured, if indeed it can be at all, by a hotch-potch of disparate 
scales, which would vary from culture to culture, from sub-culture to subcul-
ture and even from individual to individual.’ (Cubbon 1991: 81) 
Johann S. Ach, Michael Anderheiden and Michael Quante elaborate on 
the fact that there is no generally accepted definition of the term QoL stating 
that the concept is vague but also multidimensional in a positive sense (cf. Ach, 
Anderheiden and Quante 2000: 124). In this instance a reliable foundation for 
measurement and interpersonal comparison is said to be missing. For this rea-
son some authors even go as far as to state that we should therefore refrain 
from such comparisons and the application of the criterion of QoL or QALY 
when allocating vital grafts (see for instance Feuerstein 1995: 244). QoL cannot 
be put into operation in such a way that it could function as a reliable yardstick 
for expected outcome in the process of organ allocation. One should be aware 
of the fact that the concept is not merely applied in a descriptive sense. Its ap-
plication in the process of organ allocation also has far reaching normative im-
plications.  
Lockwood maintains, however, that even if measures for QoL are not in a 
position to provide accurate information, they should not be completely disre-
garded. ‘[T]he fact that any assignment of precise QALY values is bound, in 
practice, to involve a degree of arbitrariness need not invalidate the qualitative 
conclusions that emerge, to the extent that the latter prove robust.’ (Lockwood 
1988: 41) Even if welfarist considerations are not regarded as the decisive fac-
tor they should be given weight. 
A narrow concept of QoL 
Nevertheless, it is pointed out that especially ‘[a]llocation decisions that put too 
much weight on non-medical contributions to a patient's likelihood of benefit 
run the risk of arbitrariness and overgeneralization’ (AMA 1993: 3). There is a 
need for an objective standard. This, in turn, is said only to be able to be pro-
vided by focusing on medical standards when estimating QoL to determine po-
tential outcome in the process of organ allocation. Hence, instead of applying a 
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measure which is based upon a broad approach to QoL, a comparatively narrow 
concept forms the basis of QoL estimations. This has already been alluded to in 
the definition of medical benefit as provided by ET in the above. Empirical fac-
tors which are considered as indicators for high medical benefit (such as immu-
nologic factors) become ‘crude surrogates’ for predicting the expected outcome 
in terms of QoL (cf. Veatch 2000: 291). 
In addition, voices in the philosophical debate on appropriate criteria for 
organ allocation adhere to similar concepts. Frances Kamm, for example, relies 
on the concept of a ‘medical adequate conscious life’ in order to avoid refined 
QoL judgments (cf. Kamm 1993: 256pp.). She points out that especially hedon-
ist and desire-fulfilment theories ‘raise problems about the interpersonal com-
parison of utility. That is, if we want to decide whose life is better we will, for 
example, have to compare the degree of intensity of desires and their satisfac-
tion.’ (ibid.) A similar line of reasoning can be found within the report of the 
American Medical Association: ‘[p]rioritizing candidates for treatment on the 
basis of their subjective preferences, however, would be impossible in practice. 
It would be extremely difficult to assess patients' individual preferences, and 
even more difficult to make useful comparisons among patients on that basis.’ 
(AMA 1993) Thus, there appears to be a necessity to apply standards which are 
independent of subjective measures such as patients’ feelings or desires and to 
adhere to an objective and narrow concept of QoL.  
For this reason QoL judgments in terms of changes in functional status 
have been viewed as an attractive approach to the problem of allocation (cf. 
AMA 1993). ‘By this definition, improvements in quality of life would be 
measured for each patient by comparing functional status with treatment to 
functional status without treatment.’ (ibid: 3) The patient with the expected 
greatest improvement on the functional level is likely to receive the graft. QoL 
is equated with functional status. 
Nevertheless, there are thinkers, who argue that standards should not be 
too ‘remote’ from the subjective perspective of the patients concerned and that 
this perspective should be taken into account in QoL estimations and compari-
sons (Waring 2004: 102; Ach 1997; Feuerstein 1995). People differ greatly in 
the way they perceive the specific functional conditions with which they have 
to live and the implications these have in everyday life. ‘Though change in 
functional status is an important factor in defining improvements in a patient's 
quality of life, it is less important than the patient's attitude towards his or her 
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change in functional status.’ (AMA 1993: 4) Therefore, in following this line of 
reasoning medical-objective as well as patient orientated-subjective factors 
should be considered. Johann Ach refers to the normative/descriptive dual 
character (Ach 1997: 43; see also Ach, Anderheiden and Quante 2000: 134ff.) 
of QoL as an operational concept in organ allocation since, according to him, 
the concept takes into account the subjective QoL experience and estimation of 
the patient concerned and is made ascertainable by means of intersubjective or 
objective standards which are to be normatively determined.  
Interim results 
Placing the opening intuition under scrutiny again, the impression arises that 
even though well-being/QoL does not constitute a major consideration in the 
criteria as currently applied, it does emerge that it is a widely debated aspect of 
organ allocation when the criterion of potential outcome is concerned. The lines 
of reasoning which refer to the maximisation of outcome can clearly be identi-
fied as utilitarian lines of reasoning. The notion of utilitarianism focuses on the 
maximisation of overall utility.105 Since well-being frequently comes into play 
where utilitarianism is concerned, the idea could arise, at a first glance, that the 
decision as to how much weight should be given to utilitarian considerations 
determines the role which the concept of well-being is to play in the process of 
organ allocation. We will come back to this idea in due course after having 
gained a clearer picture of the role of well-being in the two different theories of 
justice. 
As previously illustrated, the proposal to use QoL as a standard (by itself 
and as a part of the QALY) has received extensive criticism. This leads to 
speculation as to whether this could provide us with a reason why it is appar-
ently of minor importance in the criteria in use. To draw a conclusion, the 
doubts levelled against QoL as a measure for outcome in the allocation of 
grafts can be divided into three different sets of objections: 1. QoL as a meas-
ure for outcome leads to injustice, 2. The specification of the criterion outcome 
and 3. The lack of a conceptual foundation. 
                                           
105  Section 5.4.1. on the relationship between well-being and alternative theories of justice 
provides detailed information on utilitarian theories of justice and the role of well-being 
within them.  
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Concerning 1: As illustrated, one of the main objections consists in the 
charge that if decisions are concerned which affect several people, the QALY 
or the QoL measure for outcome in general runs the risk of leading to situations 
perceived as grossly unjust because of its discriminatory impact and its disre-
gard of patients in need. 
 Concerning 2: When the potential outcome constitutes an important crite-
rion for organ allocation the question arises as to how outcome should be de-
fined. Should it merely be a matter of saving life or is the improvement of QoL 
to play a role? As elucidated in the above, there are thinkers who argue that in 
the process of allocating scarce resources, we should primarily be concerned 
with saving life and only in a second step with the improvement of its quality. 
Thus, there is a serious dilemma in deciding how much weight to give im-
provement of QoL in the face of saving life (cf. Veatch 2000: 290). There is 
increasing controversy concerning the place well-being should occupy when 
maximizing outcome.  
Concerning 3: As we have seen, there is, above all, considerable disa-
greement on the most basic level which is concerned with the questions as to 
how QoL should be defined. This, in turn, has great impact on the answer to the 
important question as to how it could be measured and compared in the process 
of organ allocation. The measurability and interpersonal comparability of QoL 
constitute pre-conditions for the operationability of the concept in organ alloca-
tion. The lack of conceptual clarification has led some participants in the debate 
to refrain completely from QoL estimations in organ allocation. These are the 
three main objections with which QoL as a measure for outcome is confronted. 
Since one of our main interests is the character of well-being in the discus-
sions, the following scrutinizes which solutions to the problem of the lack of a 
conceptual foundation are proposed by proponents of QoL as a measure for 
outcome in organ allocation and the specific concepts of well-being which un-
derlie their argumentation. As previously illustrated, many participants in the 
discussions refer to objective functioning models or adhere to comparatively 
narrow concepts focusing on purported medical criteria in order to avoid any 
commitment to a specific concept of QoL or value judgments (an example 
thereof being ET). First of all, it is important to note that this can be considered 
short-sighted since the adherence to ‘medical’ criteria or very narrow concepts 
(such as ‘objective medical adequacy’ in the case of Kamm) already involve 
specific conceptual commitments and value judgments which are claimed to be 
137 
bypassed. Approaches of this kind are based on the assumption that health con-
stitutes a necessary, but not sufficient condition for QoL and on the value 
judgment that health is an adequate measure for QoL. On the basis of this 
commitment health status is applied as an objective indicator for QoL.  
If we consider the three alternative levels of dimensions with regard to the 
character of well-being (the ontological, the evaluative and the epistemic level) 
it becomes obvious that the discussions are primarily concerned with the evalu-
ative level dealing with appropriate criteria for evaluating and comparing the 
well-being of potential recipients. Moreover, we can identify a striking predom-
inance of objective dimensions at all three levels. We have seen that the func-
tioning model of well-being is often considered in discussions on organ alloca-
tion. This model relies on the assumption that there is so-called ‘species-typical 
functioning’ (Daniels 2000) and that disease and disability represent a depar-
ture from normal functioning. The alleged medical criteria which are referred to 
in the discussions work in a similar fashion: they are based upon specific con-
cepts and notions of a ‘normal’ health status. Whether or not transplantation is 
expected to be efficient is determined by anticipated changes in the patient 
health status. Hence, at the ontological level these are objectivist conceptions of 
well-being. Appropriately, on the evaluative level, objective standards which 
are developed and applied by medical professionals are considered for the de-
termination of the QoL of the patients concerned. Thus, the patients themselves 
do not have the ultimate authority to determine their well-being in the process 
of organ allocation. In terms of the epistemic level it is understood that medical 
professionals have access to a person’s QoL from an external perspective. 
As illustrated, there are sometimes concepts of QoL in use which allow for 
the fact that well-being includes subjective components such as positive experi-
ences in addition to the objective dimensions such as a person’s health status. 
Accordingly, it appears to be a common assumption that both the objective 
standard of health status and the subjective experience of a person correlate and 
that the health status, therefore, can also be applied as an indicator for subjec-
tive dimensions of well-being. Hence, it is argued that the adherence to objec-
tive medical criteria also allows for taking into account the subjective dimen-
sions. In this case we have an objective as well as subjective concept of well-
being at the ontological level and, for the most part, objectivist conceptions of 
well-being on the evaluative and epistemic level. Nonetheless, it is important to 
bear in mind that, as Brock elucidates, ‘medicine provides many examples 
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which show it is a mistake to assume that the subjective happiness component 
correlates closely and invariably with other objective functional measures’ 
(Brock 2009: 119). 
All in all, if QoL is applied as a measure for outcome, it appears as if there 
is no alternative route past specific conceptual commitments as well as value 
judgements. Thus, the notion that the application of purportedly ‘medical’ crite-
ria provides a possibility to obviate the problem of lack of conceptual clarity 
and conceptual commitments is mistaken. The specific conceptual commit-
ments made should be clearly elucidated so that the instruments in use for eval-
uating QoL have a firm foundation notwithstanding rival concepts. Further-
more, the analysis of the various proposals for QoL as a measure for outcome 
indicates that if the concept is proposed to function as an operational measure 
for allocating organs, objective dimensions of well-being clearly prevail at all 
three levels. 
5.3.2.  Quality of life as a measure for patient need 
So far, we have explored the role which well-being plays within rationales for 
organ allocation, that is to say within utilitarian approaches to the problem of 
organ allocation. However, while dealing with the criteria applied in practice 
we have recognized that well-being might also come into play when the criteria 
need and urgency are concerned. The standards of need and urgency are gener-
ally grounded in the egalitarian principle of justice. Thus, the decision as to 
how much weight should be given to utilitarian consideration does not fully de-
termine the role which the concept of well-being is to play in the process of or-
gan allocation. This is because well-being also appears to constitute a consider-
ation where other approaches to justice are concerned, which focus on the pat-
tern of distribution rather than on potential outcome. Nonetheless, in the aca-
demic debate on organ allocation the consideration of well-being within egali-
tarian approaches has received considerably less attention than the application 
of the concept within utilitarian approaches. Robert M. Veatch (2000) and 
Frances Kamm (1993) have developed egalitarian approaches to the problem of 
organ allocation in which the QoL concept is applied. The following examines 
these approaches in more detail in order to gain an impression of the relevance 
of well-being within the measure of patient need. What exactly is meant by the 
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reference to theories of justice which concentrate on the pattern of distribution 
when allocating organs? Veatch elaborates that theories of justice ‘consider a 
pattern of distribution to be just insofar as it contributes to giving people oppor-
tunities for equality of outcome. In health care that often means targeting those 
who are medically worst off to give them the opportunity, as far as possible, to 
be as healthy as other people’ (Veatch 2000: 295). 
So far, we have seen that terms such as need and urgency are frequently 
used interchangeably without a concrete definition. Veatch provides a clearer 
picture identifying three notions which are linked to the expression ‘worst off’ 
and to the broader concept of need106: present need, urgency and need over life-
time (ibid.). The following sets out to determine the role of well-being within 
these three notions. 
Present need 
The criterion of present need is frequently applied in allocation systems cur-
rently in practice such as those applied by ET. Present need refers to the current 
medical status and condition of the potential recipient. The criterion operates on 
the assumption that ‘those who are the sickest or worst-off deserve first consid-
eration’ (Veatch 2000: 295). In following this concept, patients in need are in 
severe danger of losing their lives and in very bad health. Where the criterion 
of present need is concerned, QoL is viewed as an indicator apart from the 
probability of patient death. However, here again the probability of patient 
death is viewed as the more important consideration when it comes to present 
need. Estimations of QoL refer to the present QoL of a potential recipient be-
fore the process of transplantation. As in the case of potential outcome, a very 
narrow concept of QoL, which is for the most part based on medical criteria, 
finds application in order to avoid more substantial QoL evaluations. Whereas 
this standard focuses on the present, there are those which are more future ori-
entated. 
                                           
106  In the following the concept of need is applied in a broad sense encompassing the three 
notions present need, urgency and need over lifetime. 
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Urgency 
If we look at the arguments of Frances Kamm the concept of urgency relates to 
the future in contrast to the criterion of present need (cf. Kamm 2003: 234). 
Veatch points out: ‘[t]he crucial point is that some patients on the waiting list 
may need a transplant urgently even though they are not presently among the 
sickest categories of patients’ (Veatch 2000: 296). They might have a low sta-
tus of priority according to the criterion of present need but their health status 
might decline very rapidly as for instance in the case of cancer of the liver. The 
criterion of urgency takes account of this fact by focusing on the expected con-
dition in the future. Kamm differentiates between two dimensions of urgency: 
urgency t and urgency q. Urgency t (t for time) refers to ‘how soon someone 
will die without a transplant’ (Kamm 1993: 234). Urgency q (q for quality of 
life), in contrast, is linked to the question as to ‘how badly off someone will be 
without it’ (ibid.).107 Urgency q is concerned with the expected future QoL as 
the point of reference of evaluation. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that rather than focusing on the expected QoL after transplantation it focuses on 
the future QoL of the potential recipient without a transplant. Veatch proposes 
to apply the QALY calculus to determine the degree of urgency: ‘I would 
measure this in QALYs, but because we are concerned about identifying who 
has a claim of justice (rather than a claim based on medical utility) we are not 
focusing on the expected number of QALYs added by the transplant but rather 
who has the smallest number of QALYs expected in the future – that is, who is 
worst off from a “future QALYs” perspective’ (Veatch 2000: 297). This kind 
of application of the QALY calculus would avoid the above-mentioned objec-
tions (such as the alleged discriminatory impact) as put forward by Harris since 
the QALY approach is incorporated into a system of distribution which focuses 
on equality and need by giving priority to those patients who are expected to be 
worst off in the future.  
However, in current allocation practice urgency is frequently only consid-
ered in terms of urgency t, and urgency q is disregarded since the probability of 
death is considered as the only indicator for high urgency. Nonetheless, the way 
in which the criterion urgency is specified also depends on the organs con-
cerned. In the case of kidney transplantation, where there is the alternative of 
                                           
107  Dan Brock provides a similar differentiation (cf. Brock 2004: 42). 
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dialysis, urgency q plays a major role. However, Veatch distinguishes yet an-
other alternative notion of need. 
Need over a lifetime 
A third way of conceptualizing need is in terms of need over a lifetime incorpo-
rating the quantity and quality of life a person previously had. In order to illus-
trate what is meant by need over a life time, Veatch describes the following sit-
uation: 
[c]onsider, for example whether we would view two persons with 
end-stage liver disease to have lives that are equally desirable if one 
develops her disease at age 80 and the other develops his at age 30. 
Even if the two persons were equal in their present need and had 
equal urgency (i.e., had the same number of predicted future QALYs 
without treatment), we are likely to have little difficulty concluding 
that the person getting her disease at 80 has had a much better life, 
overall, than the one who develops his at the age 30. One might plau-
sibly say that the 30-year-old is much needier than the 80-year-old. 
(Veatch 2000: 299) 
The concept of need over a lifetime captures this intuition. It takes into account 
that some patients ‘very poorly off in a given moment may nevertheless have 
had [a comparatively long life and] considerable opportunity for well-being 
over their lifetimes’ (Veatch 1988: 39) whereas others might be less poorly at a 
given moment, but have had a short life with less opportunity for well-being 
over their lifetime. The approach is based on the assumption that there is a spe-
cific span of life years with a certain degree of well-being108 that we consider a 
reasonable life (a fair innings).109 This notion has also received attention under 
                                           
108  Cf. Harris 1985: 91. However, Harris only refers to the span of life years we consider a 
fair innings and not to the degree of well-being when dealing with this argument.  
109  Note that this approach clearly implies age-weighting since need is viewed as inversely 
proportional to age (cf. Waring 2004: 71). There are some thinkers such as Robert Ve-
atch (2000) and Norman Daniels (2008) who have argued that age is different from other 
properties such as gender and race and that age-weighting can be considered fair in some 
domains of health care. Veatch elucidates: ‘it turns out that there is also a strong case to 
be made in the name of justice or equity for giving allocation priority for younger people 
since it is more fair as well as more efficient’ (Veatch 2000: 300). 
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the title ‘the fair innings argument’ (Williams 1997), which was first defined by 
John Harris (1985: 91-4). To be more precise, there are two different versions 
of the fair innings argument (cf. Waring 2004: 89): 1. the first version focuses 
on equal opportunity for well-being over a lifetime. 2. The second is concerned 
with equal opportunity in terms of living to the same age as others. Here again 
the concrete way in which need over a lifetime is specified depends on the 
weight given to QoL in the face of quantity of life and the way in which both 
are balanced. The first version of the fair innings argument, which has been 
above all supported by Veatch (1991c; 1988), is of special interest to us since it 
directly refers to the well-being of potential recipients. According to this argu-
ment ‘one right-making characteristic of an allocation practice would be that it 
gives people an opportunity for equality of well-being’ (Veatch 1991c: 206). 
Veatch terms this the egalitarian principle of justice (ibid.). He maintains, 
however, that the broad notion of providing opportunities for equality of well-
being (not equality of health status) leads to problems in healthcare. The egali-
tarian principle of justice could imply that inequality in terms of health status 
could be compensated by advantages in other spheres of well-being and thus 
‘any discussion of justice in health policy has to take into account that unequal 
health can be compatible with the principle of justice’ (Veatch 1991c: 208). 
This constitutes a major problem especially for the field of health care since 
resources are distributed utterly unequally (as also in the sphere of education) 
(cf. ibid.). For this reason Veatch maintains that ‘in health policy, we should 
strive for opportunities for equality of health insofar as this is possible, leaving 
other social practices to deal with the best strategy for providing equality op-
portunities in other spheres of life’ (ibid.). Thus, in health care the egalitarian 
principle of justice is specified as ‘opportunities for equality of health’. Follow-
ing Veatch, when allocating organs (and in the field of healthcare in general) 
we should provide people with opportunities for equality of health. Neverthe-
less, people have the possibility to trade their health resources for other goods 
in the various spheres of well-being (cf. ibid.). 
Veatch identifies a theoretical problem: ‘people evaluate purported bene-
fits very differently’ (ibid.). In order to provide opportunities for equality of 
well-being in other spheres (of well-being) apart from health care, and to avoid 
the problem of inherent subjective variation we should adhere to the equal dis-
tribution of primary goods. However, Veatch states that in health care things 
are different: 
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In healthcare, however, that clearly will not work. We simply must 
introduce a concept of objective well-being in the health sphere. Peo-
ple should have no moral claim of justice to a health resource – Lae-
trile, for example—simply because they believe it will increase their 
opportunity for well-being. Society will have to tackle the very diffi-
cult problem of determining what will be taken as contributing to ob-
jective rather than subjective well-being. (Veatch 1991c: 208) 
Veatch, therefore, comes to the conclusion that in health care we decide how to 
promote opportunities for objective well-being in terms of health.110 Neverthe-
less, he does not provide us with more concrete information as to how objective 
well-being is to be estimated in health care. Frances Kamm takes a similar 
stance as Veatch. She maintains that the need over a lifetime concept should be 
the primary interpretation of patient need (cf. Kamm 1993) and defines it as 
how much adequate conscious life a person will have had before he/she dies 
(cf. ibid.: 234). As in the case of outcome Kamm states that her concept of need 
refrains from refined quality-of-life judgements focusing on the adequate con-
scious life. 
Although some participants in the debate on organ allocation have laid 
emphasis on the advantages of an over-a-lifetime perspective ‘[a]t present this 
over-a-lifetime notion of need is almost never taken into account in organ allo-
cation’ (Veatch 2000: 300). 
Interim results 
To summarize the main results of the analysis in the theoretical discussions on 
organ allocation when patient need is concerned: the analysis illustrates that if 
well-being is concerned within the three alternative concepts of need, its evalu-
ation has different points of reference. In the case of present need the current 
QoL of the potential recipient is concerned. The concept of urgency, in con-
trast, focuses on the future QoL the potential recipient will have without a 
transplant. The need over a lifetime concept takes an utterly different point of 
reference: the QoL over a lifetime. Thus, the above mentioned three way divi-
sion as provided by Ach and Bullinger does not encompass all points of refer-
                                           
110  The latest proposal for the application of the fair innings approach for kidney allocation 
is to be found in Ross, Parker and Veatch et al. (2012). 
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ence for QoL estimations in the debate on organ allocation since it does not 
properly take into account QoL evaluations within the criterion of patient need. 
It should be supplemented by at least two additional points of reference: 1. The 
future QoL of the potential recipient without a transplant, which comes into 
play when the criterion of urgency is concerned and 2. QoL from an over a life-
time perspective which is considered when the criterion of need over a lifetime 
is applied. All things considered, we end up with the following points of refer-
ence for QoL estimations in organ allocation: (1) the present QoL of a potential 
recipient before the process of transplantation, (2a) to the QoL of the patient 
after the transplantation, (2b) the future QoL of the potential recipient without a 
transplant, (3) the difference in terms of QoL before and after the transplanta-
tion (the surplus of QoL) and (4) QoL from an over a lifetime perspective. 
There is, however, a lack of more concrete information about how QoL over a 
lifetime should be estimated. 
Furthermore, the exploration indicates that if well-being is referred to 
when the concept of need is concerned, similar subjects of concern occur as 
with QoL as a measure for outcome. This applies especially to the above-
mentioned points of controversy the specification of the criterion outcome and 
the lack of a conceptual foundation. In the above analysis of the alternative 
concepts of need, it becomes obvious that if their specification is concerned, the 
standard of QoL always competes with the measure quantity of life or probabil-
ity of patient’s death respectively. Thus, also in the case of the specification of 
the criterion of patient need, it appears to be a moot point whether need in 
terms of quantity of life/the probability of patient’s death should have priority 
over need in terms of QoL. 
The lack of a conceptual foundation also clearly represents a problem in 
the case of patient need. This is, above all, apparent in the elucidation provided 
by Veatch. When dealing with the character of well-being he maintains that the 
concept of well-being/QoL is too broad by far to function within a justice-based 
criterion for organ allocation and even for the field of healthcare in general and 
that, for this reason, the concept of health-related well-being should be applied. 
In addition, it is striking that also in the case of QoL as a measure for need, the 
adherence to medical criteria is common in order to avoid conceptual commit-
ments owing to the concept of well-being being too broad as well as too vague. 
Veatch places emphasis on the requirement for an objective concept of 
well-being in the field of health care. As we have seen, the need for objective 
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standards in the case of QoL/well-being also clearly emerges in the debate on 
QoL as a measure for outcome. 
Concerning the above-mentioned objection that QoL judgments or estima-
tions lead to unjust consequences, the examination of QoL as a measure within 
the criterion of need provides us with a more differentiated picture. The con-
cepts of present need and urgency clearly are not confronted with the problem 
of unjust discrimination or ‘double jeopardy’ as they give priority to patients 
who are worst off. This, however, does not completely hold true for the concept 
of need over a lifetime since this approach implies age-weighting. Yet, Veatch 
and others maintain that there are instances in which age-weighting constitutes 
a just procedure and organ allocation provides an instance of this (cf. Veatch 
2000). Hence, whether or not QoL estimations can be viewed as having unjust 
implications (such as a discriminatory impact) appears to depend on both their 
point of reference and whether they are applied within an outcome-orientated 
or a need-based approach.  
5.4. Results arising from the analysis and the issues it 
raises 
So far, the analysis has shown that the relationship between the concept of 
well-being and the principle of justice appears to be of major importance in the 
debate on organ allocation. This has become especially apparent through the 
criticism with which the concept of well-being has been confronted when ap-
plied has a measure for outcome. Efforts have been made to incorporate well-
being within the approaches to the problem of allocation that focus on the pat-
tern of distribution rather than on the maximization of individual benefit. In or-
der to elucidate the role of well-being in the debate on organ allocation even 
further, the following examines how precisely well-being relates to, and is in-
corporated in, theories of justice. To accomplish this, section 5.4.1 analyses the 
way in which the concept of well-being is applied in the two alternative theo-
ries of justice, utilitarianism and egalitarianism, in the discussions on organ al-
location.  
Furthermore, it has become apparent that narrow objectivist concepts of 
the character of well-being predominate in the discussions. The ensuing sec-
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tions investigate the reasons for the prevalence of narrow objectivist concepts 
in organ allocation.  
5.4.1. Well-being and the principle(s) of justice 
So far we have seen that in the context of organ allocation, well-being often is 
involved with the principle of justice: sometimes the consideration of well-
being is criticized for having unjust consequences and at other times the con-
cept is incorporated into approaches in which the emphasis is placed on the aim 
of a just distribution of the grafts. The results of the analysis indicate that it is 
indispensible to place the relationship between well-being and principles of jus-
tice, or theories of justice respectively, under scrutiny when attempting to ren-
der the role of well-being in the debate on organ allocation in concrete terms. In 
order to get a clearer picture of how well-being and the principle of justice re-
late to each other, we first of all need to come to terms with the general notion 
of justice and the principles and alternative theories linked to it.  
Alternative theories of justice 
There are various kinds of concepts of justice. However, for the context of or-
gan allocation we can state that we are primarily concerned with distributive 
justice, a concept which was discussed as long ago as in Aristotle’s Ni-
comachean Ethic111 (cf. Aristotle, NE, book 5). ‘The term distributive justice 
refers to fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens de-
termined by norms that structure the term of social cooperation.’ (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013: 250) Usually differentiations are made between the formal 
and material dimensions of distributive justice (cf. ibid.). The formal dimen-
sion refers to the principle of formal justice, namely: equals must be treated 
equally, and unequals must be treated unequally. This principle constitutes the 
core of our concept of justice (cf. Höffe 2002: 82). Since there are no specific 
criteria listed which determine when individuals should be considered as equals 
and in which way they should be treated equally, this principle lacks all sub-
stance (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 251). Thus, there is a need for addi-
                                           
111  Aristotle differentiates between universal and particular justice. Particular justice in turn 
encompasses two forms: distributive and rectifiable justice.  
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tional material principles which specify the formal principle of justice in order 
to make it applicable. Various material principles of distributive justice have 
been proposed. Beauchamp and Childress distinguish between six alternative 
material principles of distributive justice (ibid: 253). These principles are in 
turn derived from six alternative theories.112 Hence, on the material level there 
does not appear to be one sole principle of justice, but rather various different 
principles of justice. Since a detailed description of all of these principles and 
theories would exceed the scope of this chapter, the subsequent part merely 
deals with those principles and theories of justice which are of relevance for 
our analysis and have been alluded to in the above. These are utilitarian and 
egalitarian theories of justice. In order to clarify the role which well-being 
plays in the discussions on organ allocation, the way in which the concept of 
well-being relates to and is incorporated into these alternative theories of jus-
tice is examined. Due to the fact that a great number of the previously depicted 
lines of reasoning which refer to the potential outcome in the debate on organ 
allocation can be assigned to utilitarian theories of justice, we will focus first of 
all on utilitarianism and the way in which the concept of well-being relates to 
this specific theory of justice.  
Well-being embedded in utilitarian theories of justice 
When considering utilitarian theories ‘we seek to produce the maximal balance 
of positive value over disvalue’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 254). The 
central goal is to maximize utility and the sole and final measure when deter-
mining what is considered to be right or wrong or even just, is the moral prin-
ciple of maximizing utility, ‘which holds that a practice or rule tends to be cor-
rect if it results in as much or more aggregated good that any alternative action 
or practice’ (Gutmann and Land 1997: 193). Hence, in following utilitarian 
lines of reasoning, and one of their main proponents, John Stuart Mill, if a prac-
tice or rule maximizes the most utility it can be considered just. Utility is often 
defined as the overall well-being which results from an action. Thus, generally 
speaking, the concept of well-being is of central relevance within utilitarian ap-
                                           
112  Beauchamp and Childress refer to the four traditional theories of justice: utilitarian, liber-
tarian, communitarian and egalitarian theories and to two recent theories, namely capabil-
ities theories and well-being theories (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 252 ff.). Obvi-
ously, not all of these alternative theories and related principles have been applied in the 
context of organ allocation 
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proaches. Traditionally, subjectivist theories of well-being such as hedonism or 
desire-fulfilment theories have been applied within utilitarianism. As Dieter 
Birnbacher maintains, the notion of utilitarianism is frequently characterized by 
the three central features (cf. Birnbacher 1992: 69f.): 1. Consequentialism: 
utilitarian theories are consequentialist approaches, which means that when the 
moral quality of an action is evaluated it is not the underlying intention which 
is decisive, but rather the actual results of the action. 2. Subjectivism of values: 
the measures which are applied in order to estimate the utility resulting from an 
action are utterly subjective referring to the well-being of the persons affected 
by an action in terms of the fulfilment of the desires and preferences or to the 
experiential quality resulting from an action. 3. The principle of aggregation: 
Utilitarianism is linked to the principle of interpersonal aggregation which im-
plies that the collective overall benefit is to be maximized.113 The way in which 
this benefit is distributed among the specific individuals is not taken into ac-
count.  
The above analysis of the criteria as applied in practice as well as of the 
theoretical discussion on well-being in the debate on organ allocation, has illus-
trated that well-being/QoL is often referred to as a measure for outcome. As 
already suggested in the previous sections, we are clearly concerned here with 
utilitarian lines of reasoning, since the underlying assumption is that well-being 
(in terms of aggregated individual benefit) is to be maximized when organs are 
allocated.  
However, it is important to note that when utilitarian lines of reasoning are 
to be found in the context of organ allocation there are some deviations from 
the above-mentioned general features: Firstly, utilitarian arguments which are 
to be found in the discussions on organ allocation primarily refer to aggregated 
individual benefit and not to other dimensions of utility such as the social 
worth114 of the lives of the individuals concerned. ‘There is an almost total con-
sensus that other aspects of utility, especially social usefulness of the lives of 
the potential recipients, should not be taken into account.’ (Gutmann and Land 
1997: 193) Secondly, we have learned that in the context of organ allocation 
                                           
113  As Birnbacher points out, there are, however, some current versions of utilitarianism 
which do not focus on the aggregated overall-benefit but rather on the average benefit 
(cf. Birnbacher 2007: 222). 
114  For further information on the concept of social utility and its history within the alloca-
tion of hemodialysis machines see Veatch 2000: 288-98. 
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narrow objectivist conceptions of well-being prevail. Thus, concepts which are 
based upon desire-fulfilment theories or hedonism rarely occur.  
Above all the afore-mentioned third feature of utilitarianism the principle 
of aggregation has evoked harsh criticism. Since utilitarianism is only con-
cerned with the overall maximization of utility and not with its distribution 
among the persons concerned, a standard objection to utilitarian theories is that 
they do not take sufficient account of distributive justice (cf. Schroth 2006). 
Interpersonal aggregation leads to problems concerning the rights, freedom and 
well-being of the specific individuals concerned. Rawls has provided a famous 
and detailed discussion of this problem stating that classical Utilitarianism does 
not take the separateness of persons seriously (Rawls 1971). When applying 
this line of reasoning, critics go as far as to discredit the fact that Utilitarianism 
can be considered a theory of justice.115 After having ascertained a clearer pic-
ture of the reference to utilitarian theories of justice in organ allocation and the 
presence of well-being within these approaches, the depicted objections with 
which the well-being-based lines of reasoning have been confronted will be ex-
amined and it will be explored how these objections relate to utilitarian theories 
and their alleged weaknesses. 
Well-being involved in the dispute on maximizing utility versus 
justice in distribution 
We have learned that the consideration of well-being especially as a measure 
for outcome has been confronted with a great deal of criticism. One of the main 
objections concerning the consideration of well-being consists in the charge 
that where allocation decisions which affect several people are concerned, the 
QALY or well-being measures for outcome generally run the risk of leading to 
situations perceived as grossly unjust and unfair because of their discriminatory 
impact and their disregard of patients in need. Veatch points out that, when 
these concerns are cited, ‘[o]ur sense of justice has something to do with recog-
nizing the fundamental equality of persons’ (Veatch 1991c: 206). Well-being or 
QoL as a standard for outcome is accused of not taking the equality of persons 
into account. If one takes a closer look at the doubts expressed with regard to 
                                           
115  It is not possible to give a more substantial and critical depiction of utilitarianism within 
the framework of this book. For a more detailed picture of the criticism leveled against 
utilitarianism and a defence against it see for instance Gesang 1998. 
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the consideration of well-being, one discovers that they appear to be familiar. 
Lockwood describes the following impression regarding the debate on the 
QALY: ‘[i]ndeed the QALY approach has a pleasantly nostalgic air, for those 
familiar with Jeremy Bentham’s “felicific calculus”. Most of the philosophical 
doubts about the QALY approach would be particular instances of familiar 
charges that have been laid against utilitarianism.’ (Lockwood 1988: 39) 
Thus, the criticism grounded in the notion of the equality of persons where 
justice in distribution is concerned does not relate to the QoL measures as such, 
but rather to the consideration of outcome in the dilemma of organ allocation in 
general and, furthermore, to the reference to utilitarianism in the debate. Ve-
atch, for instance, maintains that theories of justice other than utilitarianism116 
focus on the pattern of distribution of the good rather than on the amount of 
good done and this is of major importance when grafts are allocated (cf. Veatch 
2000: 295). We can determine that the objections facing QoL or well-being ap-
pear to be directed towards its consideration within a utilitarian approach to or-
gan allocation rather than towards the concept itself. This observation fits in 
with the fact that, generally speaking, the debate on organ allocation is con-
cerned with the familiar conflict between the two major principles maximizing 
utility and justice in distribution117 (cf. Gutmann and Land 1997: 193; Veatch 
2000: 287) and the appropriate relation of the goal of utility maximization on 
the one hand, and the allegedly competing aim of a just distribution of the 
grafts on the other hand.118 Sometimes both principles work in the same direc-
tion, but in the context of organ allocation they often come into conflict where 
they have different implications. Dan Brock provides the following précis of 
                                           
116 Veatch would probably even deny that utilitarianism can be classified as a theory of jus-
tice see Veatch 1991c: 209 ff.. When giving a response to an argument by James F. Chil-
dress he maintains that it is wrong to consider medical utility a criterion of fairness. 
117  Note that the reference to the principle of justice in distribution when describing the ten-
sion is rather vague and ambiguous, since above all utilitarians would argue that utilitari-
anism aims at increasing justice and for this reason the category principles of justice in 
distribution also encompass the utilitarian principle of maximizing utility. Nevertheless, 
as the statements by Veatch suggest in the context of organ allocation the expression jus-
tice in distribution appears to be widely used to consider the egalitarian principle of jus-
tice which refers to the notion of equality and need when distributing grafts. We will be 
coming back to this in more detail later.  
118  However, James F. Childress maintains that ‘[i]t is a fundamental mistake to suppose that 
“medical utility” and “fairness” are necessarily in tension so that if one is met, the other 
is infringed’ (Childress 1991: 187). 
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the discussions involved: ‘[t]he fundamental ethical conflict in the distribution 
of scarce organs is between doing the most good with a scarce resource and en-
suring that it is distributed fairly’ (Brock 1988: 87). Hence, the classical com-
petition between the two alternative sets of theories, consequentialist and deon-
tological theories, is apparent in the debate on organ allocation.  
Thus, in short, objections, which are based on the concern that well-being 
as a measure for outcome or the QALY calculus have unjust implications, op-
erate on the theoretical level dealing with alternative approaches to the problem 
of allocation. QoL appears to be involved in the dispute on utility maximisation 
versus justice in distribution and on the superordinate level consequentialist 
versus deontological theories. As the concept is frequently embedded in utili-
tarian frameworks, it often becomes a victim of the criticism which is basically 
aimed at utilitarianism in the context of organ allocation. It is, however, im-
portant to keep the criticism which operates on the level of alternative theories 
(or divergent ethical traditions) separate from the conceptual level on which 
well-being is concerned. In the debate on organ allocation many, above all, crit-
ical voices appear not to succeed in distinguishing between the levels.  
In addition, it is important to keep the objections on the theoretical level sepa-
rate from the criticism on the conceptual level, since well-being measures need 
not necessarily be incorporated in a utilitarian line of reasoning. While dealing 
with the measure of patient need in 5.3.2. we have observed that QoL might 
also come into play when the criteria need and urgency are concerned. The var-
ious standards of patients’ need, however, are generally grounded in egalitarian 
principles of justice. In order to further clarify the role which well-being plays 
in organ allocation, the subsequent section concentrates on the relevance of 
well-being within egalitarian theories of justice. 
Well-being within egalitarian lines of reasoning 
Generally speaking, egalitarian theories refer to material criteria of need and 
equality (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 252). ‘These theories explicate 
the idea of equality in terms of treating persons as equals in certain respects.’ 
(ibid.: 256) Various forms of egalitarianism have been brought forward and in 
these alternative forms the distribution of certain goods has various goals such 
as the equality of opportunity or the equality of well-being. Hence, in some 
152 
egalitarian approaches well-being plays a central role. These approaches are 
often discussed under the title ‘welfare egalitarianism’ (cf. Keller 2002).  
In A Theory of Justice (1971) John Rawls, developed his well-known egal-
itarian approach challenging utilitarian theories by focusing on the least well 
off when distributing goods in order to achieve more equality and to compen-
sate for the inequality arising from nature. ‘Hence there is an effort to maxim-
ize the minimum, and the notion is often referred to as a “maximin”’ (Veatch 
1998: 457). Rawls has argued for the ‘fair equality of opportunity’ rule, which 
Beauchamp and Childress classify as belonging to the group of ‘fair opportuni-
ty rules’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 257). His approach and especially 
his principle of fair equality of opportunity have been transferred to the realm 
of healthcare.119 Hoedemakers and Dekkers point out that ‘[a]n egalitarian jus-
tice model is based on a positive obligation on the part of the community to re-
duce differences in individual health and central to this model is determining of 
who is worst off’ (Hoedemaekers and Dekkers 2003: 228). We have seen that 
important voices in the debate on organ allocation such as Robert M. Veatch 
and Frances Kamm have developed, along the lines of Rawls, egalitarian ap-
proaches to the problem of organ allocation in which the QoL concept is ap-
plied. Within these egalitarian approaches the QALY measure and well-being 
measures (or in a more concrete form measures for opportunity for well-being 
over lifetime) do not face the above-mentioned problems of unjust discrimina-
tion or ‘double jeopardy’ as priority is given to patients who are worst off. 
Thus, a large number of the above depicted objections do not hold water when 
well-being has an embedded presence within egalitarian standards for the just 
distribution of grafts. This highlights the fact that the above depicted criticism 
referring to well-being and the QALY-measure is misdirected if it refers to the 
concept and not to the approach in which well-being is embedded. However, 
this does not in the least imply that the application of the concept of well-being 
within egalitarian theories is not without its problems. One instance of this is 
the previously mentioned challenge of ‘measuring’ and comparing well-being 
and the presence of alternative concepts. This obstacle and proposed ways to 
circumvent it by means of a narrow objectivist conception are the central theme 
of the following section. 
                                           
119  See, for instance, Norman Daniels 1985. 
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5.4.2. The predominance of a narrow objective concept of 
well-being 
The findings have indicated that in the practice of organ allocation as well as in 
the theoretical debate on this subject, objective dimensions of well-being pre-
vail where the character is concerned. Furthermore, these concepts are compar-
atively narrow. This is the case when well-being is considered as a measure for 
outcome and as a rationale for patient need. In the enhancement debate we also 
discovered a predominance of objective dimensions. Nonetheless, these were 
broad and comprehensive concepts. We observed that the predominance of ob-
jective dimensions was due to the central role which the notion of human na-
ture plays in the discussions on enhancement. However, this does not provide 
us with an explanation for the prevalence of objectivist concepts in the debate 
on organ allocation since the notion of human nature does not enjoy such rele-
vance and there is also the distinguishing factor that the concepts of well-being 
applied in organ allocation are narrow. Thus, there seem to be other explana-
tions for the predominance of narrow objective concepts within the context of 
organ allocation. The following sets out to examine these underlying reasons 
for the prevalence of narrow objectivist conceptions of well-being in the prac-
tice of organ allocation and in the theoretical discussions.  
Facilitating the operationalizability and the application of 
standards of well-being  
Although the proponents of narrow objective criteria for measuring well-being 
are often not very explicit about the reasons underlying their choice, there is 
evidence to suggest that narrow objective criteria increase the ease with which 
the concept of well-being/QoL can be put into operation when organs are allo-
cated. This would serve us with a first reason as to why objective dimensions of 
well-being and narrow conceptions predominate. In order to examine the pre-
cise way in which narrow objectivist concepts might facilitate the application 
of well-being as a standard, we need to determine which conditions need to be 
met for the operationalizability of the concept of QoL. 
The operationalizability and application of QoL in the process of organ al-
location requires the following: since the priority-setting decision in organ allo-
cation focuses on the differences of QoL among persons the possibility of in-
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terpersonal comparability120 of well-being is a necessary condition if QoL is to 
be put into operation. This, in turn, demands a common standard for measuring 
QoL, which facilitates its quantification and its empirical evaluation by means 
of instruments. A common standard and instruments for measurement need in 
turn to be based on a firm conceptual foundation of well-being. All of these re-
quirements are closely intertwined and mutually dependent. A change in the 
conception of well-being leads to changes of shape in the standard for measur-
ing it and in its interpersonal comparability. Also the adherence to a specific 
scale for measuring well-being has implications on the other two levels of re-
quirements.  
In addition to these requirements, emphasis is frequently placed on the 
fact that the system applied for organ allocation should be transparent since it 
is under pressure to prove its legitimacy as it is concerned with the sensitive 
decisions of life and death (cf. Ach 1998; Feuerstein 1995). This also holds true 
for the standards for measurement which are applied when determining the 
well-being of the potential recipients where individual well-being is being tak-
en into consideration within the criteria for allocation. These standards for es-
timating and comparing well-being should also be transparent and easily com-
prehensible so that they evoke trustworthiness and reliability. The following 
considers the alternative concepts of well-being in the light of these require-
ments.  
Before we commence, however, we should repeatedly call to mind that, 
concerning the requirement of a firm conceptual foundation, there does not 
seem to be a single substantiated theory of well-being, either in biomedical eth-
ics or in the general theoretical debates on the nature of well-being. As demon-
strated in chapter 2 the dispute about this is ongoing. The concepts underlying 
the standards for measuring and comparing well-being can be justified to a 
greater or lesser degree independent of whether they are subjective or objective, 
narrow or broad. Thus, the requirement that the standards applied when meas-
uring and comparing the well-being of different individuals need to have a firm 
conceptual foundation does not in fact enlighten us as to whether standards 
should be objective or subjective, narrow or broad conceptions. Moreover, as 
we have already established, in the debate on organ allocation the experts who 
                                           
120  The subject of interpersonal comparison of well-being has, as Matthew Adler points out, 
‘not been much disputed by philosophers’ (Adler 2012: 157). For a more detailed picture 
see Elster and Roemer 1991, being one of the few works published on this topic. 
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are prepared to explain the conceptual foundation on which they base their 
measures for well-being, are few and far between. Hence, it is difficult to pin-
point whether or not their underlying conceptions are well-founded. 
It is now important to return to the other requirements listed above in or-
der to discover in how far narrow objectivist concepts (as opposed to subjectiv-
ist and broad concepts) are more likely to fulfil these. First of all, concerning 
the narrowness of the concept, generally speaking it becomes evident that the 
more comprehensive and person-directed the concept of well-being is, the more 
difficult it becomes to measure and compare the well-being of different indi-
viduals. This is due to the fact that comprehensive concepts of well-being take 
into account a variety of various aspects which all need to be estimated if the 
well-being of an individual is to be measured and compared. Thus, if a narrow 
concept is chosen, based solely on a limited number of medical criteria, for in-
stance, measurement and interpersonal comparability are facilitated. Further-
more, we have seen that in the debates and practice of organ allocation compar-
atively narrow concepts focusing on purported medical criteria are mainly ad-
hered to and that this is also done in order to avoid any commitment to a specif-
ic concept of QoL or value judgments. Nonetheless, it has been shown that the 
application of purported medical criteria in order to avoid conceptual commit-
ments can be considered short-sighted since the adherence to them already in-
volves specific conceptual commitments and value judgments which are 
claimed to be bypassed.  
Moving to our primary concern, the underlying reasons for the predomi-
nance of objectivist conceptions in the context of organ allocation, it appears to 
be the case that these concepts of well-being more easily meet most of the re-
quirements listed in the above in comparison to subjectivist conceptions. They 
facilitate the measurement of well-being because they allow the comparatively 
simple development of an easily applicable scale for measurement. This is due 
to the fact that objective concepts clearly list the relevant components which 
universally contribute to the well-being of the individual and thereby also pro-
vide a scale for interpersonal comparison. All this can be carried out by third 
parties, that is to say medical professionals, from an external perspective. As 
we have seen at the beginning of this chapter the different organisations which 
are responsible for the mediation and allocation of donor organs operate with 
the aid of a computer database, which contains the information of each poten-
tial recipient. The pieces of information about the patients are broken down into 
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basic, for the most part medical, ‘facts’ which are easily accessible and compa-
rable and do not contain many personalized details. The process of allocation is 
designed to take place impersonally. Standards for assessing the well-being of 
potential recipients need to function accordingly if they are to be integrated into 
the system. This can best be attained by objective measures as they disengage 
from the individual patient. In addition, the standards for measurement are tan-
gible, which increases their transparency – also one of the above-mentioned 
requirements. Nonetheless, as shown, some participants in the debate on organ 
allocation consider it disadvantageous that objective criteria are distanced from 
the individual patient and his/her subjective perspective.  
A more personal process however, could only be achieved by the help of 
subjective conceptions of well-being. Nonetheless, such concepts appear to 
have more difficulties to meet the above depicted requirements of QoL stand-
ards in organ allocation. Utterly subjective accounts in which well-being is 
considered subjective on all three levels, the ontological, the evaluative and the 
epistemic level, would complicate the application of well-being standards since 
the measurement and above all the interpersonal comparison become extremely 
challenging. In order to get a more vivid picture, it is worth considering desire-
fulfilment theories, for instance, within the criterion of present need. In follow-
ing this approach the patient who receives the graft is the one who is considered 
to be worst-off in terms of his/her actual well-being estimated from a subjective 
point of view focusing on his/her desires. For inter-personal comparison the 
estimations of the well-being of the potential recipients concerned are weighed 
up. However, in following an approach to allocation based on a desire-
fulfilment theory what exactly is to be compared? What is the decisive com-
parandum? In the context of well-being and fair distribution Matthew Adler 
maintains: ‘[f]or anyone who adopts a view of well-being that makes prefer-
ences a central element, there is indeed a genuine intellectual puzzle about the 
possibility of interpersonal comparability’ (Adler 2012: 186). One could, for 
instance, focus on the strength of the desires of all potential recipients in order 
to determine who is the neediest person and should receive the graft. This, 
however, appears to be a very intransparent approach to the problem of organ 
allocation which inevitably complicates the measurement and inter-personal 
comparability and is vulnerable to abuse. The only way to integrate a more or 
less subjectivist conception of well-being would be a standard which is based 
upon average wishes and desires of reasonable patients, similar to the reasona-
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ble person standard121. This, however, constitutes rather an objective or inter-
subjective concept of well-being which cannot be considered as entirely subjec-
tive. Thus, we can conclude that in order to facilitate the applicability to the 
context of organ allocation, the concept of well-being concerned needs to be 
narrow and (at least to a certain degree) objective. 
The impression arises that apart from the technical problems mentioned in 
evaluating and comparing the strength of desires, there also appears to be a 
more profound problem involved when subjective concepts of well-being such 
as desire-fulfilment theories constitute the basis for standards in organ alloca-
tion especially when interpersonal comparability is concerned.  
Justice leading to the requirement of a narrow objective 
concept of well-being 
We have ascertained that when subjective concepts of well-being such as de-
sire-fulfilment theories provide the basis of standards for measuring and com-
paring well-being in organ allocation, there are problems involved. In order to 
obtain a better understanding of the obstacles present an examination of the fol-
lowing case could be of assistance.  
Two people are waiting for a donor kidney: Samantha is a demanding 
woman of 39. She has recently been diagnosed with renal failure and for this 
reason has now to rely on dialysis. Ever since then her world has simply caved 
in. She thinks it is terrible having to go to dialysis every three days, not being 
able to do the things she did before such as going on holiday spontaneously, 
working hard at her career and doing high-performance sports. Although her 
health status is comparatively good according to her physician, she is very un-
happy not being able to maintain her former standard of life and is not overwill-
ing to adapt to her current condition. For this reason she considers her well-
being as diminished in the extreme and feels that she needs a kidney transplant 
very urgently. Therefore, we can conclude that her desire for a graft is strong. 
On the other hand, Tom is around the same age as Samantha but of a more 
unassertive character. He has been living with dialysis for the past ten years and 
has come to terms with his condition. Because he is rather self-effacing, he is 
content with the things he is able to do like interaction with friends and watch-
                                           
121  The reasonable person standard will be dealt with in detail in the subsequent chapter 6. 
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ing TV and does not make other demands. His condition has gradually deterio-
rated to such an extent that from a medical point of view it is important for his 
future health condition122 to receive a kidney transplant as soon as possible. De-
spite his condition Tom remains in character and still evaluates his well-being 
as being acceptable. He has requested a kidney transplant, but in comparison to 
Samantha his desire for a donor organ is more modest. 
Tom and Samantha both require a matching donor kidney. The question 
arises: who is to be given priority. Let us imagine that, for the sake of argu-
ment, criteria such waiting time are omitted and that both have the same degree 
of tissue compatibility. The decisive factor when deciding who should be given 
priority is merely their present need in terms of the current strength of desire 
for a graft. Thus, this standard is based on a desire-fulfilment conception of 
well-being, functioning within an egalitarian approach to distributive justice. If 
this subjective standard of need is applied, it follows that Samantha is to be 
given priority since her desire is the strongest. But is this really a fair solution? 
Many have argued that this is not what distributive justice requires us to do.  
Norman Daniels (1995; 2001) and Thomas M. Scanlon (1975) have given 
thought to this problem in great detail. When dealing with the uneasy feeling 
which arises if persons are given priority during allocation processes on the ba-
sis of their strength of desires, Daniels maintains that ‘something seems clearly 
unjust if we deny the moderates equal claims on further distribution just be-
cause they have been modest in forming their tastes’ (Daniels 2001: 332). Con-
templating this in the face of our example we might get the impression that it 
would be unjust if Tom were not to receive the graft, solely because he is more 
modest. Samantha, in contrast, expects a great deal more from life. She could 
be held responsible for not having adjusted her preferences to her current con-
dition so that she is in a position to endure her situation more easily.  
In following arguments of John Rawls this phenomenon has been widely 
discussed under the title expensive tastes or the social hijacking objection.123 It 
                                           
122  Note that Tom is not suffering from an acutely life threatening condition. Thus, currently 
there is no life/death decision involved, but it goes without saying that his health and 
from an objective point of view his well-being, are steadily deteriorating under dialysis. 
123  See Rawls 1982: 168-9. Madison Powers and Ruth Faden provide the following descrip-
tion of the expensive taste objection: ‘[t]heories that employ a conception of individual 
well-being that depends inherently upon differences in personal satisfaction means that 
those with expensive tastes, say, for fine foods and wine, count on a par with those 
whose preferences are for the satisfaction of basic or more urgent needs. The more im-
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is maintained that ‘the special features of an individual’s conception of the 
good – [such as] extravagant tastes and resulting dissatisfaction – do not give 
rise to any special claims of justice on social resources’ (Daniels 2001: 333). 
Impartiality is a central factor within distributive justice. This implies that the 
subjective evaluation of well-being cannot be the decisive factor when goods 
are to be fairly distributed since this would jeopardize impartiality. Hence, 
when assessing the importance of competing claims on scarce goods, we cannot 
rely upon subjectivist conceptions of well-being such as desire-fulfilment theo-
ries because they are vulnerable to the problem of expensive tastes and biased. 
For these reasons they are apt to lead to decisions which could be considered 
unjust. It is, on the contrary, essential that a narrow objectivist approach to 
well-being is taken. Daniels points out that in contrast to subjective standards, 
‘[a]n objective criterion invokes a measure of importance independent of the 
individual’s own assessment, for example, independent of the strength of his 
preference’ (Daniels 2001: 323). This concept is narrow (or truncated as Dan-
iels calls it) because it is only concerned with needs such as health, food and 
social relationships which, according to Daniels, have objective importance 
since they establish the precondition for all other specific goals we have and a 
lack of them reduces our range of opportunity. In short, if resources are allocat-
ed, it is important that a narrow objective concept of well-being functions as a 
conceptual foundation to avoid unjust consequences (cf. Daniels 2001: 324; 
Scanlon 1975: 661). Scanlon states within his argument for narrow objective 
concepts: ‘[w]hat the examples show, however, is not that there is anything 
wrong with maximizing doctrines or with egalitarian doctrines per se but rather 
that a subjective criterion of well-being seems insensitive to differences be-
tween preferences that are of great relevance when these preferences are taken 
as the basis for moral claims’ (Scanlon 1975: 659). Thus, according to Scanlon 
in cases of distributive justice approaches, independent of whether they are 
                                                                                                                                  
portant goal of morality, or of justice in particular, should be the narrower aim of helping 
those whose well-being is low, not the satisfaction of exotic tastes.’ (Powers and Faden 
2006: 33) There has been, above all, a debate between G.A. Cohen (2011) and Ronald 
Dworkin (2000) as to the question whether expensive tastes are really concerns of justice. 
However, the impression could arise that it is inappropriate to speak of ‘expensive tastes’ 
in the context of organ allocation, since the desire for a donor organ can be considered an 
essential desire for life. Thus, it could be considered more appropriate to differentiate be-
tween moderate desires and more demanding desires. 
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egalitarian or utilitarian, should adhere to narrow objective conceptions of well-
being.  
If we transfer this to our example and apply a narrow objectivist concept 
of well-being mainly referring to health related quality of life, Tom would be 
given priority because of his comparatively bad health status and would receive 
the kidney transplant. Obviously, this appears to be more in line with what dis-
tributive justice requires us to do. Thus, the great importance attached to the 
notion of justice in the context of organ allocation appears to influence concep-
tual choices in terms of well-being and sets limits to the applicability of subjec-
tivist and broad concepts.  
In summary, there are, above all, two reasons for the predominance of nar-
row objectivist conceptions of well-being where organ allocation is concerned: 
Firstly, narrow objective concepts of well-being facilitate the operationalizabil-
ity and the application of well-being in organ allocation. Secondly, the im-
portance of the notion of justice in organ allocation requires that narrow objec-
tive concepts of well-being are applied. 
5.5. Drawing together the main findings concerning the 
role of well-being in the debate on organ 
allocation 
At the beginning of this chapter on the role of well-being in the debate on organ 
allocation, we started with the notion that well-being is to play a prominent role 
in the debate on organ allocation since the ‘simple strategy’ of putting one’s 
resources where they do the most good in terms of longevity and well-being 
has much intuitive appeal. However, analysis has shown that the conception 
needs to be modified to a more modest view: well-being constitutes one of 
many considerations in the debate on organ allocation. It thereby plays a sub-
ordinate role. Nonetheless, where well-being does come into play it is explicit-
ly mentioned and can, therefore, be said to have an overt presence. The subor-
dinate role of well-being was suggested right at the beginning of the chapter by 
the results of the analysis of the criteria as applied by ET and UNOS. Thus, the 
results concerning the role of well-being in the debate on organ allocation are a 
marked contrast to the findings in the previous chapters – above all to the 
prominent role well-being plays in the enhancement debate. Especially the ex-
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amination of the consideration of well-being in the academic debate on organ 
allocation indicated that the concept has, for the most part, received attention 
(mostly in terms of criticism) when functioning as a measure for outcome with-
in utilitarian approaches and comparatively less attention within egalitarian ap-
proaches to the problem of organ allocation. The finding that well-being plays a 
subordinate role in the debate on organ allocation is in such stark contrast to the 
results so far with regard to the presence of well-being in the other debates, that 
it deserves some attention at this point before we come to our other findings 
concerning the presence and character of well-being. What exactly are the rea-
sons for the subordinate role of well-being when guidance in organ allocation is 
concerned and why do opinions differ so greatly as to how much importance 
the promotion of well-being should have in organ allocation? 
First of all, it has been observed that well-being is deeply involved in the 
dispute on alternative principles of justice, namely maximizing utility versus 
justice in distribution. Since well-being mainly occurs within utilitarian ap-
proaches to the problem of organ allocation, the decision as to how much 
weight should be given to utilitarian considerations does, at least to some de-
gree, determine the role which the concept of well-being is to play in the pro-
cess of organ allocation. Thus, if utilitarian approaches fade into the back-
ground, the concept of well-being does become, to a certain extent, less signifi-
cant. As illustrated, the consideration of utilitarian approaches to the problem 
of organ allocation is highly controversial for its alleged unjust consequences 
and for this reason utilitarianism does not play the principal role within the cri-
teria as applied in practice and in the academic debate. This provides a first rea-
son as to why the concept of well-being is of subordinate importance in the 
context of organ allocation. 
Moreover, it has been shown that the concept of well-being often becomes 
a victim of the criticism about unjust consequences which is basically aimed at 
utilitarianism in the context of organ allocation. This fosters a ‘negative reputa-
tion’ of the concept and especially of the QALY measure and might lead to sit-
uations in which people avoid the use of measures of well-being within stand-
ards for organ allocation. However, it has been pointed out that the criticism 
which operates on the theoretical level should be kept separate from objections 
which directly confront the concept of well-being itself.  
There is, nonetheless, a further aspect: as we have seen, the concept of 
well-being does not necessarily need to be embedded in a utilitarian frame-
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work, although this is frequently the case. It can also occur within egalitarian 
approaches to organ allocation or even within an allocation system which is 
based upon a balanced application of various principles. However, the incorpo-
ration of well-being within these approaches to the problem of organ allocation 
has so far received comparatively little attention. This could possibly change 
since theories of justice which incorporate the concept of well-being other than 
utilitarianism are enjoying increasing popularity in the wider context of 
healthcare (see Powers and Faden 2006). Thus, if these approaches gain in-
creased access to the context of organ allocation, the role which well-being 
plays might undergo a change. 
There does, however, appear to be another important reason for the subor-
dinate role of the concept of well-being in the context of organ allocation: the 
promotion of well-being competes with the predominant aim of saving life or 
prolonging life. We have learned that one major problem and point of contro-
versy is the question as to how much weight should be given to improving 
well-being as opposed to the predominant aim of saving or prolonging life. Pri-
ority-setting decisions in organ allocation are for the most part ‘tragic choices’ 
or ‘fatal decisions’. For this reason it does not come as a surprise that many 
participants in the debate, such as Harris, give priority to the aim of saving life 
rather than improving its quality. This argument has received considerable at-
tention under the title of the moral uniqueness of life saving124. In addition, be-
ing alive is viewed as the precondition for experiencing well-being. This pro-
vides us with a further explanation as to why well-being frequently appears to 
fade into the background in the debate on organ allocation. Especially the pro-
posed allocation system provided by OPTN clearly reveals that the prolonga-
tion of life is often viewed as the major or even sole goal when distributing or-
gans. Nevertheless, in the debate emphasis is also placed on the fact that crite-
ria for organ allocation should not only be concerned with the prolongation of 
life, but also with the improvement and conservation of its quality. This, above 
all, is pointed out in the QALY debate. Having said that, one should bear in 
mind that the objection of well-being considerations based on the moral 
uniqueness of life saving might have a lesser importance in debates which fo-
cus on the allocation of scarce goods which are not as essential as organs and 
where priority-setting does not imply decisions of life and death but rather de-
                                           
124  See the deliberations provided by Madison Powers and Ruth Faden 2006: 171.  
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cisions of greater or lesser QoL. These elaborations made on the basis of the 
findings provide some possible reasons for the subordinate role of well-being in 
discussions on organ allocation.  
With regard to the character of well-being the examination has revealed that 
there is a predominance of narrow objectivist concepts of well-being in the con-
text of organ allocation. The exploration of the underlying reasons for this pre-
dominance has indicated that if the concept is to function as an operational 
measure for allocating organs, there needs to be some kind of narrow objective 
or intersubjective standard for interpersonal comparison. This is the case regard-
less of whether QoL as such is defined in objective terms (as in the case of the 
functioning model) or in a more subjective way. We have seen that this is due to 
the fact that objective or intersubjective concepts of well-being facilitate the op-
erationalizability and the application of well-being in organ allocation and that 
they, furthermore, avoid unjust consequences due to partiality and the problem 
of ‘expensive tastes’. Utterly subjective conceptions, in contrast, impede the ease 
with which well-being can be measured and compared and are likely to lead to 
unjust consequences. We can maintain that, above all, with regard to its objective 
character, the concept of well-being is strongly influenced by the notion of jus-
tice. We have ascertained that the concept of well-being is embedded in alterna-
tive theories of justice. Thus, as in the previous debates, the predominant notion 
referred to within the debate has a major impact on well-being. 
In addition, it has been established that discussions dealing with the appli-
cation of the concept of well-being within the context of organ allocation operate 
primarily at the evaluative level. Hence, the focus is set on appropriate criteria 
for the estimation and comparison of the well-being of potential recipients of a 
graft. Discussions are first and foremost concerned with the restoration of well-
being of patients who are in need of a graft. Furthermore, it has been extrapolat-
ed that sometimes also the future well-being patients will have if they do not re-
ceive a graft is referred to and thus, the protection of well-being is involved.  
Concerning the observation that that the term QoL is applied with higher 
frequency in the debate than the expression well-being: in the analysis of the 
discussion on prenatal testing and selective abortion we have already seen that 
the term ‘QoL’ is used in preference when important decisions have to be tak-
en, precise estimations of well-being are required and an operational and trans-
parent standard for evaluation is needed. This hypothesis becomes strengthened 
by the observations in this chapter. 
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6. Well-being in discussions concerning the 
end of life: the cases of assistance in 
dying and foregoing life-sustaining 
treatment 
Our journey through bioethical issues in various phases of life has now reached 
the final stage of life. This chapter finally concentrates on the role of well-being 
in discussions dealing with the end of life. 
Developments in modern medicine facilitate the possibility of resuscita-
tion and life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, new treatments in the field of 
palliative medicine have prevented and relieved the suffering of many patients 
at the end of life. At first glance, it appears as if the current developments have, 
above all, had a positive impact on patients’ well-being in the final phase of 
life. However, there are also a variety of factors which have recently led to 
changes which could also be perceived as problematic. Among them are ‘the 
increasing secularization of dying, the continuing dissolution of family life, the 
increasingly rapid development in possibilities to postpone dying until a stage 
of utter mental and physical deterioration, the increasing number of patients 
who know that they suffer from an incurable disease owing to medical diagnos-
tics and prognostics and finally the physician-patient relation that exists today 
in which mostly silence is kept about the process of dying’125 (Schöne-Seifert 
2007: 109). These changes might have a negative impact on the well-being of 
the patients at the end of life making them feel lonely, hopeless, dependent, 
having no control over the circumstances of their death or concerned about be-
ing a burden to others. Above all, the developments on the medical front (not-
withstanding all their advantages) have also influenced the process of dying 
negatively. ‘Medical and technological progress means that there are more fre-
                                           
125  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘die zunehmende Säkularisierung des Sterbens, die 
fortschreitende Auflösung engerer familiärer Lebensformen, die rasant gewachsenen 
Möglichkeiten, das Sterben bis in Phasen hochgradigen körperlichen und geistigen Ver-
falls aufzuschieben, die zunehmende Zahl von Patienten, die dank medizinischer Diag-
nostik und Prognostik um eine bei ihnen bestehende unheilbare Krankheit wissen und 
schließlich das Arzt-Patienten-Verhältnis heutiger Prägung, in dem über das Sterben 
doch wohl weitgehend geschwiegen wird‘. 
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quently life situations in which the prolongation of life and the quality of life 
diverge.’126 (Siep and Quante 1999: 38) This problem has already been indicat-
ed in the previous chapter with regard to organ allocation. Often the prolonga-
tion of life extends a burdensome period of physical and intellectual decline. As 
the German National Ethics Council depicts ‘[m]any people manifestly fear 
that such fate, might await them at the end of their lives and would prefer a 
non-lingering death without dependence on technical apparatus’ (German Na-
tional Ethics Council 2006: 9).  
The problem of divergence between the prolongation of life and the quali-
ty of life and the fears linked to it have caused adverse reactions: on the one 
hand it is argued that terminally ill persons should have better access to pallia-
tive care including support from physician, nurses, social workers and psy-
chologists. It is important to note that recently there has been progress in this 
field of end-of-life care as for instance permitting patients to die at home or in 
hospices with intensive palliative care and psychological support (cf. Schöne-
Seifert 2007: 110). On the other hand it is argued that severely or terminally ill 
patients should have the possibility to end their life when they want ‘in order to 
release the person from an incurable disease, intolerable suffering, or undigni-
fied death’ (Beauchamp et al. 2007: 398). In some countries the decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment has become a commonplace 
when the burdens of the prolongation of life outweigh its benefits to the patient. 
In addition, there is the call for the moral and legal right to physician-assisted 
suicide or voluntary active euthanasia.127 Daniel Callahan (1993) uses the 
phrase ‘a sea change in the climate of opinion’ to describe the change in atti-
tude which took place concerning the permissibility of physician-assisted sui-
cide or voluntary active euthanasia instead of preserving life at all costs. As in 
the debates on the beginning of life dealt with in Chapter 3, proponents of eu-
                                           
126  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Der medizinisch-technische Fortschritt führt dazu, 
dass es immer häufiger Lebensumstände gibt, in denen Lebensverlängerung und Lebens-
qualität auseinandertreten‘. 
127  As Bettina Schöne-Seifert points out, the call for the moral and legal right to physician-
assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia would not die down even if everyone had 
access to comprehensive and the best possible end-of-life care since there are also other 
subjective values and notions at stake such as a self-determined death with dignity. (cf. 
Schöne-Seifert 2007: 110). 
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thanasia128 for the most part base their arguments on the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Following this line of reasoning competent individuals should be 
able to decide autonomously how they wish to die. However, also the preven-
tion of major reductions in well-being at the end of life presents a prominent 
argument in the debate and gives a reason why patients seek euthanasia.  
This chapter sets out to analyse the role of well-being in discussions on 
euthanasia. After an introduction to the discussion about euthanasia, two exam-
ples of assistance in dying in practice are placed under scrutiny: physician-
assisted dying in the Netherlands and physician-assisted suicide in the U.S. 
state of Oregon. It is examined which role well-being plays in the jurisdictions 
of each country/state. The focus then changes and encompasses the theoretical 
discussions: the role of well-being in the debates on assistance in dying and 
foregoing life-sustaining treatment is put under scrutiny. This section is divided 
into two parts, the first of which deals with the reference to well-being in dis-
cussions on assistance in dying in the case of competent patients. The second, 
in contrast, concentrates on well-being in debates on foregoing life-sustaining 
treatment in the case of incompetent patients.  
6.1. An introduction to the discussion about euthanasia 
Right up to the present there has been substantial debate concerning the ‘pre-
cise boundaries of the legitimate practice of medicine when patients [or surro-
gates] request help in ending their lives’ (Beauchamp et al. 2007: 397). The 
term ‘euthanasia’ originates from the Greek meaning ‘a good death’ and has 
been widely applied in connection with discussion on this matter. Albert R. 
Jonsen, Mark Siegler and William J. Winslade elaborate that ‘[i]n its original 
medical use, “euthanasia” implied the duty of a doctor to assure that his pa-
tients died as peacefully and comfortably as the medicine of the time could 
provide. … Later the term was used as a synonym for mercy killing, that is, de-
liberately and directly killing a sufferer to relieve pain, either by physician or 
by some other compassionate party.’ (Jonsen et al. 2010: 149) Euthanasia is 
considered in cases with the unfavourable prognosis that the therapeutic treat-
ment of the patient is futile because of a terminal illness and in which his/her 
                                           
128  If the term ‘euthanasia’ is used in the following, cases of involuntary euthanasia (cases in 
which individuals are killed against their will) are excluded. 
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death is approaching. Broadly speaking, this applies to dying patients, patients 
in the final phase of a serious illness, for those who are in a persistent vegeta-
tive state and for neonates with serious untreatable and incurable illnesses or 
malformations (cf. Schramme 2002: 110). It is, however, important to note that 
due to its negative connotations because of the term’s misuse in the case of the 
horrors which took place during the Nazi era the usage of the expression ‘eu-
thanasia’ is still avoided in Germany (cf. Schöne-Seifert 2007: 111; Schramme 
2002: 109).129  
Common classificatory schemes 
In the discussion dealing with the topic of euthanasia there is usually a differen-
tiation made between voluntary, non-voluntary and in-voluntary euthanasia. 
Whereas voluntary euthanasia refers to cases in which a competent person con-
sciously and deliberately makes an enduring request for death, the expression 
non-voluntary euthanasia is applied to instances in which patients are decision-
ally incapacitated and have made no request for death (cf. Jonsen et al. 2010: 
149). Cases of in-voluntary euthanasia occur in situations in which individuals 
have explicitly expressed opposition to euthanasia and are killed against their 
will as was the case during the Nazi era. Nowadays, involuntary euthanasia is 
universally condemned. As John Harris points out, ‘[w]henever the so-called 
problem of euthanasia is debated, or wherever it appears as an issue in morality 
generally or more particularly in medical ethics, the issue is almost always seen 
in terms of whether or not voluntary euthanasia is or is not justifiable, and so 
whether or not it should be permitted’ (Harris 1985: 83; see also Schöne-Seifert 
2000: 100). Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that in cases which deal 
with incompetent patients also non-voluntary euthanasia comes into play since 
these patients might not have been prepared (for example by means of an ad-
vance directive) for the condition they find themselves in. 
Another widely applied differentiation is the one between active and pas-
sive euthanasia. This in turn rests upon the distinction between killing by a de-
liberate act and letting die by withholding (not starting) or withdrawal (stop-
ping) of treatment. A case of active euthanasia constitutes, for instance, the 
administering of a lethal overdose of insulin or barbiturates (cf. Schöne-Seifert 
                                           
129  In Germany debates are carried out under the title ‘Sterbehilfe’, since this term has fewer 
negative connotations. 
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2007: 114). Non-resuscitation in a case of cardiac arrest, in contrast, provides 
an example of passive euthanasia (cf. ibid.). Although, this distinction is said to 
function in a descriptive sense, it is based upon alleged normative differences 
of the practices (cf. Schöne-Seifert 2000: 99). It is a widely held view that there 
is a difference between active and passive euthanasia in terms of their moral 
and legal permissibility. Whereas the latter is sometimes viewed as permissible 
the former mainly is considered as inadmissible. This is due to the alleged mor-
al difference between carrying out an action and omitting to carry it out. In this 
respect, it should be noted that in the Netherlands and Belgium physicians are 
permitted to perform acts of voluntary active euthanasia under specific condi-
tions130. 
Further categories applied in the debate are physician-assisted suicide and 
indirect euthanasia. As Dan Brock maintains ‘a paradigm case of physician-
assisted suicide is a patient’s ending his or her life with a lethal dose of a medi-
cation requested of and provided by a physician for that purpose’ (Brock 2007: 
437-438). Physician-assisted suicide has been made legal in the US states of 
Oregon, Washington and also in Montana since 2009. In Switzerland assisted 
suicide has also been legally tolerated for many years. In cases of indirect eu-
thanasia physicians administer medication (sometimes in large doses) in order 
to alleviate the patient’s pain with the unintended but foreseen consequence 
that it hastens death.131 Instances of indirect euthanasia are frequently to be 
found involving patients suffering from terminal cancer, where ‘there may 
come a point where the administration of pain-killing drugs hastens death’ 
(Harris 1985: 84). This practice is not prohibited in many countries.  
In the contemporary debate, the depicted classification schemes have for 
various reasons been strongly criticized and some participants in the discus-
sions have moved away from these schemes (cf. Jonsen et al. 2010: 149; 
                                           
130  A detailed analysis of these conditions is provided in the following. 
131  In connection with indirect euthanasia the principle of double effect is frequently referred 
to in order to justify this practice and distinguish it from VAE. Jonsen et al. provide the 
following description of this principle: ‘[t]he principle of double effect is a form of ethi-
cal reasoning that recognizes that persons may face an unavoidable decision which will 
bring about inextricably linked effects, some good and desirable and others bad and un-
desirable. The good effects are intended by the agent and are ethically permissible (e.g., 
relief of pain is a benefit); the bad effects are not intended by the agent and are ethically 
undesirable (e.g., depression of consciousness and risk of pulmonary infection).’ (Jonsen 
et al. 2010: 145) 
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Schöne-Seifert 2007: 114-115). Nevertheless, the following analysis is based 
upon the differentiations as outlined in the above since they provide a rough 
orientation regarding the different practices in question. As Miller and Truog 
point out ‘[m]edical ethics has traditionally drawn a bright line between with-
holding and withdrawing treatment, on the one hand, and both assisted suicide 
and active euthanasia, on the other’ (Miller and Truog 2012: 27). Whereas the 
former is permitted from an ethical point of view, the latter are frequently pro-
hibited. A large part of the actual discussions has centred on the questions as to 
whether physician-assisted suicide (hereinafter PAS) and/or active voluntary 
euthanasia (hereinafter VAE) should also be legalized (cf. G. Dworkin 2009: 
375). Gerald Dworkin points out that ‘[b]y definition, there is only one descrip-
tive difference between assisted suicide and euthanasia. It lies in who performs 
the last causal act leading to death. In the case of assisted suicide it is the pa-
tient; in the case of euthanasia it is the physician.’ (ibid.: 391) In the current 
discourse both practices are summarized under the expression ‘assistance in 
dying’ (hereinafter AiD) (cf. Schöne-Seifert 2000), the term which I also apply 
in the following to refer to both practices (PAS and VAE).  
Having received a first impression of what kind of practices are under 
consideration when the theme of euthanasia is treated we will look of at two 
examples of assistance in dying in practice. This will illustrate how PAS and 
VAE are implemented in practical terms, what conditions prevail for it and 
whether or not well-being plays a role thereby. 
6.2. Two examples of assistance in dying in practice 
In the various industrialised countries patients who wish to die and request AiD 
name similar reasons for their decision such as their suffering and increasing 
dependency, but ‘one finds striking differences in the extent to which this wish 
is recognised and reflected in public policy’ (Birnbacher and Dahl 2008: pref-
ace V). In most parts of the world VAE as well as PAS are not permitted and 
are considered illegal acts. As mentioned in the above, countries such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium or the US states Oregon, Washington and Montana in 
which VAE or PAS respectively constitute regulated practices, are exceptions. 
In these countries and states various regulatory models with different guidelines 
and safeguards against potential abuse exist. Birnbacher and Dahl maintain that 
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the following criteria are the ‘paradigmatic euthanasia conditions’: ‘(1) The pa-
tient is in an irreversible state of terminal illness, (2) The patient suffers intoler-
ably, (3) The patient explicitly wishes to die, (4) This wish is not only momen-
tary but also constant’ (ibid.). This list of paradigmatic conditions indicates, 
that patient’s well-being does come into play in terms of the degree of dimin-
ishment due to the patient’s suffering. In order to examine the role of well-
being within the criteria for AiD as applied in practice in more detail, the ensu-
ing part provides an exemplary analysis of the regulation of assisted dying in 
the two jurisdictions: the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act and the Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. As 
in the previous chapter on organ allocation, the examination of the criteria as 
applied in practice provides us with an initial approximation concerning the 
role of well-being where euthanasia is concerned. In addition, the theoretical 
discussions are often conducted on the basis of practical experiences where 
AiD has been legalized. Thus, it is advisable to have taken note of the criteria 
as applied in practice and the role of well-being within these when reading the 
subsequent sections examining the theoretical discussions. 
6.2.1. Physician-assisted dying in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands physician-assisted dying is regulated by the Termination of 
Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, which has been 
legally permitted since 2002. It legalizes VAE and PAS as administered by 
physicians in certain cases and under specific conditions. Both written direc-
tives as well as oral requests are considered in cases of AiD. Written directives 
apply in situations in which the patient is not in a position to voice or signal 
his/her desires and considered as incompetent as for instance in cases of persis-
tent vegetative state. However, whether an act of AiD is performed or not also 
relies on the physician forming his/her own evaluation in the light of additional 
criteria. Concerning the legalization of physician assistance in dying The Neth-
erlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that ‘[t]he inclusion in the Criminal 
Code of a special ground for exemption from criminal liability means that doc-
tors who terminate life on request or assist in a patient’s suicide can no longer 
be prosecuted, provided they satisfy the statutory due care criteria … and notify 
death by non-natural causes to the appropriate regional euthanasia review 
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committee.’ (NMFA 2010: 3) In applying a uniform set of criteria to each case, 
it is the aim to reduce the number of unreported cases of AiD and to make the 
various practices more transparent (ibid.). The quotation highlights that when 
dealing with a patient’s request for AiD the doctors concerned are monitored by 
review committees. These committees verify that they have acted in accordance 
with the criteria of due care (Article 2 of the Act). Namely: 
 
[Physicians] must:  
 
a. be satisfied that the patient’s request is voluntary and well-considered;  
b. be satisfied that the patient’s suffering is unbearable and that there is no 
prospect of improvement;  
c. inform the patient of his or her situation and further prognosis;  
d. discuss the situation with the patient and come to the joint conclusion 
that there is no other reasonable solution;  
e.  consult at least one other physician with no connection to the case, who 
must then see the patient and state in writing that the attending physician 
has satisfied the due care criteria listed in the four points above;  
f. exercise due medical care and attention in terminating the patient’s life 
or assisting in his/her suicide. 
(NMFA 2010: 3) 
 
Buiting et al. maintain that ‘[a]lthough self-determination of the patient is a 
necessary condition to justify the termination of their life, in the final analysis 
the physician’s responsibility to alleviate the patient’s suffering is the most im-
portant principle underlying the Act’ (Buiting et al. 2008: 2). Especially criteri-
on b. and d. stress this and are of interest to us since they define the extent to 
which the well-being of the patient needs to be diminished in order to make 
physician AiD a legitimate act. The suffering and the resulting diminishment of 
well-being ought to be unbearable and hopeless and it is essential that there are 
no reasonable alternatives to alleviate it. Concerning the interpretation of the 
criterion b. Buiting et al. also state that although the suffering might have vari-
ous causes, as for instance pain, increasing dependency and anxiety, in follow-
ing ‘a decision of the Supreme Court in 2002, the suffering should predomi-
nantly result from a medically classifiable disease or disorder: other forms of 
suffering do not justify euthanasia or assisted suicide’ (Buiting et al. 2008: 1). 
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This especially refers to the ‘no prospect of improvement’ condition dealing 
with the anticipated medical situation of the patient in the foreseeable future 
(ibid.). The requirement that suffering is ‘unbearable’ also focuses on the pa-
tient’s subjective experience of his/her condition. ‘The physician only needs to 
be convinced that the patient is experiencing unbearable suffering.’ (ibid.) The 
criteria are worded in a very open way so that they have to be interpreted in the 
light of the specific circumstances of each new case. A study dealing with the 
physicians’ perspective on the criteria of due care conducted by Buiting et al. 
indicated that especially the evaluation of whether the criterion b. (the suffering 
is unbearable and hopeless) is fulfilled is problematic for many physicians: 
79% of the physicians who stated that they experience problems when evaluat-
ing whether the criteria of due care are fulfilled maintained that especially the 
assessment of criterion b constituted an obstacle (cf. ibid.). Therein, according 
to the physicians, the main problem was to decide whether they themselves 
were convinced of the patient’s unbearable suffering. Buiting et al. state: 
‘[h]owever, our results indicate that physicians predominantly experience prob-
lems with such subjective aspects. From a physician’s perspective, this is un-
derstandable because it is more difficult to rely on a patient’s experience and 
ideas than on one’s own medical-professional judgement’ (Buiting et al. 2008: 
4). 
Thus, the physician has to assume two different roles: an empathising role 
and a medical-professional role, the former of which appears to be the more 
difficult (cf. ibid). In addition, it is important to note that physicians have to 
make these decisions of AiD under very different conditions: in hospitals deci-
sions have to be made quickly and when hardly acquainted with the patient and 
his/her values, whereas in nursing homes the medical professionals are well ac-
quainted with their patients and their specific characters. 
The confrontation with the Dutch jurisdiction has shown us that the pa-
tient’s well-being is of central importance within the criteria of due care and 
that the patient’s subjective perspective on his/her well-being plays a large role 
where AiD is concerned. Nonetheless, it becomes obvious that in order to be in 
a position to receive AiD with the aim of ending suffering, the patient (or 
his/her suffering respectively) need to fulfil certain requirements. These are for 
example the criteria that the patient is competent, that the suffering results from 
an illness or disorder and cannot be alleviated by means other than the termina-
tion of life. Furthermore, the physician should be able to verify the unbearabil-
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ity of the patient’s suffering. Hence, the subjective perspective of the patient is 
only valid within a certain framework. We witness an interplay between the 
subjective and objective dimensions of well-being on the evaluative level. As 
we have ascertained, it is especially this interplay which represents a problem 
for physicians. The following now turns to the implementation of PAS in the 
state of Oregon in order to be in a position to compare the relevance of well-
being and the concepts as applied in both practices. 
6.2.2. Physician-assisted suicide in the U.S. state of Oregon 
In 1997 Oregon's Death with Dignity Act was finally ratified to make PAS a 
legal practice for terminally-ill patients after first having been approved in 
1994. Terminally-ill patients are, under a specific set of safeguards, allowed to 
end their life through using a prescription from their physicians for lethal medi-
cation and the voluntary self-administration of the medication (Oregon Death 
with Dignity Act (ORS) 1994: 127.800–127.867). Emphasis is placed on the 
fact that by the Act a terminally ill patient is enabled to ‘end his or her life in a 
humane and dignified manner’ (ORS 1994: 127.805§2.01.). In contrast to PAS, 
VAE is explicitly prohibited by the Act. It is pointed out, however, that in the 
state of Oregon only a small number of the patients who receive a prescription 
for lethal medication actually administer it. The feeling that they have the free-
dom to choose the time and the manner of their death (and therefore, the feeling 
that their autonomy is respected) is very often all the reassurance that patients 
need (cf. Ganzini and Dahl 2008: 67). The following conditions need to be met 
if terminally ill patients are allowed to obtain a prescription for lethal medica-
tion for the purpose of ending their lives: 
• The patient must be adult (18 years of age or older) and a resident of Or-
egon. 
• The patient must be capable (defined as able to make and communicate 
healthcare decisions). 
• The prescribing physician and a consulting physician must confirm the 
diagnosis and prognosis. 
• The patient must be diagnosed by two physicians as having a terminal 
illness (defined as 6 months or less to live). 
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• The patient must make two oral requests to his or her physician, separat-
ed by at least 15 days, and one witnessed written request. 
• If either physician believes the patient’s decision may be influenced by a 
mental disorder, the patient must be referred for a mental health evalua-
tion. 
• The patient must be informed by the prescribing physician of feasible al-
ternatives, including comfort care, hospice care and pain control. 
• The prescribing physician must request, but may not require, the patient 
to notify his or her next of kin of the request. 
• The physician must report the prescription for lethal medication to the 
Oregon Department of Human Services (formerly the Oregon Health Di-
vision); and the Department must make available an annual statistical re-
port of information collected under the Act. 
• Pharmacies are required to report filling such prescriptions.  
(Battin et al. 2007: 593) 
In contrast to the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act, the Death with Dignity Act does not appear to have 
any kind of requirement directly referring to the well-being of the patient in 
terms of his/her pain and suffering. It is mainly concerned with the patient’s 
competency for making a request for PAS. It is, however, stated that in order to 
have access to PAS, the patient needs to suffer from a terminal illness that will 
lead to death within six months.132 One could get the impression that this crite-
rion is also indirectly linked to the well-being of the patient since the nearer 
he/she gets to the point of death the more frequently his/her well-being tends to 
diminish. But this is not always the case. There are many illnesses which bring 
about drastic reductions in a patient’s well-being, but do not directly lead to 
his/her death such as the Locked-in Syndrome133 or forms of dementia as for 
                                           
132  The criterion that the illness ought to be terminal is linked to the notion that the process 
of the patient’s dying should have already begun and that when administering PAS the 
physician only hastens this process rather than bringing it about. The former is viewed as 
more compatible with the integrity of the medical profession. 
133  The term ‘Locked-in Syndrome’ is applied to a condition in which the patient suffers 
from an almost complete paralysis caused by damage to the lower brain and brainstem 
but is otherwise cognitively intact. Frequently the eyes are not affected by the paralysis. 
Patients are fully conscious while at the same time unable to move any of their muscles. 
Devices have been developed to help these patients communicate. Some patients die 
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instance Alzheimer’s disease134. Thus, there are many cases in which the dimin-
ishment of well-being and the time until death do not correlate. Hence, Ore-
gon’s Death with Dignity Act has no specific requirements referring to the pa-
tient’s well-being or to the degree to which it needs to be diminished. 
Nevertheless, one could argue that indirectly it takes account of the pa-
tient’s well-being by respecting his/her autonomous choice that he/she evalu-
ates his/her well-being as diminished to such a degree that he/she prefers to die. 
Thus, if the patient is to die within six months (and if the other criteria of the 
Act such as the patient’s competence are fulfilled) it is the subjective view of 
the patient of his/her well-being which is crucial and, in this respect, there are 
no objective limits set. 
All in all, if one compares the reference to the patient’s well-being in both 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act and the Dutch Termination of Life on Request 
and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, it becomes obvious that the pa-
tient’s well-being plays a central role in both, but that there also are differences. 
Although the Dutch law has no direct requirements concerning the severity of 
illness (as for example that it needs to be terminal) it demands that the suffering 
of the patient is unbearable and hopeless. Oregon’s law, in contrast, requires 
that the illness of the patient is terminal and will presumably lead to death with-
in six months, but has no criteria which refer to the degree of suffering or to the 
fact that it needs to be non-relievable. As indicated in the above, the suffering 
and therefore, the diminishment of well-being of the patient does, nevertheless, 
play an important role since it is likely to motivate his/her decision to request 
AiD. In the legislation both in Oregon and the Netherlands, it is apparent that 
with regard to the character of well-being a personalized perspective concern-
ing patient well-being is, within different limits, overriding. Even though the 
Dutch law demands the presence of unbearable and non-relievable suffering, 
the estimation of the suffering as being unbearable is a highly patient-centred 
procedure. The physician must simply be in a position to reinforce this, which, 
as illustrated, nonetheless presents a great difficulty for many physicians. All in 
all, the subjective dimension of well-being is of great importance within the 
criteria for AiD in both the Netherlands and the state of Oregon. However, it is 
                                                                                                                                  
shortly after having lapsed into this state, but there are also numerous cases in which pa-
tients live for many years under this condition.  
134  For more detailed information on Alzheimer’s disease see American Psychiatric Associa-
tion 2000: 154-7. 
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important to be aware of the fact that in both jurisdictions the subjective per-
spective of the patient is only valid within a certain framework which requires, 
for instance, that the patient is competent.  
In addition, it should be noted that, whereas in the Netherlands both PAS 
and VAE are decriminalised, in the state of Oregon only PAS is permitted. In 
the debate on AiD, PAS is frequently viewed as a practice with a lesser risk of 
abuse in comparison to VAE since the patient him/herself performs the last 
causal act which leads to his/her death. This might provide us with a reason as 
to why the Netherlands have additional requirements also focusing on the QoL 
of the patient. 
6.3. The role of well-being in the debate on assistance 
in dying and foregoing life-sustaining treatment 
So far, we have observed that the promotion of the patient’s well-being plays a 
prominent role next to respecting his/her autonomy where the criteria as ap-
plied in practice are concerned and that there appears to be a predominance of 
subjective dimensions in terms of the character of well-being. The ensuing sec-
tion is concerned with a detailed analysis of the considerations of the concept 
of well-being that arise in the theoretical discourse on euthanasia. As in the 
previous chapters, the examination is to show where exactly well-being comes 
into play in the debates and what kind of presence and character it has when it 
is considered. As the following will illustrate, it appears as if different concepts 
of well-being are considered depending on whether competent or incompetent 
patients, the latter lacking decision-making capacity, are concerned. Competent 
patients are primarily (but obviously not exclusively) involved in debates which 
deal with AiD, whereas discussions on forgoing life-sustaining treatment 
(FLT), above all, refer to incompetent patients since they frequently are in need 
of life-sustaining treatment. This shows a general tendency, but there are of 
course numerous exceptions.135 Owing to this tendency, the upcoming analysis 
is divided into two separate sections: 6.3.1. concentrates on well-being in dis-
cussions on assistance in dying in the case of competent patients, whereas 6.3.2. 
                                           
135  As illustrated in the above in the Netherlands, for instance, patients can request AiD by 
means of advance directives. Hence the question as to whether or not AiD should be ad-
ministered also arises in cases of incompetent patients. 
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is concerned with the consideration of well-being in debates on forgoing life-
sustaining treatment in the case of incompetent patients. 
6.3.1. Well-being and assistance in dying in the case of 
competent patients 
It has already been hinted at in the introductory part of this chapter that the 
principle of respect for autonomy136 is a major argument brought forward in or-
der to argue for the moral and legal permissibility of AiD. The argumentation 
on the basis of this principle has received much attention. Nonetheless, also 
lines of reasoning which focus on the well-being of patients at the end of life 
appear to play an important role. It is argued that terminally ill patients might 
evaluate their well-being as so diminished that they prefer to die and request 
AiD.137 In this case AiD would be a relief for these patients. In the following 
this lines of reasoning in favour of AiD, the so-called argument of mercy, are 
placed under scrutiny. 
The ‘argument of mercy’138 
There are many eminent voices to be found, above all in the current Anglo 
American debate on AiD, who state that respect for autonomy and individual 
well-being are the two central arguments applied when arguing in favour of 
AiD. Dan Brock, for instance, maintains that there are two central ethical ar-
guments for VAE. ‘These values are individual self-determination or autonomy 
and individual well-being.’ (Brock 2007: 438) Margaret P. Battin paints a simi-
lar picture concerning PAS: 
                                           
136  This principle and its relationship to the concept of well-being receive sustained atten-
tion, above all, in section 6.4.1.. 
137  In connection with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, which was enacted in 1997 and 
legalizes PAS, a survey dealing with reports of hospice nurses and social workers, who 
had been caring for patients who requested PAS, indicates that among the most important 
motivating factors for PAS were concerns about the loss of autonomy especially concern-
ing the circumstances of their death, the decreased ability to participate in activities that 
make life enjoyable and a poor quality of life (cf. Ganzini et al. 2002). Hence, there is 
empirical evidence indicating that the diminishment of well-being constitutes one of the 
major reasons for requesting AiD. 
138  Nonetheless, it should be noted that the expression ‘mercy’ is for obvious reasons not 
widely used in Germany. 
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[t]here are two mainstay issues in the ‘pro’-PAS column: the auton-
omy argument and the one about ‘mercy’ or ‘compassion’ and the re-
lief of pain and suffering. These two arguments jointly provide the 
foundations of the case for social acceptance and legalization of PAS, 
at least where both are the case — that is, where a patient wants to 
die and dying is the only way acceptable to him or her of avoiding 
pain and suffering. (Battin 2010: 406) 
Battin refers to the second (the well-being based) assertion as the argument of 
mercy. John Harris elaborates on the notion of death as a mercy or as a release 
from suffering when stating: ‘when it comes to the very old and infirm, or to 
individuals who are suffering from a painful and terminal illness, [death is re-
garded] as a “blessed release” or a “merciful and welcome end”’ (Harris 1985: 
64). The argument of mercy appears to be among the two central lines of rea-
soning for both procedures of AiD and seems to play an important role in the 
discussions. But what exactly does the argument of mercy encompass and in 
what condition does the patient need to be that his/her death can be considered 
as merciful? The following attempts to examine the argument in more detail. 
One would expect that these well-being-based lines of reasoning have re-
ceived considerable attention and are presented in detail as they play an im-
portant role in the discussions on AiD. This, however, is not the case. A more 
careful examination of the debate illustrates that ‘[g]iven the uncontroversial 
nature of the values [autonomy and individual well-being] invoked by support-
ers of physician-assisted suicide, their moral arguments are usually attempts to 
show that the arguments of the opponents are faulty rather than to present posi-
tive arguments in favor of physician-assisted suicide’ (G. Dworkin 2009: 377). 
Thus, it is frequently taken for granted that the pro-arguments are not in need of 
elucidation since they are based upon the indisputable values autonomy and 
well-being.139  
Bettina Schöne-Seifert confirms this impression that the values of auton-
omy and well-being are considered as self-explanatory when giving the follow-
ing statement: 
                                           
139  A great number of the discussions are rather concerned with typical counter-arguments 
against AiD such as the alleged normative difference between active vs. passive or in-
tended vs. foreseen euthanasia and their refutation (see for instance Birnbacher 1995; 
Quante 1998; Siep and Quante 1999; Miller and Truog 2012). 
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[i]t is scarcely necessary to explain assertions in favour of assistance 
in dying: respect in face of the autonomy of a patient, who wants to 
free himself (or to be freed) from his condition of understandably se-
vere suffering. This is, therefore, the convergence of two moral prin-
ciples – the obligations to respect autonomy and to promote well-
being, which justifies assistance in dying in the eyes of the propo-
nents.140 (Schöne-Seifert 2000: 105) 
It is worth pointing out that Bettina Schöne-Seifert is one of the few German 
participants in the debate who explicitly maintain that well-being-based asser-
tions are among the two major arguments applied in order to argue in favour of 
AiD. There appear to be differences concerning the reference to well-being in 
the German debate and in Anglo-American discussions on AiD. The principle 
of respect for autonomy is said to be the paramount argument in the German 
discussions, in contrast to the Anglo-American discourse in which the im-
portance of both arguments (the argument for mercy as well as the patient’s au-
tonomy) is stressed. Whereas the terms QoL and well-being are frequently ap-
plied in the Anglo-American discourse on AiD, the reference to them and the 
consideration of their assessment are obviously avoided in the German discus-
sion. As the results of the analysis of the reference to well-being in discussions 
on prenatal testing and selective abortion in chapter 3 have already indicated, 
this is due to the tainted connotation of QoL estimations in the past. I shall be 
returning to this observation in due course. 
Schöne-Seifert’s quotation also provides further information as to what is 
at stake when the promotion of well-being is concerned in the context of AiD. 
The well-being of the patient is viewed as being endangered by severe suffer-
ing. Furthermore, her quotation draws attention to another interesting matter: 
she places emphasis on the fact that both lines of reasoning, the one which is 
based on respect of the patient’s autonomy and the other which refers to indi-
vidual well-being, are closely intertwined or even converge when applied as 
arguments in favour of AiD (see also Bleek 2012: 195; Battin 2010: 406).  
                                           
140  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Was zugunsten von Sterbeassistenz angeführt 
werden kann, bedarf kaum der Erläuterung: Respekt vor der Selbstbestimmung eines Pa-
tienten, der sich aus einer Situation nachvollziehbaren schwersten Leidens durch den Tod 
befreien (lassen) möchte. Es ist also die Konvergenz zweier Moralprinzipien – des Gebo-
tes, Autonomie zu respektieren und des Wohltätigkeitsgebotes, welche Sterbeassistenz in 
den Augen ihrer Befürworter rechtfertigt.‘ 
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The relationship of autonomy and well-being within the main 
argument for AiD 
As the elaboration provided by Schöne-Seifert elucidates, the convergence of 
both arguments (autonomy and well-being) leads to the claim that one should 
comply with the request of the competent patient (respect of autonomy) to pre-
vent a severe diminishment of his/her well-being (promotion of well-being) by 
means of AiD. Dan Brock provides the following description of the interde-
pendence when dealing with the question as to how the principles of respecting 
autonomy and promoting well-being can lead to the conclusion that AiD is a 
legitimate act without being at variance to each other. 
It might seem that individual well-being conflicts with a person’s 
self-determination when the person requests euthanasia. Life itself is 
commonly taken to be a central good for persons, often valued for its 
own sake, as well as necessary for pursuits of all other goods within 
life. But when a competent patient decides to forgo all further life-
sustaining treatment, then the patient, either explicitly or implicitly, 
commonly decides that the best life possible for him or her with 
treatment is of sufficiently poor quality that it is worse than no fur-
ther life at all. Life is no longer considered a benefit by the patient, 
but has now become a burden. (Brock 2007: 438) 
Thus, at first glance, the reference to both principles when arguing for VAE 
(and AiD in general) seems contradictory. This is due to the fact that life is 
viewed as a necessary condition for experiencing individual well-being. Auton-
omously deciding to end one’s life implies depriving oneself of the possibility 
of experiencing well-being. Brock, however, stresses the fact that the person 
who requests AiD evaluates his/her well-being as diminished to such a degree 
that he/she prefers to end this life. Rather than being a benefit, life is viewed as 
a burden by the patient. John Harris elucidates that ‘[what] is meant is simply 
that for a particular person the prospect of continuing to live under certain con-
ditions is a worse prospect than immediate death’ (Harris 1985: 78). In follow-
ing these authors this dissolves the alleged contradiction. Margaret P. Battin, 
above all, stresses the fact that there is a necessity for both assertions to ‘oper-
ate in tandem’ (Battin 2008: 27) in an argumentation for AiD thereby providing 
us with a deeper insight to their interdependence: ‘[n]either provides an ade-
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quate basis for PAS by itself, but jointly they do. Each provides a safeguard 
against abuse: if PAS is either involuntary or if it is not a response to pain and 
suffering, the societal provision of PAS cannot be supported. Because this point 
is so often misunderstood, it is well to say it again: you need both.’ (Battin 
2010: 406) According to Battin, two requirements need to be fulfilled to have 
an adequate basis for PAS: 1. the principle of respect for autonomy lays down 
that PAS needs to be voluntary and 2. the argument from mercy requires that it 
is a response to pain and suffering. Although seldom explicitly mentioned, for 
reasons that have already been dealt with, this also appears to hold true for the 
German debate: both arguments operate in tandem. However, in the German 
discussion on AiD this is not directly ascertainable. 
Death with Dignity 
As already suggested in the above, there appear to be differences between the 
German and the Anglo-American debate on AiD. Whereas well-being is not 
frequently referred to in the German debate, the notion of ‘dignity in dying’ or 
a ‘death with dignity’141 finds wide application as an argument in favour of 
AiD.142 It is also considered in the Anglo-American debate (as inter alia the title 
of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act indicates), but does not enjoy such a cen-
tral role as in the German discourse. When this notion is concerned as an argu-
ment for AiD, it is maintained that at the end of their life, patients frequently 
find themselves in a state of pain, suffering and dependency which violates 
their dignity and is said to prohibit them from a death with dignity. AiD, in 
contrast, is said to give patients the opportunity to die with dignity. A closer 
examination of the application of this argument indicates that the expression 
‘death with dignity’ is used in various ways143. For our purpose it is fruitful to 
                                           
141  In German the phrase ‚Menschenwürdig sterben‘ or ‚das würdige Sterben‘ is widely ap-
plied. See for instance Jens and Küng 1995; Schöne-Seifert 2007: 109; Schaber 2012. 
142  In their study, which focuses on the representation of euthanasia and palliative care in 
German newspapers, Hahnen et al. (2009) make a similar diagnosis stating that the 
phrase ‘death with dignity’ is widely applied in the German media. It should, however, 
be noted that the expression ‘death with dignity’ is also used in a different sense referring 
to a process of dying in which the person concerned endures whatever destiny has in 
store without trying to hasten death. This constitutes an argument against AiD. An exam-
ple of this line of reasoning can be found in Kass 1998. 
143  As Peter Schaber points out, some voices even go as far as to maintain that the term ‘dig-
nity’ has no content at all since it is used utterly different ways (cf. Schaber 2012). How-
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take two specific forms of applications of the term under scrutiny which are re-
lated in dissimilar ways to the well-being-based argument in favour of AiD: 1. 
dignity in terms of normative authority and 2. dignity in terms of freedom from 
severe pain and suffering.  
Concerning 1.: the former is used to indicate that a patient experiences a 
death with dignity in the sense that he/she has control over the circumstances of 
his/her death due to the fact that he/she is not hooked up to life support ma-
chines, is not totally dependent or not in a state of severe debility or dementia. 
A death with dignity, therefore, is a death in which the normative authority 
over one’s own life is preserved (cf. Schaber 2012: 304). Schaber points out 
that although a death with dignity might sometimes overlap with an autono-
mous death, both are not identical (ibid.). This usage of the expression ‘death 
with dignity’ does not directly relate to the patient’s well-being. 
Concerning 2.: the latter usage of the expression, on the contrary, encom-
passes other aspects than the normative authority over one’s own life. It refers 
to the absence of severe pain, suffering and thus to a death without a major di-
minishment of the patient’s well-being. A death with dignity is a death without 
severe suffering and pain (cf. Gentzler 2003: 466). This line of reasoning ap-
pears to be used in a similar way as the argument of mercy and for this reason 
refers directly to the patient’s well-being. It is widely applied in the general 
discourse on AiD but above all in the German debate.144 Concerning this appli-
cation of the expression, Hillebrand points out that the value of freedom from 
pain and suffering is derived from the principle of human dignity (Hillebrand 
2009). Human dignity is considered as being jeopardized through the prolonga-
tion of suffering in the process of dying and by grossly diminished QoL.  
It appears as if well-being-based arguments tend to be concealed within 
arguments referring to a dignified death since the expression ‘death with digni-
ty’ seems to be the more socially acceptable term. This is especially the case in 
Germany. Thus, in many instances the argument of mercy is masquerading be-
hind the death with dignity argument. This might provide us with a reason as to 
why at a first glance well-being does not appear to play a prominent role in the 
                                                                                                                                  
ever, Schaber opposes this thesis attributing the term ‘dignity’ its own normative mean-
ing. 
144  The results of the study conducted by Hahnen et al. (2009) indicate that the expression 
‘death with dignity’ is also widely used in this way in the debates on AiD taking place in 
the German print media. 
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German debate on AiD. Well-being-based lines of reasoning are not directly 
identifiable and have a subliminal presence above all in the German debate. We 
have already learned in chapter 3, which deals with the role of well-being in 
debates concerning the beginning of life, that the explicit reference to QoL es-
timations is avoided due to their tainted past. This impression becomes rein-
forced by the hidden presence of well-being in discussions on euthanasia. Nev-
ertheless, it is important to bear in mind that there are various ways of applying 
the death with dignity argument and that it is not always a disguised argument 
of mercy.  
The above has illustrated, however, that in terms of the various considera-
tions of well-being in the discussions on AiD the phrase ‘pain and suffering’ 
are often used. The following sets out to scrutinize what exactly is understood 
by ‘pain and suffering’ and what concepts of well-being predominate when 
they are referred to.  
Alleviating pain and suffering 
As Battin states ‘[p]ain and suffering are usually understood as central factors 
that contribute to reduced “quality of life”, a standard notion in the medical and 
bioethics literatures’ (Battin 2010: 406). However, especially the term ‘suffer-
ing’ is rather broad in meaning and different aspects could be concerned when 
it is applied. A passage from Gerald Dworkin might help to get a clearer picture 
of what exactly is meant when ‘pain and suffering’ are referred to in the debate 
on AiD: ‘[i]t is important, however, to note that pain is not the only issue. 
Those who are incontinent, or paralyzed, or unable to think clearly, or free from 
pain but in a mental state that is disconnected from reality, or slowly losing 
their ability to control their muscles, are not in pain. But they are suffering. 
And pain medication is not going to help them.’ (G. Dworkin 2009: 386) G. 
Dworkin emphasizes that suffering encompasses far more than mere physical 
pain. There is also a further side to the matter involving suffering in terms of 
progressive mental and physical debility and the resulting psychological bur-
dens. He thereby also pays attention to the fact that ‘modes of indignity such as 
incontinence, paralysis, muscular wastage, and mental deterioration’ (ibid.: 
376) diminish the well-being of patients at the end of life. Also a definition 
provided by Eric. J. Cassell illustrates the various physical and psychological 
aspects the term suffering encompasses. ‘It is an afflicted state of being, a spe-
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cific distress that happens to a particular person on whom has been inflicted 
unendurable pain or other symptoms, losses, enduring fear, hardship, injury, 
disaster, grief, sorrow, or care and who has been changed as a result of the bur-
den.’ (Cassell 2004: 76) The prospect of deterioration is an additional factor 
which reduces the patient’s well-being. Especially the importance of paying 
attention to the subjective experience of patient’s suffering is accentuated and 
also its subject relativity. ‘Whatever may be the origin of suffering (for exam-
ple, pain or the depredations of disease), the loss of a person’s intactness – the 
hallmark of suffering – is related to the specific nature of that person.’ (Cassell 
2004: 79) Thus, on the one hand it is stated that specific conditions at the end 
of life such as physical pain, dependency, mental and physical degeneration 
generally have a negative impact on individual well-being. On the other hand, it 
is pointed out that the subjective dimension in terms of the patient’s experience 
of his/her condition and the pain and suffering is of major importance and that 
there are great differences in terms of this experience between different indi-
viduals. Hence, at the ontological level, well-being is considered as having in-
tersubjective but above all subjective dimensions. 
It is emphasized that it is up to the patient to decide at which point his/her 
well-being is diminished to such a degree that he/she would wish to make use 
of AiD. ‘Deciding that the benefits [of continuing living] are proportionate re-
quires the inherently nonmedical determination of how valuable it is to contin-
ue living. It should be obvious that these are judgments that no outsider should 
be able to make.’ (Veatch 1989: 82) This line of reasoning is endorsed by Dan 
Brock who states that ‘[e]specially in the often severely compromised and de-
bilitated states of many critically ill or dying patients, there is no objective 
standard, but only the competent patient’s judgment of whether continued life 
is no longer a benefit’ (Brock 2007: 438). Hence, the evaluation of well-being 
in connection with a request for AiD is considered a highly subjective proce-
dure. In order to counter arguments of potential misuse it is repeatedly empha-
sized that it is the patient him-/herself who decides when his/her well-being is 
diminished to such an extent that he/she requests AiD. It is stressed that the pa-
tient should have the ultimate authority to determine his/her well-being. How-
ever, it is worth mentioning that there are some limits set to the subjective 
evaluation of the suffering and pain as a safeguard against misuse. This has al-
ready been hinted at in the previous section on AiD as applied in practice. PAS 
and VAE should only be administered if the patient can be considered compe-
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tent and his/her choice autonomous. Thus, in a case in which a patient evaluates 
his/her well-being as grossly diminished due to the fact that he/she is suffering 
from depression, AiD is not considered a legitimate act. It is apparently a wide-
ly held view among the proponents of AiD that in these cases the patient’s 
evaluation of his/her well-being should not have the ultimate authority. Thus, it 
is argued also in the theoretical debate that when AiD is to be considered, there 
should be additional criteria which must be fulfilled especially ensuring that the 
patient is competent before his/her subjective evaluation of his/her well-being 
is taken into account. We will come back to this observation in due course. 
The argument of non-necessity145 
The argument of mercy depicted in the above is frequently confronted with ob-
jections formulated, above all, from members of the hospice movement. It is 
argued that palliative and terminal care as well as an ethics of solidarity render 
AiD based on concerns about the well-being of terminally ill patients unneces-
sary. This is due to the fact that it is the aim of palliative care to improve the 
well-being of patients at the end of life (cf. Gutmann 2002: 176). In particular, 
it is stressed that in contrast to common opinion, palliative care encompasses 
far more than the alleviation of physical pain. In order to see what exactly it 
refers to, it is fruitful to make a closer examination of the definition of pallia-
tive care that the WHO provides: ‘Palliative care is an approach that improves 
the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problem associated 
with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by 
means of early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain 
and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual.’ (WHO 2012a) Thus, 
according to the WHO definition, palliative care not only aims at promoting the 
well-being of the patient concerned but also that of the family members in-
volved. In addition, the WHO emphasizes that palliative care is not only con-
cerned with the physical condition of the patient but also with psychological 
and spiritual matters. But what exactly does this mean? When expressing their 
aims in concrete terms, they state that palliative care: 
• provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; 
• affirms life and regards dying as a normal process; 
                                           
145  Cf. Gutmann 2002: 176. 
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• intends neither to hasten or postpone death; 
• integrates the psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; 
• offers a support system to help patients live as actively as possible until 
death; 
• offers a support system to help the family cope during the patients illness 
and in their own bereavement; 
• uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and their families, 
including bereavement counselling, if indicated; 
• will enhance quality of life, and may also positively influence the course 
of illness; 
• is applicable early in the course of illness, in conjunction with other ther-
apies that are intended to prolong life, such as chemotherapy or radiation 
therapy, and includes those investigations needed to better understand 
and manage distressing clinical complications. 
(WHO 2012a) 
In following these explanations palliative care at the end of life is very compre-
hensive, encompassing many needs from the physical to the spiritual and thereby 
counteracting a diminishment of QoL. One can observe that many of the afore-
mentioned factors which lead to a diminishment of well-being and therefore mo-
tivate a wish towards assistance in dying are treated by palliative care. On this 
basis it is argued that AiD is not necessary to safeguard well-being at the end of 
life. Furthermore, members of the hospice movement claim that a seriously ill 
patient’s wish to die is a result of the lack of good palliative and psychological 
care. Thus, rather than legalizing procedures of AiD, substantial efforts should 
be made to improve palliative care as well as to increase the access to it.  
We can ascertain that members of the hospice movement directly refer to 
the well-being of the patients when arguing that AiD is unnecessary. They also 
place emphasis on the subjective dimensions of well-being when referring to 
the various wishes patients might have and when claiming that palliative care 
encompasses far more than the alleviation of physical pain. It is pointed out that 
palliative care addresses a broad range of patients’ wishes at the end of life and 
therefore, patients can request support for a variety of needs which they might 
have. They can do this in any way they see fit. Hence, the arguments are based 
on comparatively broad subjective concepts of well-being referring to a variety 
of aspects which patients might wish at the end of life. 
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Reactions to the argument of non-necessity 
 When responding to these objections to AiD proponents also appear to tie their 
argument to comparatively broad subjective conceptions of well-being. They 
respond that one should bear in mind that there are a considerable number of 
patients who have the wish to end their lives despite successful palliative care. 
This is due to the fact that there are further factors which cause the diminish-
ment of well-being at the end of life and these are and cannot be encompassed 
by palliative or end-of-life care.  
Many patients have the wish to control the circumstances of their death 
and want to avoid the loss of independence at the end of life. This has also been 
indicated by the survey conducted in connection with Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act (cf. Ganzini et al. 2002). Apart from setting limits to patients’ au-
tonomy, the loss of independence also has a negative impact on their well-
being. It is pointed out that patients also suffer from the feeling of being a bur-
den to their family and others persons who are taking care of them (cf. Bleek 
2012). Even successful palliative care is not in position to counteract this prob-
lem.  
Increasing mental decline constitutes another reason why patients request 
AiD. Concerning this matter Gerald Dworkin maintains that ‘there comes a 
point at which the life of the patient (in their eyes) is one of degradation and 
misery. What they want is to end their life, not to have it extended in a slightly 
improved fashion.’ (G. Dworkin 2009: 386) Palliative care is only able in a 
limited way to prevent this from happening. In addition, it is stressed that pain 
medication can provide a relief from physical suffering but the downside is fre-
quently that the patients live in a state of vegetation and lose ‘contact with the 
world around them – in particular with those loved ones with whom they would 
like to communicate’ (ibid.). Patients have the wish to die ‘because their illness 
means the end of those things which make life meaningful and coherent accord-
ing to their own personal basic desires: for instance physical activity, social in-
teraction or intellectual participation in the world around them’146 (Schöne-
Seifert 2000: 107). The loss of these valued things and the resulting diminish-
ment of well-being cannot be prevented by means of palliative and end-of-life 
                                           
146  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘weil ihre Krankheit das Ende dessen bedeutet, 
was nach den ganz persönlichen elementaren Vorstellungen das eigene Leben bedeu-
tungsvoll und kohärent macht: etwas körperliche Aktivität, soziale Interaktion oder intel-
lektuelle Teilnahme an der Welt‘. 
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care. Cassell points out that ‘[t]he suffering of some patients cannot be relieved 
because its sources within the patient are inaccessible’ (Cassell 2004: 79). 
Moreover, it is emphasized that there are limits to the successful applica-
tion of palliative care and the successful treatment of pain is not always possi-
ble (cf. Birnbacher 2005: 4). For these patients there is no other solution to 
avoid pain and suffering apart from their death. Furthermore, it is argued that 
the existent capacities of palliative care will not suffice on a medium-term basis 
and already existing trends such as the individualization in Western Society 
make ‘dying in the bosom of one’s family’ an improbability (cf. Gutmann 
2002: 176). Nevertheless, Thomas Gutmann maintains: ‘[i]ndeed the provision 
of hospices and palliative care units as well as the willingness of relatives to 
support dying patients should be the most important aims which should be fo-
cused on in society’s attempts to deal with death...’147 (Gutmann 2002: 176). It 
is important to note that most proponents of AiD share the view that palliative 
care should have priority over AiD (cf. Schöne-Seifert: 2000: 106). Dieter 
Birnbacher states that there should not be a polarized opposition between palli-
ative care and AiD (cf. Birnbacher 2005: 4). Both practices should rather be 
viewed a complementing each other. 
Once again, emphasis is placed on the variety of desires which persons 
might have at the end of life and the variety of things the lack of which reduces 
their well-being such as physical activity, social interaction or intellectual par-
ticipation in the world. Arguments which refer to the desires for these aspects 
also for the most part rest upon broad subjective concepts of well-being. 
Preliminary results  
The analysis of the role of well-being in discussions of AiD in cases of compe-
tent patients has shown that the well-being of patients at the end of life plays a 
prominent role especially as an argument in favour of AiD. This is explicitly 
indicated in the Anglo-American discussion but well-being is, for the most part, 
only implicitly referred to in the German debate. It has been illustrated that, 
above all, in the German discourse well-being-based lines of reasoning are 
                                           
147  Translation by author. Original quote: ‚In der Tat dürften der Ausbau von Hospizen und 
palliativmedizinischen Stationen sowie die Förderung der Bereitschaft von Angehörigen, 
Sterbenden beizustehen, die wichtigsten Ziele markieren, die es im gesellschaftlichen 
Umgang mit dem Tod zu erreichen gilt…‘. 
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masquerading behind the death with dignity argument and the reference to the 
principle of autonomy since these appear to be the more widely accepted asser-
tions. Hence, it can be provisionally concluded that well-being has an overt as 
well as a subliminal presence in the debates dealing with AiD. Nonetheless, it 
can be said that the concept of well-being constitutes a prime reference in the 
discourse on AiD.  
However, as we have seen, considerations of well-being occur in connec-
tion with autonomy-based lines of reasoning. Both principles, the promotion of 
patients’ well-being and respecting their autonomy, are in a relationship of in-
terdependence when applied as an argument in favour of AiD. In the discus-
sions on AiD emphasis is placed on the fact that well-being does not by itself 
constitute an argument for AiD. It needs to be complemented by the principle 
of respect for autonomy since the mere reference to patients’ well-being would 
throw the doors wide open to well-being evaluation by third-parties, which are 
to be avoided since they are highly susceptible to abuse. The principle of au-
tonomy, on the other hand, is substituted by the principle of promoting well-
being in order to ensure that the request for AiD results from severe pain and 
suffering. This aspect will be discussed in more detail later. 
Regarding the character of well-being considered in the debate on AiD in 
cases of competent patients, it can clearly be said that the subjective dimen-
sions of well-being are at the forefront. The importance of subjective dimen-
sions of well-being in the debate on euthanasia also becomes evident from the 
way in which members of the hospice movement place emphasis on the fact 
that palliative care encompasses far more than the alleviation of physical pain. 
Much is done to address various needs patients might have and the end of life. 
Members of the hospice movement as well as critics of the argument of non-
necessity often referred to the desires of the patients which clearly can be clas-
sified as subjective aspects of well-being. Furthermore, it is stressed that in 
psychological as well as spiritual aspects are of major importance when taking 
care of patients at the end of life. This refers to the subjective dimension of 
well-being focusing on the patient’s experience of his/her situation. Moreover, 
we can observe that in the theoretical debate a comparatively broad concept of 
the character of well-being is applied, which refers to a variety of different de-
sires patients at the end of life might have such as intellectual participation in 
the world. It is important to note that the aspects of well-being are viewed as 
health related. Hence, a broad concept of health-related well-being is applied. 
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However, it is necessary to provide a more detailed description of the con-
cepts of well-being concerned on the different levels in the discussions: at the 
ontological level subjective dimensions appear to be of relevance. On the one 
hand, the patient’s subjective experience of his/her condition and their desires 
play an important role. Especially the term ‘suffering’ is applied in a way in 
which it encompasses various elements which could be considered as subjec-
tive since they refer to the patients’ feelings, personal experience of their condi-
tion and their mental state. On the other hand, specific goods such as freedom 
from pain, independence and having contact to reality, which are viewed as 
generally contributing to individual well-being, are listed. Hence, the argu-
ments do not appear to be based upon an utterly subjectivist concept of well-
being, but are tied to the assumption that there are certain goods which patients 
generally value in the final phase of life. 
When the evaluative level is considered the subjective dimensions of well-
being also clearly prevail. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the patient has 
and should have the ultimate authority to evaluate and determine his/her well-
being. As the elucidations in the above indicate, this subjectivist perspective on 
the evaluative level is linked to the predominance of subjectivist dimensions at 
the epistemic level: it is often maintained that the patient him-/herself has the 
best access to his/her individual well-being. As afore-mentioned, this is only 
the case if the patient is considered competent. Thus, there are some formal cri-
teria which need to be fulfilled before full account is taken of the patient’s sub-
jective evaluation of his/her diminishment in well-being.  
The concept of competency thereby appears to be of central relevance. But 
what conditions need to be fulfilled when a patient is considered competent and 
what happens in cases in which he/she is regarded as incompetent and decisions 
whether to end life or not have to be taken?  
6.3.2. The reference to well-being in the special case of 
incompetent patients in discussion on forgoing life-
sustaining treatment  
Many patients in the final phase of life are deprived of their decision-making 
capacity and unable to express the evaluation of their well-being in their current 
condition. Moreover, these patients frequently are not able to make decisions 
191 
which serve their well-being (Buchanan and Brock 1990: 30). They are consid-
ered incompetent148 since they lack the mental capacity for a given task such as 
making autonomous decisions (cf. Davis 2009: 350). Especially in cases in 
which decisions as to whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment – cases of FLT – have to be taken, patients have frequently lost decision-
making capacity. They might, for instance, be severely demented or in a persis-
tent vegetative state. In these cases, in which the patients are incompetent, spe-
cial standards are applied for decision-making to safeguard the patient’s well-
being and to extend his/her autonomy as far as possible. However, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that these cases are also often concerned with incapaci-
tated patients who are severely debilitated but not terminally ill as in the case of 
patients in a persistent vegetative state.  
The subsequent part sets out to analyze the role of the patient’s well-being 
in discussions on foregoing life-sustaining treatment since these cases are fre-
quently concerned with incompetent patients. It elaborates on the various 
standards for decision-making when patients have become incompetent. The 
analysis focuses on so-called formerly competent patients ‘who used to have 
the relevant decision-making capacity, but lost it, for example, due to Alzhei-
mer's disease or other medical problems (or procedures such as surgical anaes-
thesia) undermining normal brain functioning’ (Jaworska 2009).149 Due to the 
fact that in cases of FLT, patients have sometimes made no specific request for 
assistance in dying since they were unprepared for their current situation, non-
voluntary euthanasia also comes into play. Attention is paid to the character of 
well-being under consideration in cases of incompetent patients in which the 
question of FLT arises and especially to divergences from cases of competent 
patients and AiD with regard to the concepts applied. 
                                           
148  Although in the general debate on competency, such as in connection with the doctrine of 
informed consent, children (as so-called minors) play a large role, the subsequent part fo-
cuses primarily on incapacitated adult patients at the end of their life. However, it must 
be stressed that children could also be involved in end- of- life decisions, which raises 
divergent problems. 
149  Cases of patients who have never been competent, such as young children or patients 
with a severe mental retardation, are not considered in the following part. 
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The concept of competence and its gate keeping function 
Due to the continually ageing society in which we live an increasing number of 
patients suffer from different forms of dementia at the end of their life. Thus, 
decisions concerning FLT and AiD are to an increasing extent concerned with 
so-called incompetent patients who lack decision-making capacity. The concept 
of competency has a gate-keeping function: complying with a request for AiD 
or FLT (in some countries) is only permitted if the patient is competent (or had 
requested AiD or FLT by means of an advance directive before he/she became 
incompetent). The underlying concern is that the decisions of the incompetent 
patient, provided that he/she is conscious and able make (as well as express) a 
decision, might fail to serve his/her well-being. As Buchanan and Brock (1990: 
30) maintain, ‘[t]he same value of patient well-being that requires patients’ par-
ticipation in their own health care decision making sometimes also requires 
persons to be protected from the harmful consequences to them of their own 
choices’. For obvious reasons this holds especially true for decisions concern-
ing AiD and FLT. Generally speaking, the concept of competence distinguishes 
‘persons whose decisions should be solicited or accepted from persons whose 
decisions need not or should be solicited or accepted’ (Beauchamp and Chil-
dress 2013: 114). However, to what exactly does the concept of competence 
refer? Buchanan and Brock point out that ‘competence is competence for some 
task, competence to do something’ (Buchanan and Brock 1989: 84). Thus, a 
person may be considered incompetent for some special decision or task but at 
the same time competent with regard to another. ‘So incompetency must be de-
termined with regard to a particular set of choices.’ (Veatch 1989: 107) If, for 
instance, decisions whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
for terminally ill patients have to be taken, the term incompetence refers to a 
patient’s lack of mental capacity with regard to making an autonomous deci-
sion about wanting to end his/her life.150 Thus the concept of competence in 
terms of decision-making is closely linked to autonomous decision-making (cf. 
Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 116). ‘Patients ... are competent to make a de-
cision if they understand the material information, to make a judgement about 
                                           
150  It should be noted that there are many participants in the debate who distinguish between 
judgments of competence and judgments of capacity: ‘health professionals assess capaci-
ty and incapacity, whereas courts determine competence and incompetence’ (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013: 114). However, since the distinctions breaks down in practice (cf. 
ibid.) both terms (competence and capacity) are used interchangeably in the following. 
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this information in the light of their values, to intend a certain outcome, and to 
communicate freely their wishes to caregivers.’ (ibid.) These are some general 
standards which are similar to the properties of autonomous persons. However, 
there is considerable controversy on the appropriateness of these and other 
standards for determining competency or incompetency respectively. Further-
more, it is important to note that there are different degrees of incompetency 
and it can have various causes. 
Incompetence may be limited or complete, chronic or intermittent, 
and it may be due to one or more of a diverse set of medical disor-
ders, including: (1) degenerative neurological disorders such as Alz-
heimer's disease and Parkinson's disease, (2) single or multiple cere-
brovascular accidents (stroke), (3) severe acute or chronic depression 
that impairs cognitive function, (4) temporary or permanent coma, 
(5) mental retardation, (6) psychosis, or (7) severe personality disor-
ders. (Buchanan and Brock 1986: 17) 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that for practical reasons competence is a 
threshold concept rather than a comparative one: patients are judged as either 
competent or incompetent with respect to a specific decision. Different guiding 
principles and standards have received considerable attention and are applied 
when patients are incompetent and the question of AiD or FLT arises. The con-
troversy about appropriate standards for incapacitated patients in this context 
has also been treated at length in law. Generally speaking, the following hierar-
chy of decision-making standards applies (cf. DeGrazia 2005b: 163): 
1. Informed consent.151 
2. Advance directive 
3. Substituted judgment. 
4. Best interests. 
                                           
151  The standard of informed consent is applied in cases in which the patient is competent. It 
refers to the voluntary consent of the patient to a medical intervention. However, since 
the debate on euthanasia is mainly concerned with voluntary requests for AiD and FLT 
as opposed to physicians’ suggestions for a specific treatment, the standard of informed 
consent is not of crucial importance in the discussions. The debate rather focuses on the 
patient’s competency when making a request for AiD or FLT. 
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The various standards for incompetent patients, namely the advance directive 
standard, the substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard, re-
ceive sustained attention in the following analysis of the role of well-being in 
the discussions at the end of life.  
Advance directives 
In order to clarify which actions (above all life-sustaining medical interven-
tions) should be taken in the event that they become incapacitated, patients can 
make use of so-called advance directives. These encompass the expressed in-
terests, preferences and values of the patient at a time when he/she was still 
competent. As Buchanan and Brock point out ‘the advance directive principle 
offers the simplest extension of the competent patient’s right of self-
determination to the problem of decision making for incompetents’ (Buchanan 
and Brock 1986: 57). The underlying assumption is that individuals should 
have the same moral authority over their current as over their future affairs – 
the so-called ‘Extension View’152 (Davis 2009: 350). Ronald Dworkin refers in 
this context to the ‘precedent autonomy’ of the patient, which is carried out by 
means of advance directives (cf. R. Dworkin 1993: 226). It provides patients 
with control over the circumstances of their death spelling out their wishes 
about when life-sustaining treatments should be initiated, forgone or ceased. 
According to PCB, advance directives mollify the following concerns. 
People worried especially that life-sustaining medical technologies 
might keep them alive for too long in what they perceived to be an 
undignified state, unrewarding to themselves and excessively burden-
some to their loved ones. More generally, people worried that deci-
sions might be made without sufficient regard to their own wishes 
and welfare. (PCB 2005: 54) 
Thus, the quotation by the PCB indicates that advance directives are regarded 
as allowing for the application of the above-mentioned converging principles 
respect for autonomy and promoting well-being in the case of incompetent pa-
tients. There are two basic types of written instructions: 1. instruction directives 
and 2. proxy directives.  
                                           
152  Proponents of the Extension View are among others Buchanan and Brock (1990) and R. 
Dworkin (1993). 
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1. Instruction directives express the competent patient’s preferences about 
care such as life-sustaining treatments in the event that he/she becomes incom-
petent. They can be written (living will) or oral statements.153 The declarant 
states which treatments he/she wants to receive or refuse in the event that 
he/she becomes incapacitated. ‘More often, [advance directives] contain gen-
eral statements, reflecting the person’s basic values, about the considerations 
that should guide those at the bedside.’ (PCB 2005: 57) However, the majority 
of people give oral statements rather than completing a written living will. Alt-
hough living wills are also applied in order to request life-sustaining treatment, 
they are more frequently used to express decisions involving non-treatment. 
They provide evidence of the now incompetent patient’s earlier wishes con-
cerning specific circumstances e.g.: ‘[d]o not prolong my life if I enter persis-
tent vegetative state.’ (Jaworska 2009) Often informal documents provided by 
religious or right-to-die groups are used (cf. Davis 2009: 352).  
2. Proxy directives (also referred to as health care powers of attorney) 
constitute the second type of advance directives. They can also be written or 
oral statements. A competent individual gives the authority to make health care 
decisions including terminating care and life support to another appointed, trusted 
individual (the proxy or surrogate) in the event he/she becomes incompetent. 
The proxy acts on the behalf of the then incompetent patient and as his/her rep-
resentative in the decision-making process. ‘Appointing a formal proxy can be 
especially valuable if a patient has no close family members, if the patient’s 
relatives are dispersed, or if relatives disagree among themselves.’ (PCB 2005: 
58) Both instruction and proxy directives can be combined, for instance, the 
latter might help to resolve problems with the interpretation of the wishes for-
mulated by the formerly competent patient in a living will. 
The discussion of the advance directive standard manifests that also in the 
case of incompetent patients, autonomy and well-being are the two guiding 
principles. Furthermore, by focusing on the patients’ former (when competent) 
desires and interests the subjective dimensions of well-being also prevail. As 
we will see, the constellation is similar where the substituted judgement stand-
ard is concerned. 
                                           
153  It should, however, be noted that laws in various states and countries vary concerning 
this matter. 
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The substituted judgment standard 
In cases in which patients have not executed an advance directive while compe-
tent, ‘courts have generally appealed to the doctrine of substituted judgment, 
permitting a family member or another appropriate surrogate to attempt to de-
termine what the patient would have wanted in the present circumstances’ 
(DeGrazia 2005b: 161). Based on the values and interests of the formerly com-
petent patient, the surrogate tries to decide in a way the patient would have de-
cided him-/herself when competent. ‘The “substituted judgment” principle 
states that a surrogate is to choose as the patient would choose if the patient 
were competent and aware both of the medical options and of the facts about 
his or her condition, including the fact that he or she is incompetent.’ (Buchan-
an and Brock 1986: 56) This requires the surrogate to have a ‘deep familiarity 
with the patient’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 227). He/she takes account 
of dimensions such as the patient’s religious affiliation, cultural background or 
attitudes toward medical care (cf. PCB 2005: 63). On this basis the autonomous 
decision and the subjective point of view of the once-competent patient are re-
constructed. Thus, both advance directives as well as the substituted judgment 
standard are Extension Views referring to the patients past wishes when he/she 
was competent in an attempt to extend the patient’s autonomy now they have 
become incompetent. ‘The goal is to determine the treatment alternative most 
consistent with the patient’s earlier values and preferences.’ (PCB 2005: 63) 
Thus, also in the case of the substituted judgment standard a subjectivist per-
spective is taken in terms of the patient’s well-being, paying attention to his/her 
former desires. 
The alleged shortcomings of advance directives and substituted 
judgments 
For various reasons advance directives as well as the substituted judgment 
standard have received extensive criticism.154 One problem which has received 
considerable attention is the ‘past wishes versus present interests problem’ 
                                           
154  Both, advance directives and the substituted judgment standard, have been confronted 
with various objections. Nevertheless, I am only concentrating on the criticism in which 
the concept of well-being is involved. For a broader overview of the most common ob-
jections see for instance Mappes 1998; Jaworska 2009. 
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(Mappes 1998). In order to provide a more vivid picture of the problem, Thom-
as A. Mappes portrays the following case: 
[s]omeone has unambiguously stipulated in an advance directive that 
life-sustaining treatment should not be provided if she becomes seri-
ously mentally debilitated; this patient is now severely mentally de-
bilitated but is "pleasantly senile" and does not appear to be suffer-
ing. The problem is that life-sustaining treatment, although clearly 
incompatible with her past wishes, appears to be in her present inter-
ests. (Mappes 1998) 
How are we to decide in these cases of the so-called ‘Happy Alzheimer’s Pa-
tients’ (Davis 2009: 355)? Recently the case of Walter Jens, a Professor of 
Rhetoric who fought for the legalization of VAE, has received considerable at-
tention in Germany. Before he became severely demented, Jens said that he 
could not visualize a life without intellectual interaction and formulated his 
wish to forgo life-sustaining treatment in this event in an advance directive. But 
now in a state of severe dementia he appears to value his life and has uttered 
the following words: ‘Don’t kill me, please don’t kill me.’155 (Die Berliner Lit-
eraturkritik 2009). Should the patient’s advance directive be binding or over-
ridden in the event that he needs life-sustaining treatment?156  
In this context Ronald Dworkin (1993) distinguishes the critical life inter-
ests of an individual which were expressed in a competent state from his/her 
experiential interest when incompetent. In cases of conflict he attributes higher 
value to the former. In following Rebecca S. Dresser and John A. Robertson, in 
contrast, the preferences which the patient stated when he/she was competent 
need no longer be valid when he/she becomes incompetent (cf. Dress-
er/Robertson 1989). According to them the ‘orthodox approach’ of giving pri-
ority to the preferences expressed in advance directives or by means of substi-
tuted judgments is misleading since the values and interest of the once compe-
tent patient are likely to have changed since he/she has become incompetent. 
‘In giving priority to Advance Directives and Substituted Judgment, the ortho-
                                           
155  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Nicht totmachen, bitte nicht totmachen.’ 
156  These cases of conflict between the interests of the earlier and current self, above all, 
raise questions concerning the concept of personal identity. For a more elaborate analysis 
of this concept see Quante 2002 and DeGrazia 2005b.  
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dox view overlooks the possibility that the earlier competent self and the cur-
rent incompetent self may have conflicting interests.’ (Jaworska 2009) Accord-
ing to critical voices, referring to the earlier desires and values of the now-
incapacitated patient does, contrary to common opinion, not respect his/her au-
tonomy and might even cause harm when these wishes contradict his/her cur-
rent welfare interests. Thus, it is argued that a more differentiated perspective is 
needed, which also takes into consideration the current interests of the now-
incompetent patient. A close examination of the incompetent patient’s actu-
al/current situation is said to be of vital importance. Agnieszka Jaworska em-
phasizes the importance of paying attention to the specific circumstances of the 
incompetent patient in each case (cf. ibid.). Since patients in a vegetative state 
cannot have ‘interests potentially different from the interests of the person he 
used to be’ (ibid.) it is appropriate to focus on the wishes expressed in advance 
directives or surrogates. However, in cases of patients who are suffering from 
dementia the circumstances are often utterly different: these patients ‘have 
simply lost the mental capacity to comprehend and reaffirm their earlier prefer-
ences’ (David 2009: 359) and have developed new interests in their current 
condition which might conflict with their former interests when they were 
competent. ‘Once mental deterioration progresses, the patient's universe of in-
terests shrinks and new interests may become dominant.’ (ibid.) In order to 
avoid harm, these new interests should be overriding in the process of decision-
making. 
Some critics state that ‘advance directives fail on a practical level to effect 
a patient’s autonomous choices because, for example, people cannot foresee 
their futures well enough to make informed decisions in advance’ (Davis 2009: 
350). This is, among other things, due to the fact that the therapeutic options 
might be improved by the time the patient becomes incompetent and the ad-
vance directive becomes viable. Furthermore, competent individuals might not 
be in a position to anticipate how their interests might change in the event that 
they become incompetent. Hence, in following this line of reasoning the indi-
vidual him-/herself is not considered the best judge concerning his/her future 
interests after having become incompetent. For this reason, it is argued that ra-
ther than advance directives and substituted judgments the patient’s ‘best inter-
ests’ should take effect when he/she has become incapacitated (cf. Dresser and 
Robertson 1989). 
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Hence, critics state that paying attention to the subjective perspective of 
the once competent patient is not appropriate in cases in which his/her desires 
and interests might have changed when becoming incompetent. They propound 
that it would be more appropriate to apply a standard which is based upon in-
tersubjective (or even objective) criteria of well-being such as the best interest 
standard. But what exactly is the best interest standard and when is it applied? 
Best Interest Standard 
If there is a lack of information about the values and the preferences the patient 
had when he/she was competent, the so-called ‘best interest standard’ is applied 
in clinical decision-making.157 Instead of focusing on the patient’s former sub-
jective perspective, this standard is based on a set of interests or elements 
which all humans appear to share (cf. Jonsen et al. 2010: 116). These are con-
sidered the interests of all reasonable persons. Jonsen et al. list the following 
interests for which this holds true: 
It can be presumed that all humans have an interest in being alive, 
being capable of understanding and communicating their thoughts 
and feelings, being able to control and direct their lives, being free 
from pain and suffering, and being able to attain desired satisfaction. 
It can be presumed that all humans would choose to avoid loss of 
these abilities.  
(Jonsen et al. 2010: 116) 
The net benefit to the patient of each option is determined in the light of these 
various interests and the present circumstance of the patient. As the term best 
indicates the aim is to determine the highest benefit among the available op-
tions (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 228). It is asked how a ‘reasonable’ 
person would decide under the given circumstances and in how far widely val-
ued goods such as freedom from pain and the ability to communicate are pre-
sent. Thus, putatively objective or at least intersubjective measures are used to 
determine the patient’s best interests. Beauchamp and Childress point out that 
‘the best interest standard protects an incompetent person’s well-being by re-
quiring surrogates to assess the risks and benefits of various treatments and al-
                                           
157  The best interest standard is also used in cases in which the patient has never been com-
petent such as in cases of neonatal treatment or child custody. 
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ternatives to the treatment. It is therefore inescapably a quality-of-life criteri-
on.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 228) Furthermore, as illustrated the best 
interest standard operates on a more objective (in terms of intersubjective) con-
cept of well-being in contrast to the advance directive or the substituted judg-
ment standard.  
Preliminary results 
The analysis illustrates that, as in the discussions on AiD in the case of compe-
tent patients, well-being plays a prominent role, however, for the most part in 
connection with the principle of respecting the patient’s autonomy. The above 
elucidations demonstrate that it is a crucial factor whether or not there is infor-
mation about the now incapacitated patient’s former desires and interests. This 
has a great impact on the role well-being is to play and the concepts applied. 
First of all, the following takes a closer look at instances in which there is 
information available about the patient’s former wishes and desires: in follow-
ing the Extension View, the principle of respecting autonomy is extended, as 
far as possible, to the case of now incompetent individuals. This is accom-
plished through taking patients’ former wishes and desires as a basis in the ac-
tual process of decision making for the now incapacitated patients. This course 
of action indicates that similar concepts of well-being as in the case of compe-
tent patients and AiD serve on the alternative levels: at the ontological level, 
above all, the subjective elements of well-being are stressed since the desires, 
values and interests of the once competent patient play a major role. This is al-
so the case at the epistemic level. The patient him-/herself is considered to have 
the best access to his/her well-being and, furthermore, he/she is viewed as be-
ing in a position to anticipate his/her future well-being under specific condi-
tions. Where the evaluative level is concerned, the ultimate authority is given to 
the once competent patient’s desires and interests. Hence, the fact that the pa-
tient is incompetent now means that his/her former interests and desires by 
means of advance directives and substitutes judgments have the ultimate au-
thority on the evaluative level. As we have seen in the above, this has evoked 
harsh criticism since in some cases the earlier interests of the competent patient 
might conflict with his/her current desires when incompetent. In these cases it 
is argued that it would be more appropriate to evaluate the patient’s well-being 
with a focus on his/her current situation (or experiential interests) by means of 
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objective or intersubjective criteria such as the best interest standard. It is main-
tained that patients can be mistaken about what might promote their well-being 
especially if their evaluation concerns specific future conditions which have not 
yet occurred. 
As depicted in the above, this best interest standard is applied in cases in 
which there is no information about the patient’s former interests and desires. 
Since there is no evidence of the once competent patient’s desires and interests 
serving as a guideline for the patient’s autonomous choice, the principle of re-
spect for autonomy recedes and the promotion of well-being comes to the fore-
front. Thus, a shift takes place from the Extension View (which, as shown, also 
involves the principle of promoting well-being) to a purely well-being based 
view. The application of the best interest standard implies changes in terms of 
the concept of well-being under consideration: an objective or intersubjective 
stance is taken. It is not immediately apparent precisely whether it is an objec-
tive or intersubjective stance. Nonetheless, there are some indications which 
suggest that the perspective which prevails is intersubjective since the best in-
terests standards is said to represent the standard desires of a reasonable person. 
There is no reference to an essentialist perspective in terms of well-being at the 
ontological level. Intersubjective standards are applied to evaluate the incompe-
tent patient’s well-being in order to determine whether or not foregoing life-
sustaining treatment is a legitimate act. This change from a subjectivist to a 
more inter subjectivist stance is due to the lack of information about the pa-
tient’s former values and preferences and therefore, was born out of necessity. 
Nevertheless, we can conclude that it acts on the assumption that the nature of 
well-being is not utterly subjective and that to a specific degree external evalua-
tions of a person’s well-being are possible, otherwise the application of the best 
interest standard would be rendered impossible. 
6.4. Results arising from the analysis and the issues it 
raises 
The results of the analysis so far clearly illustrate that where the role of well-
being in discussions on euthanasia is concerned its relationship to the principle 
of respect for autonomy is of major importance. It appears to have a great im-
pact on the role well-being plays and its character which is under consideration 
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in the discussions on AiD and FLT. Hence, in order to clarify the role which 
well-being plays in the debate on euthanasia it would appear to be fruitful, as in 
the previous chapters, to analyze the relationship between well-being and the 
other major concept with which it appears to interact. Therefore, in this chapter 
we take a closer look at the presence of well-being when occurring with auton-
omy (6.4.1.). Furthermore, we have ascertained that there is a predominance of 
subjective dimensions of well-being in debates on euthanasia. But what are the 
underlying reasons for this prevalence of subjective conceptions? Section 6.4.2. 
involves itself with this question.  
6.4.1. The presence of well-being when occurring with 
autonomy 
When dealing with the relationship of well-being and autonomy, it is initially 
important to get a clearer picture of what exactly is meant by referring to the 
principle of respect for autonomy (or self-determination as maintained by Bu-
chanan and Brock 1990) in the debate on euthanasia. On the authority of Beau-
champ and Childress, ‘to respect autonomous agents is to acknowledge their 
right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on their personal 
values and beliefs’ (2013: 106). They stress the fact that linked to this are nega-
tive as well as positive obligations. The negative ones mainly consist of the 
non-interference of physicians and other health care professionals in the auton-
omous actions and choices of the patient as long as these do not harm others 
(cf. ibid.: 107). The positive obligations, in contrast, refer to the disclosure of 
information and the assurance that the patient fully understands it so that he/she 
is in a position to make an autonomous choice. Of central interest to us, howev-
er, is the question as to how both principles, the respect for autonomy and the 
promotion of well-being, relate to each other in the context of discussions on 
euthanasia. In order to approach the answer to this question it appears to be 
fruitful, in a first step, to see how both autonomy and well-being can relate to 
each other and then, in a second step, to ascertain how exactly they relate in the 
discourse on euthanasia on the basis of this information. 
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Paternalism: well-being and autonomy in conflict 
To begin with, it should be noted that especially in the realm of biomedical eth-
ics there are often far-reaching discrepancies between the implications of the 
principles of respect for autonomy and promoting individual well-being (cf. 
Hildt 2006: 169). An example is the case of a patient who decides to act in a 
way which the physician views as harmful to his/her health and for this reason 
the physician meddles with the aim of protecting the patient’s well-being. Cas-
es of this kind are discussed under the title ‘paternalism’. The field of medicine 
especially has a long tradition of paternalism. Beauchamp and Childress give 
the following definition of paternalism: ‘the intentional overriding of one per-
son’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person who overrides 
justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefiting or of preventing or miti-
gating harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden’ (Beau-
champ and Childress 2013: 215).158 Thus, the concept of well-being is seen to 
play a central role since the patient’s preferences or actions are overridden by 
the physician for the sake of the protection or promotion of the patient’s well-
being. Where paternalism is concerned, both the principles of autonomy and 
well-being conflict and autonomy is overridden by well-being. Let us consider 
whether the problem of paternalism plays an eminent role in the above depicted 
discussion on euthanasia. At a first glance, this does not appear to be the case 
since both principles, respect for autonomy and promoting or protecting indi-
vidual well-being, work together in one direction: they both are used within the 
argument for AiD which, as described in the above, claims that one should 
comply with the request of the competent patient to prevent a severe diminish-
ment of his or her well-being by means of AiD. Thus, both principles, well-
being and autonomy, work in tandem and do not have conflicting implications. 
Nonetheless, in the case of incompetent patients, when the question as to 
whether FLT should be administered arises, it appears to be somewhat differ-
ent. Let us investigate these cases more closely. 
The differentiation between hard and soft paternalism, introduced by Joel 
Feinberg (1971), is of relevance here. Whereas hard paternalism refers to inter-
ferences with autonomous desires and decisions, in cases of soft paternalism 
                                           
158  This is the so-called broader definition of paternalism. There is also a narrow one that 
paternalistic interventions restrict autonomous preferences, desires and actions (cf. 
Schöne-Seifert 2009: 109; Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 215). 
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the choices and desires of the individual concerned do not necessarily need to 
be autonomous. Thus, soft paternalism deals with intervention in cases of in-
competent individuals. A mother who has her child vaccinated although the 
child is screaming provides an instance of soft paternalism (cf. Schöne-Seifert 
2009: 110). ‘A necessary condition for this variant of paternalism are currently 
uttered or perceivable wishes or intentions ..., which are not considered auton-
omous.’159 (ibid.) Like Ronald Dworkin, Bettina Schöne-Seifert terms these 
‘empirical wishes’ and intentions. In contrast to hard paternalism, soft paternal-
ism is generally viewed as admissible. ‘Soft paternalism only tries to prevent 
the harmful consequences of a patient’s actions that the patient did not choose 
with substantial autonomy.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 217). A special 
form of soft paternalism is called ‘self-paternalism’ or ‘Odysseus paternalism’ 
(Quante 2002; Schöne-Seifert 2009: 111): an incompetent person’s empirical 
desires and intentions are interfered with for the sake of his/her well-being, 
since he/she has authorized somebody to do so when he/she was still in a com-
petent state. Hence, self-paternalism comes into play when the advance di-
rective and surrogate decision standards are concerned in cases of euthanasia. 
The afore-mentioned cases of the ‘Happy Alzheimer’s patients’ constitute typi-
cal examples of self-paternalism if their prior decisions and wishes, as ex-
pressed in advance directives, are complied with. The special feature of self-
paternalism is that the incompetent person him-/herself has authorized persons 
to act in a specific soft paternalistic manner in the event that he/she becomes 
incompetent. Taken together, when putting the relationship of well-being and 
autonomy in concrete terms one can say that soft paternalism in the form of 
self-paternalism plays a role in discussions on euthanasia whereas hard pater-
nalism is rarely involved. On the contrary, substantial weight is given to the 
principle of respect for autonomy in cases of competent patients so that in-
stances of hard paternalism are avoided. Hence, we can conclude that discrep-
ancies between the implications of the principles of respect for autonomy and 
promoting individual well-being in terms of paternalism are not strongly repre-
sented in the discussions of euthanasia. 
                                           
159  Translation by author. Original quote: ‘Notwendige Bedingung für diese Paternalismus-
variante sind aktuell geäußerte oder erkennbare Wünsche oder Absichten, … die nicht 
autonom sind.‘ 
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Possible relationships of autonomy and well-being 
In order to clarify the role which well-being plays in the debate on euthanasia it 
is also worthwhile placing the axiological relationship of well-being and auton-
omy under scrutiny. Are both, well-being and autonomy, ascribed intrinsic val-
ue in the discussions or is one of the notions merely valued for the sake of the 
other? In order to shed light on our central interest at this point, the axiological 
relationship of well-being and autonomy, let us first of all scrutinize which rea-
sons can be brought forward to justify why autonomy should be respected. 
Above all, two different reasons can be brought forward: 1. because of its in-
strumental value and 2. owing to its intrinsic value (cf. Buchanan and Brock 
1990 and Schermer 2002). The following, first of all, portrays these two differ-
ent approaches to the value of autonomy and, in a second step, classifies the 
value which is ascribed to autonomy in the debate on euthanasia against this 
background. 
1. The instrumental value of autonomy: in following approaches which as-
cribe instrumental value to autonomy, autonomy is ‘only valuable as an instru-
ment to promote well-being’ (Schermer 2002: 11). It is pointed out that this no-
tion of autonomy and its relationship to well-being are based upon the assump-
tion that competent individuals are in the best position to determine what will 
or will not promote their well-being and for this reason they should have the 
ultimate authority to evaluate their well-being. Their preferences resemble their 
best interests.160 This view has received considerable attention under the head-
ing ‘the patient knows best’ in medical contexts and constitutes a counter-
movement to the long and powerful paternalistic tradition characterized by the 
idea that ‘the physician knows best’ what is good for their patients (cf. Buchan-
an and Brock 1990: 35). Thus, this approach relies on the notion that well-
being has a clearly subjective nature. Various degrees of subjectivity can be 
distinguished: it could be based upon an utterly subjectivist stance in which at 
all three levels (the ontological, the evaluative and the epistemic level) well-
being is viewed as exclusively subjective. In this case, the patient would always 
be considered the best judge in matters of his/her well-being. Alternatively, a 
view could be taken in which subjective dimensions of well-being are predom-
inant at all three levels, but also objective dimensions play a sporadic role. This 
                                           
160  Proponents of this view are for instance Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma 
(1988). 
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could lead to the conclusion that the person him-/herself is generally but not 
always the best judge in terms of his/her well-being and that there are instances 
in which others might be better judges. ‘This means that in as far as people’s 
choices do not promote their well-being, there is no reason to respect this right, 
so that interference with people’s choices becomes admissible.’ (Schermer 
2002: 11) Thus, in following this approach if patients are not competent to 
make decisions which contribute to their well-being, there is no reason why 
their autonomy should be respected in these cases. One can maintain that the 
more clearly objective dimensions of well-being gain importance, the further 
autonomy drifts into the background. Hence, an approach which attributes in-
strumental value to autonomy and takes into account the objective dimensions 
of well-being is confronted with the protest that it is vulnerable to the problem 
of paternalism. 
However, there is another slightly different view in which instrumental 
value could be attributed to autonomy when the promotion of well-being as the 
main goal is concerned. ‘This is the claim that making one’s own choices in 
itself contributes to a person’s good even if he does not always have the best 
knowledge of his own well-being, or of how to promote it.’ (Schermer 2002: 
11-2) In this case a different, more objectivist concept of well-being is at stake: 
autonomy is viewed as one among various others on a list of components which 
promote individual well-being. Objective dimensions of well-being predomi-
nate especially on the ontological level. As Buchanan and Brock maintain 
‘[t]his ideal of a self-determining agent presupposes the development of the ca-
pacities necessary for reflective choice. When these capacities are substantially 
limited or impaired, the value of choosing for oneself likewise is diminished 
because the ideal of the self-determining agent and the value it represents is 
less able to be realized.’ (Buchanan/Brock 1990: 39) Therefore, this approach 
is utterly vulnerable to paternalistic interventions. 
2. Intrinsic value of autonomy: approaches which ascribe intrinsic value to 
autonomy refer to ‘the value that autonomy has in itself or for its own sake, as 
opposed to its being valuable for the sake of something else’ (Varelius 2006: 
378). According to this approach, the value of autonomy is entirely independ-
ent of the value of well-being. The realization of autonomy is good in itself, 
regardless of whether or not it promotes individual well-being. Different no-
tions of the intrinsic value of autonomy have been brought forward: Kantians, 
for instance, view the obligation to respect autonomy as a part of human digni-
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ty. John Harris derives the value of autonomy from the moral status of persons, 
who have the highest moral importance and value (cf. Harris 2003: 10). Propo-
nents of the approach which attributes intrinsic value to autonomy maintain that 
especially in cases in which important decisions about our life have to be taken 
we want to make these decisions by ourselves and this is even the case when 
we believe that there are others who are in a better position to make the choice. 
‘Even when we believe that others may be able to decide for us better than we 
ourselves can, we often prefer to decide for ourselves.’ (Buchanan and Brock 
1990: 38) In following this concept of autonomy, patients should make their 
own choices irrespective of whether or not they have the best knowledge of 
their well-being. Thus, the approach requires that the autonomy of persons is 
always respected even if the patients have become incompetent and they them-
selves are not aware whether or not their autonomous choices are being re-
spected. 
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that John Harris views well-being as 
instrumentally valuable when attributing an intrinsic value to autonomy. ‘We 
need welfare, broadly conceived in terms of health, freedom from pain, mobili-
ty, shelter, nourishment, and so on because these things create the conditions 
which not only maximize autonomy but also give autonomy minimum scope 
for operation.’ (Harris 2003: 11) Hence, there is a third kind of relationship be-
tween well-being and autonomy attributing intrinsic value to well-being in or-
der to promote autonomy. This opinion, however, appears to be rarely brought 
forward. 
Putting the relationship of autonomy and well-being into 
concrete terms  
After having dealt with the possible relationships between autonomy and well-
being, in the following it is examined which relationship prevails in the above 
depicted arguments for AiD and FLT. Two observations can be made which 
suggest that most participants in the discussion act on the assumption that au-
tonomy and well-being have an intrinsic value rather than being viewed as in-
strumentally valuable. 
First of all, it is explicitly stated that both principles, the promotion of 
well-being and the respect for autonomy, are of central importance within the 
argument in favour of euthanasia. It does not appear to be the case that one of 
208 
the two principles is merely valued for the sake of the other. Although both 
principles operate in tandem, the application of each of them has a very specific 
function. The principle of autonomy functions to ensure that it is the autono-
mous choice of the patient concerned to end his/her life. It thus provides a safe-
guard against paternalistic interventions, such as in a case in which a physician 
administers AiD in order to prevent the diminishment of a competent patient’s 
well-being and the patient has not requested AiD. The principle of promoting 
well-being, in contrast, functions to ensure that the wish to die is brought about 
by the diminishment of the patient’s well-being and not as a result of a sudden 
whim or random state of mind. The standards for AiD as applied in the Nether-
lands illustrate especially the way in which the principle of well-being sets lim-
its to a patient’s autonomy in terms of termination of life decisions. AiD is only 
administered if the patient is suffering unbearably and if this suffering cannot 
be alleviated by other means. Thus, the principle of well-being compliments the 
threshold concept of competence in as far as it presents a safeguard against 
misuse. Both principles set mutual limits in order to prevent different kinds of 
abuse or misuse. This observation suggests that although they operate in tan-
dem both, autonomy and well-being, appear to be valued for their own sake and 
are, therefore, attributed intrinsic value. 
However, there is a further observation which, above all, supports the the-
sis that in the debate on euthanasia intrinsic value is attributed to autonomy: it 
has been demonstrated earlier that the autonomy of the patient is also valued 
and respected by means of advance directives in cases in which he/she has be-
come incompetent and is unaware of the fact that his/her autonomy is being re-
spected owing to being in a vegetative state for example. In these instances, 
therefore, one could not argue that the autonomy of the patient is respected in 
order to promote the patient’s well-being since respecting the patient’s autono-
my does not have a direct impact on the patient’s current or future well-
being.161 This is at least the case if one takes an utterly subjectivist view in 
terms of well-being, which presupposes that the well-being of a person is only 
promoted if he/she perceives it in this way. An objectivist conception, in con-
                                           
161  It should be noted, however, that one could argue that the reassurance that a patient’s 
autonomy will be respected even if they become incompetent has an impact on their pre-
sent well-being when they are still competent. This is due to the fact that patients are not 
afraid of losing control over their life and the circumstances of their death if they should 
become incompetent. 
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trast, would allow for the fact that the well-being of the person concerned is 
promoted through respecting his/her autonomy although he/she does not per-
ceive this. However, the results in the above elucidate that a strongly objectivist 
conception of well-being can be ruled out in the debate on euthanasia. Hence, 
standards such as advance directives, applied for incompetent patients in situa-
tions in which the question of FLT arises, indicate that autonomy appears to be 
valued for its own sake. Thereby, they provide us with further useful infor-
mation in terms of the relationship between autonomy and well-being.  
On the basis of the two observations it can, thus, be concluded that in the 
debates on euthanasia both autonomy and well-being are attributed intrinsic 
value. Although they both operate in tandem as an argument in favour of eu-
thanasia their values are mutually independent and neither appears to have pri-
ority over the other. 
Broadly speaking, the role of well-being is virtually as important as the 
role of autonomy within arguments in favour of euthanasia. Both are attributed 
intrinsic value and they enjoy a nearly non-competitive relationship. Well-
being, therefore, appears to have a dependent presence on an equal footing with 
the notion of autonomy. However, as the following will illustrate the substan-
tial weight given to the notion of autonomy leads to interference with the con-
ceptual level in terms of well-being. 
6.4.2. Predominance of subjective dimensions of well-being  
The analysis provided in the above has made it plain that subjectivist dimen-
sions predominate when the character of well-being is concerned within argu-
ments in favour of euthanasia. In the discussions, much weight is placed on the 
fact that the patient has and should have the ultimate authority to evaluate and 
determine his/her well-being. However, a more careful scrutiny gives rise to the 
impression that different conceptual and theoretical aspects, which must be 
kept separate, are muddled up in the discussions and that some inconsistencies 
with regard to the conceptual level in terms of well-being are present.  
Inconsistencies on the conceptual level of well-being 
We have noted when dealing with the concepts of well-being concerned at the 
various levels that at the ontological level apart from subjective also intersub-
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jective dimensions are concerned. The terms ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’ are used to 
refer to aspects which commonly diminish well-being particularly in the final 
phase of life. Although it is pointed out that attention needs to be paid to the 
fact that two patients in a similar terminal situation might experience it in an 
utterly different way, specific factors such as physical pain, mental degenera-
tion and dependency are listed which are viewed as commonly causing suffer-
ing and therefore diminish individual well-being in this phase. This can espe-
cially be recognised by the fact that the best interest standard is applied in cases 
of incompetent patients in which their former preferences are unclear. As afore-
mentioned, this standard is based on the assumption that the character of well-
being has some kind of common denominator and that the nature of well-being 
is not utterly subjective. Thus, in order to remain consistent, the argument must 
follow that due to its intersubjective nature it is possible to evaluate well-being 
at least to a certain degree from a third-person perspective. This is, however, 
not often articulated. On the contrary, as shown and illustrated in the above 
quotations it is always emphasized in the discussion that at the evaluative and 
epistemic level, well-being is considered as completely subjective. This is not 
truly consistent and, furthermore, especially with respect to the evaluative level 
this is only a half-truth. First of all, in order for the patient’s subjective evalua-
tion of his/her well-being to be taken seriously there are certain formal objec-
tive criteria derived from the notion of autonomy which need to be fulfilled. 
For instance, he/she needs to be competent. In addition, specific and substantial 
criteria come into play since the pain and suffering need to have convincing 
causes in order to be considered as legitimate reasons for administering eutha-
nasia. Thus, the evaluation of pain and suffering is not viewed as a completely 
subjective endeavour. This, above all, becomes obvious in the paradigmatic eu-
thanasia conditions we have been dealing with in the previous section on the 
two examples of assistance in dying in practice. As have been shown in the 
Netherlands the suffering should predominantly result from a medically classi-
fiable disease or disorder (cf. Buiting et al. 2008: 1) in order to justify euthana-
sia or assisted suicide. Let me clarify the impact of this restriction through an 
example: 70 year old Mrs B. lost her husband two years ago and has considered 
her well-being to be severely diminished ever since despite not having any 
medically classifiable illness. Her life with her husband was of such value to 
her that nothing can now replace this and consequently she considers herself to 
be in a state of great suffering with no prospect of improvement. On these 
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grounds she requests PAS. This is an instance in which the administration of 
PAS is not considered legitimate in the Netherlands (or elsewhere where PAS 
has been legalized). Her suffering does not constitute a sufficient reason for 
PAS since she has no medically classifiable illness causing it and she is not in a 
final stage of life. Thus, it becomes evident that the notion of suffering in the 
Dutch context of euthanasia is not taken to be entirely subjective. There are ob-
jective dimensions in terms of the evaluation of well-being involved and these 
place limitations on Mrs. B.’s potential to act or request assistance in putting 
her wishes into action.162 This is not only the case where assistance in dying in 
practice is concerned, but also in the theoretical discussion on the legalisation 
of these procedures.163 All in all, it appears as if objective dimensions of well-
being play a larger part than hitherto supposed. Proponents of euthanasia invest 
much effort in attempting to conceal this fact either consciously or uncon-
sciously. What is the reason for this? And why does subjectivism finds more 
favour than objectivism in discussions on euthanasia? 
The interference of the principle of autonomy with the concept 
of well-being 
As we have just ascertained, autonomy is attributed an intrinsic value when re-
ferred to in arguments for euthanasia. It plays a primary role in order to exclude 
heteronomous influences where euthanasia is concerned. This primary role is 
continually emphasized. This is especially due to the fact that during the Nazi 
era involuntary euthanasia was justified by referring to the allegedly reduced 
quality of life of those concerned. Thereby, from a third person perspective, the 
lives of human beings were classified as ‘worthless lives’ in contrast to 
‘worthwhile lives’. Ever since then objective evaluations of the quality of life 
or well-being, which do not take into account the perspective of the person 
concerned have been brought into disrepute. This provides a major reason why 
so much emphasis is placed on the patients’ autonomy in the debate on eutha-
nasia. On the normative level it is always maintained that the well-being of the 
                                           
162  My sincere thanks to Peter Schaber for making me aware of this problem by means of 
this example. 
163  There are of course some exceptions. John Harris, for instance, argues that we should 
refrain from formulating any additional condition which place limitations on a patient’s 
potential to undergo AiD. The patient should have the ultimate authority to decide. 
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patients concerned should not be determined externally. It is the patient’s own 
personal perspective of their well-being which ought to count. However, this 
normative level should be separated from the question whether the nature of 
individual well-being is subjective or objective (the conceptual level). The im-
pression arises that this does not always happen in the debate: the different lev-
els, the normative level and the conceptual level, become muddled. Rather than 
merely stating that well-being should not be determined externally, it is main-
tained that the determination of individual well-being is a completely subjective 
endeavour. This has been illustrated by the quotations in the above such as the 
quotation by Veatch: ‘[d]eciding that the benefits [of continuing living] are 
proportionate requires the inherently nonmedical determination of how valua-
ble it is to continue living. It should be obvious that these are judgments that no 
outsider should be able to make.’ (Veatch 1989: 82) This quotation confuses 
two divergent statements: 1. No outsider should determine how valuable it is to 
continue living. 2. No outsider is able to determine how valuable it is to con-
tinue living. Whereas the former is a normative statement, the latter statement 
refers to the conceptual level of well-being, namely the epistemic level. Both 
statements operate on different levels which must be kept separate. This is, 
however, rarely done in the discussions on euthanasia. Hence, the afore-
mentioned inconsistencies on the conceptual level arise because of the interfer-
ence of the normative level with the principle of autonomy. Especially propo-
nents of euthanasia appear to avoid objective dimensions of well-being due to 
the fact that the more objectivist the concept of well-being becomes, the more 
prone it is to heteronomous influences which are to be avoided especially when 
euthanasia is concerned. 
However, it is of central importance to keep the normative level and the 
conceptual level in terms of well-being separate. Respect for autonomy leads to 
the fact that the competent patient has the ultimate authority to determine 
his/her wellbeing, but this should not be confused with commitments on the 
conceptual level stating (with regard to the epistemic level) that the patient 
him- or herself is the best judge of his/her well-being. 
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6.5. Findings in respect of the role of well-being in the 
discussions concerning the end of life 
The analysis has shown, above all, that well-being plays a prominent role in 
debates on the end of life. The concept is a widely applied point of reference in 
arguments in favour of euthanasia. This finding can be maintained in both dis-
cussions on assistance in dying in the case of competent patients, as well as in 
debates on foregoing life-sustaining treatment in the case of incompetent pa-
tients. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the prominent role of well-
being in these discussions is not as easily recognisable as in the enhancement-
debate. The results of the examination suggest that there are manifold reasons 
for this. As in the case of the debates dealing with the beginning of life, it is 
essential to differentiate between the overt and the subliminal presence of well-
being, which provides us with a second reason why the prominent role of well-
being is not so easily recognisable. The results of the analysis clearly indicate 
that well-being has an overt as well as a subliminal status in debates on eutha-
nasia. Within arguments in favour of euthanasia, well-being has its position 
alongside autonomy. Both are of central importance, are attributed intrinsic 
value and, as illustrated, operate in tandem. The analysis has revealed that au-
tonomy is often given pride of place whereas the importance of well-being is 
disregarded. In these cases well-being has a subliminal presence. This is partic-
ularly true of debates in Germany.  
Further instances of the subliminal presence can be found in the above-
depicted well-being-based lines of reasoning concealed behind the death with 
dignity arguments, which are considered as more socially accepted. As already 
suggested, the subliminal presence of well-being behind arguments which refer 
to autonomy or a death with dignity appears to rest upon negative and traumatic 
experiences in which human lives were classified as ‘worthless lives’ in con-
trast to ‘worthwhile lives’ during the Nazi era. Thus, it becomes evident that 
there are many similarities to the role of well-being in the discussions at the be-
ginning of life, where estimations of the QoL are a sensitive issue. Hence, 
above all, in German discussions well-being is not explicitly mentioned but 
implicitly referred to. 
A major result of the analysis with regard to the character of well-being 
constitutes the predominance of subjective dimensions. This finding forms a 
stark contrast to those in the debates on enhancement and organ allocation, 
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where we have ascertained a predominance of objective dimensions. However, 
it has been shown that the concepts of well-being under consideration in the 
discussions on euthanasia are not totally subjective and that also intersubjective 
dimensions are involved, which are based on the assumption that there are so-
cially shared notions of what promotes or diminishes our well-being. This is 
especially the case in instances of incompetent patients when the question 
whether to forego life-sustaining treatment arises and the best interest standard 
is applied. The findings illustrate that the debate is mainly concerned with the 
evaluative and epistemic level with regard to well-being. Moreover, the investi-
gation has revealed that inconsistencies exist on the conceptual level with re-
gard to well-being. The underlying intersubjectivism, especially if incompetent 
patients are concerned, is not compatible with the radical subjectivism found 
within many arguments in favour of AiD where patients are competent. It has 
been shown that the concept of well-being is influenced by the major role 
which autonomy enjoys in discussions on euthanasia. This influence of auton-
omy could be described as an interference. This finding supports the already 
existing impression that the concept of well-being appears to be vulnerable to 
influences from other dominant notions and principles in biomedical ethics. 
An additional observation is the fact that in debates on euthanasia a con-
cept of well-being is used which is broader in comparison to the narrow con-
cept applied in organ allocation, but can only be described as narrower in the 
face of the very broad concept of well-being which finds application in the en-
hancement debate. Hence, the concept of well-being under consideration in the 
(theoretical) discussions on euthanasia refers to health-related aspects of well-
being, albeit in a broader sense. The debate is, above all, concerned with the 
protection of well-being. This protection is accomplished through the preven-
tion of the major diminishment of well-being due to pain and suffering and also 
by the provision of the prospect that patients can determine an end to their suf-
fering if it becomes unbearable. Having analysed the role of well-being in the 
final phase of life within this chapter, the journey has now come to an end. The 
task now is to recapitulate all the findings with regard to the role of well-being 
in the various debates in biomedical ethics. 
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7. Rethinking well-being in biomedical 
ethics – synopsis of the observations 
and issues raised by the analysis 
It has been expounded in the introduction to this book that, although the con-
cept of well-being seems to be an important point of reference within the field 
of biomedical ethics (and also in the general realm of ethics), there is not a sug-
gestion of agreement as to what well-being actually is. This, as illustrated, con-
stitutes a major problem since the notion of well-being comes into play where 
decisions with far reaching implications are taken. There is a need for both a 
common language and for clarification in terms of the concept. A vital step in 
achieving clarification with regard to the understanding of well-being is to es-
tablish a critical analysis of the present state of affairs concerning the role of 
well-being in biomedical ethics, which the previous chapters provided. All in 
all, the detailed exploration of the four debates has provided a varied and col-
ourful tapestry of the presence and character of well-being within the extensive 
field of biomedical ethics. This chapter draws the threads together and takes 
stock of the results gained through the analysis in the four debates.  
In the course of the examination it has become obvious, step by step, that 
rather than playing one specific role, well-being has various roles and manifold 
facets in the realm of biomedical ethics. It has gradually emerged that the con-
cept of well-being is subject to the influence of other principles and notions 
prevalent in the various debates, that is to say the notions of moral status and 
human nature as well as the principles of justice and autonomy. These have a 
major impact on the presence of well-being in the discussions and on its very 
character. To put this in tangible terms: one main finding of the analysis pro-
vided in this book is that rather than playing an independent role, well-being 
strongly depends on the other principles and notions which are prevalent in the 
respective debates. The results illustrate that the dependence occurs on both 
levels, the level concerning the presence of well-being and the level dealing 
with the character of well-being.  
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7.1. The influence of predominant notions on the role 
of well-being  
The results of our analysis clearly indicate that the concept of well-being enjoys 
a shifting presence in the respective bioethical debates and that it has an unsta-
ble character, which differs from debate to debate. It appears, however, that this 
variation in terms of presence and character is not a result of chance and rather 
that it has an underlying pattern. This section aims to extrapolate this pattern. 
As mentioned in the above, our findings appear to suggest that the role (that is 
to say: presence and character) which well-being plays in biomedical ethics is 
strongly influenced by the other predominant notions in the respective debates. 
The following aims to elaborate on this finding and to provide a clearer picture 
of it. We concentrate, first of all, on the influences which occur with regard to 
the presence of well-being in biomedical ethics. Another major part of this sec-
tion examines the changing character of well-being with regard to its subjec-
tivity and objectivity and the way in which it is determined by the other pre-
dominant notions.  
7.1.1. The shifting presence of well-being in biomedical ethics 
The examination of the four bioethical debates has shown that in each of them 
the concept of well-being is involved in a relationship with another prevalent 
notion. Nonetheless, the relationships which well-being cultivates with these 
are of an utterly different kind. First of all it is fruitful to recapitulate on these 
various kinds of relationships and then, in a second step, deal with the influence 
of the notions on the presence and character of well-being. 
The presence of well-being in the face of other prevalent 
notions  
Over the course of our analysis we have ascertained that the concept of well-
being is involved in a special relationship with the notion of moral status. This 
was clearly indicated by our findings in the examination concentrating on the 
role of well-being in debates on prenatal testing and selective abortion. It has 
been shown that the question dealing with the moral status of prenatal entities 
is superordinate to the query as to the impact of illness and disability on the fu-
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ture child’s well-being. As illustrated in chapter 3, it is important that partici-
pants in the debate expound the stance they take in terms of moral status before 
they address the topic of the well-being of future children, otherwise one is not 
in a position to grasp the implications of their well-being-based arguments. 
Hence, the consideration of well-being within debates on prenatal testing and 
selection heavily depends on the specific stance taken with regard to prenatal 
moral status. Thus, the concept of well-being has a subordinate presence in the 
face of the notion of prenatal moral status.  
The findings have indicated that the relationship of the concept of well-
being and the notion of human nature in the debate on mood enhancement is of 
a similar kind: although not always explicitly indicated, the notion of human 
nature is ascribed intrinsic value whereas the concept of well-being is attributed 
derivative value and strongly depends on the notion of human nature. We have, 
therefore, concluded in chapter 4 that the concept of well-being has a subordi-
nate presence taking a back seat to the notion of human nature.  
In the context of organ allocation, it has been extrapolated that the concept 
of well-being has a very close relationship with the notion of justice. To be 
more precise, well-being is deeply involved in the dispute of alternative princi-
ples of justice, namely utilitarian and egalitarian principles of justice, which in 
turn derive from different ethical traditions. The concept of well-being occurs 
within utilitarian and egalitarian approaches to the problem of organ allocation 
and can, therefore, be classified as having an embedded presence within alter-
native principles of justice. Hence, the consideration of well-being strongly de-
pends on the alternative principles of justice. 
In addition, it has emerged that the relationship of autonomy and well-
being is important in the realm of biomedical ethics. This, above all, became 
obvious in our findings in chapter 6 dealing with the role of well-being in dis-
cussions concerning the end of life. We ascertained that in discussions dealing 
with euthanasia, autonomy and well-being operate in tandem and are both as-
cribed intrinsic value. On the grounds of our findings, well-being can be con-
sidered to have a dependent presence on an equal footing with autonomy in 
discussions at the end of life. It has also been illustrated in chapter 3 that the 
relationship of well-being and autonomy is likewise of importance in discus-
sions dealing with prenatal testing and selection where the prospective parents 
are concerned. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in these instances the rela-
tionship of autonomy and well-being is of a different kind. The reference to the 
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reproductive autonomy of the parents is superordinate to the consideration of 
their (the parents’) well-being. Hence, as in the case of moral status, well-being 
can be classified as having a subordinate presence in the face of reproductive 
autonomy. 
All in all, we can maintain that the relationship between well-being and 
other notions and principles not only depends on the other notion under consid-
eration but also varies greatly from debate to debate as the example of the rela-
tionship between well-being and autonomy illustrates. As a result, there is great 
variation with regard to the presence of well-being in the face of other preva-
lent notions. Keeping this in mind, we will now turn to our central point of in-
terest, that is to say, how the other notions influence the role of well-being in 
biomedical ethics. 
An overt versus a subliminal presence of well-being 
During the course of our analysis we have observed that the notion of well-
being alternates between possessing an overt and a subliminal presence. Where 
well-being is considered in the debates on enhancement and organ allocation, it 
is overtly referred to and its presence within the lines of reasoning is directly 
recognisable. However, matters are more complicated in the discussions deal-
ing with the beginning and end of life. Here the presence of well-being is, in 
turn, overt and subliminal. Where well-being plays a subliminal role, the refer-
ence to the concept is sometimes hardly recognizable. With regard to the dis-
cussions on prenatal testing and selection, it should be noted that the concept of 
well-being has, above all, a subliminal presence where the prospective parents 
are concerned. Generally speaking, the subliminal presence of well-being does 
not appear to correlate with the relevance (prominent or subordinate presence) 
which the concept has in the respective debates. It has, for instance, been 
shown that in the debates on organ allocation well-being has an overt presence 
although it merely plays a subordinate role. Hence, where well-being comes 
into play in the context of organ allocation, it is mentioned explicitly although 
it does not play a prominent role in general. In the debates dealing with the be-
ginning and the end of life, in contrast, we have learned that well-being plays a 
prominent role but sometimes has a subliminal presence. For this reason there 
appears to be no connection between the weight given to consideration of well-
being in the debate and its partly subliminal presence. But what are the underly-
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ing reasons for the sometimes subliminal presence of well-being and why does 
it only occur in the debates dealing with the beginning and the end of life? 
It has already been suggested in the previous chapters that quality of life 
estimations, especially in the context of reproduction and euthanasia, provoke 
recollections of the atrocities which took place during the Nazi era, such as the 
eugenic programs and mass murder. These were justified by the reference to 
the classification of ‘worthless lives’ as against ‘worthwhile lives’. Especially 
in the German bioethical discussions, participants in the debate are very careful 
since they want to avoid their arguments being associated with the lines of rea-
soning brought forward by the Nazis. As elucidated, this is clearly mirrored by 
our findings concerning the role of well-being in the discussions dealing with 
the beginning and end of life. Furthermore, it provides us with an explanation 
as to why the concept of well-being, above all, has a subliminal presence within 
the German debates on these matters. However, it should be noted that the sub-
liminal presence of well-being in discussion on prenatal testing and selection, 
above all, occurs where the prospective parents are concerned. These well-
being based lines of reasoning have little to do with the negative recollections 
of Nazi atrocities. There does, therefore, appear to be another reason as to why 
well-being has a partly subliminal presence in the debates dealing with the be-
ginning and the end of life. 
The subliminal presence of well-being and the ‘triumph of 
autonomy’ 
If we examine where exactly the concept of well-being shifts into a subliminal 
role we can recognize that this frequently happens when it occurs together with 
the principle of autonomy. It has been shown that in these instances the refer-
ence to the principle of autonomy conceals the consideration of well-being. 
Thus, there seems to be a connection between the subliminal presence of well-
being and the reference to autonomy. It is striking that this only appears to hold 
true for the relationship between well-being and autonomy and not elsewhere. 
In contrast, in the case of prenatal testing and selection, we have observed that 
the consideration of the future child’s well-being is even put forward as an al-
leged argument to conceal the reference to the notion of prenatal moral status 
since it is often considered as conservative and ‘old-fashioned’. The same holds 
true for the role of well-being in the debate on mood enhancement. The refer-
220 
ence to well-being is placed in the foreground although the notion of human 
nature is at the core of the opposing arguments and well-being merely has a 
subordinate presence. Hence, in these cases the situation is reversed: well-being 
is in the forefront and moral status and human nature have a subliminal pres-
ence behind it, although, as shown, the reference to both notions constitutes the 
main part of the respective arguments. 
Yet, why does the presence of autonomy in discussions lead to the sublim-
inal role of well-being? If one studies the latest developments in the field of bi-
omedical ethics, above all in the liberal Western tradition, one rapidly realizes 
that the principle of respecting autonomy has gained major importance. Some 
authors even go as far as to talk about a ‘triumph of autonomy’ in biomedical 
ethics (Wolpe 1998 and Beauchamp 2006). The principle of autonomy is highly 
respected in general, but most especially in the realm of biomedical ethics and 
is considered a powerful argument. Elisabeth Hildt points out that ‘[t]he argu-
ment of autonomy is frequently considered so strong and of such intuitive plau-
sibility that it is accepted without further questioning’ (Hildt 2002: 65). Alt-
hough they constitute an important point of reference, well-being based lines of 
reasoning can obviously not be considered to have such a high standing within 
biomedical ethics. In contrast, as portrayed in chapter 6, the notion of well-
being is often associated with medicine’s long and problematic tradition of pa-
ternalism, in which the patient’s preferences or actions were overridden by the 
physician for the sake of the patient’s well-being. Thus, within bioethical dis-
cussions participants in the debates have good reason to place the principle of 
autonomy in the foreground while permitting the consideration of well-being to 
recede into the background. As a consequence, if the concept of well-being oc-
curs together with the principle of autonomy it often takes a backseat and, 
therefore, it has a subliminal presence in these cases. It has been illustrated that 
the concept of well-being is present in different ways in the face of autonomy 
in the debate dealing with the beginning of life as opposed to the discourse on 
the end of life. Whereas well-being has a subordinate presence in the face of 
autonomy in the discussions on prenatal testing and selection, in discussions on 
the end of life it enjoys a presence on an equal footing with autonomy. None-
theless, well-being has a subliminal presence in both debates. Hence, the sub-
liminal presence of well-being does not appear to depend on the kind of rela-
tionship it has to autonomy in the respective debates. Due to the high standing 
of the principle of autonomy, well-being seems rather to recede into the back-
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ground whenever both (well-being and autonomy) occur together within an ar-
gument. 
In conclusion, it can be maintained that the presence of well-being within 
biomedical ethics, that is to say, whether it has a subliminal or overt presence, 
strongly depends on the other notions with which it occurs in the discussions as 
well as the specific standing of the respective notion under consideration. If the 
other notions have a very high standing within the field of biomedical ethics, 
such as the principle of autonomy, well-being is likely to have a subliminal 
presence. If, in contrast, the notion or principle with which well-being occurs 
has a comparatively ‘low’ standing or is viewed as old-fashioned such as the 
notions of moral status and human nature, the consideration of well-being is 
likely to be placed in the foreground within the arguments in order to conceal 
the alleged weaker line of reasoning. 
It has already been suggested in the above that the other predominant no-
tions not only influence the presence of well-being but also its character within 
the various debates in the field of biomedical ethics. The subsequent section 
sheds light upon this finding. 
7.1.2. The changing character of well-being in the debates 
One further significant observation during the course of our analysis is the find-
ing that the notion of well-being has a changing character in the various discus-
sions. It is clearly recognizable that the concept of well-being hovers between 
subjective and objective dimensions in the four debates. In the discussions deal-
ing with prenatal testing and selection, we have extrapolated that there is ten-
sion between subjectivist and objectivist conceptions where the future child’s 
well-being is concerned. A striking prevalence of objective dimensions of well-
being was identified in the debates dealing with mood enhancement and organ 
allocation. Within the discourse on the subject of euthanasia, in contrast, we 
discovered a predominance of subjective conceptions of well-being. However, 
the close examination of the respective prevalent conceptions of well-being 
within the specific bioethical discussions revealed that that the alternative con-
ceptions of well-being do not have an arbitrary occurrence within the various 
debates. Within each of the four discourses it was possible to extrapolate spe-
cific reasons for the predominance of the respective subjective or objective 
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conceptions of well-being. In all of the four debates the reasons identified were 
strongly associated with the respective other predominant notions. They ap-
peared to determine, at least to a certain degree, whether subjective or objective 
dimensions prevailed in each discourse. 
Connections between the prevalent notions and the changing 
character of well-being 
In the discussions on prenatal testing and selection we have discovered that 
there is a strong connection between alternative attitudes with regard to prena-
tal moral status and the specific conceptions of well-being which are purported. 
Whereas thinkers who take a liberal stance with regard to prenatal moral status 
and argue in favour of prenatal testing and selection tend to base their argu-
ments on objective conceptions of well-being, conservative thinkers in terms of 
moral status, tie their lines of reasoning to subjective approaches to well-being 
in order to argue against the permissibility of these procedures. We have, how-
ever, identified the latter well-being based lines of reasoning as alleged argu-
ments since in their core they rest upon the notion of a full prenatal moral sta-
tus. Hence, we can conclude that subjectivist conceptions are instrumentalised 
within the argumentations of critics of prenatal testing and selection. 
In the debate on mood enhancement it has been concluded that the pre-
dominance of objectivist concepts of well-being results from the weight and 
value given to the notion of human nature by both proponents and opponents of 
the procedures in question. Both have been classified as taking an essentialist 
stance with regard to human nature. Since essentialist conceptions of human 
nature are objectivist, it does not come as a surprise that proponents as well as 
opponents of mood enhancement tie their arguments to objective conceptions 
of well-being. There appear to be requirements, deriving from the notion of 
human nature which they purport, to the concepts of well-being under consid-
eration. 
The predominance of objective conceptions of well-being in the context of 
organ allocation has been attributed to the importance which the principle of 
justice has within this field. In chapter 5 it was illustrated that the subjective 
evaluation of well-being cannot be the decisive factor where donor organs are 
allocated since subjective dimensions are vulnerable to the problem of expen-
sive tastes and partial. Impartiality is a central aspect of distributive justice. As 
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a result, the weight given to the notion of justice within the context of organ 
allocation requires that objective conceptions of well-being are prevalent. 
In the discussions dealing with the end of life, the utterly subjectivist 
stance taken with regard to the character of well-being has been identified as 
resulting from interferences from the principle of autonomy. This has been 
suggested by inconsistencies which have been extrapolated with regard to the 
conceptual level of well-being: the radical subjectivism found within many ar-
guments in favour of euthanasia has been shown to be inconsistent with the un-
derlying intersubjectivism which is noticeable, especially where incompetent 
persons and the best interest standard are concerned. It has, above all, been 
pointed out that the normative level and the conceptual level in terms of well-
being become confused and that they should preferably be kept separate. 
Taking all these findings into consideration, we can maintain that, also 
with regard to its character, the concept of well-being is subject to influences 
from the other predominant notions. These influences appear to be the reason 
underlying the observation that the concept of well-being hovers between sub-
jective and objective dimensions in the four debates. In each debate the charac-
ter of well-being is, to a varying degree, determined by the respective predomi-
nant notion. Nonetheless, the impact on the character of well-being which de-
rives from the respective notions in the various debates is each of a different 
kind. With regard to the influence of the notion of moral status in the discus-
sions on prenatal testing and selection, it has been revealed that this can be 
classified as an instrumentalisation of the character of well-being. In the case 
of the principle of autonomy in the debate on euthanasia, the influence can be 
considered an interference. The impact of the notions of human nature and jus-
tice on the character of well-being within the contexts of mood enhancement 
and organ allocation is of a different kind: it has been revealed in the above that 
well-being has a subordinate presence in the face of human nature and an em-
bedded presence within alternative principles of justice. In order for the concept 
of well-being to be compatible with the notions of human nature and of justice, 
well-being is required to have a character which is based upon objective dimen-
sions. Hence, if well-being is to have a subordinate presence in the face of hu-
man nature or is to be embedded within the principle of justice, there is an ob-
jectivity requirement which it needs to fulfil. 
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Well-being – a chameleon in biomedical ethics? 
On the grounds of these findings, the impression could arise that the character 
of well-being within biomedical ethics resembles the behaviour of a chameleon 
which adjusts its skin pattern and colour to correspond with its surroundings. In 
the case of the chameleon the colour change can obviously be considered a 
good thing since it has the function of camouflage which protects the animal 
from predators. However, in the case of the ‘colour change’ of well-being with-
in biomedical ethics, things appear to be a bit different. Rather than being an 
advantage, the colour change of well-being brings a problem to our attention: 
the character of well-being can be considered vulnerable to external influences 
such as the impact of other predominant notions. Above all the kinds of impact 
which have been classified as instrumentalisations and interferences can be 
considered troublesome since they provoke an illusion that conceals the actual 
essence of well-being. They pass off attributes as components of the character 
of well-being which do not really belong to it but derive from other notions, 
thereby creating a ‘false’ character of well-being. Furthermore, if well-being is 
applied in a way in which it solely operates for the sake of other notions, one 
could argue that the concept itself is hollow and merely ‘swimming with the 
tide’. Influences which can be classified as requirements, in contrast, appear to 
be of a different kind. They express specific needs which must be met if well-
being occurs in connection with the notion under consideration. They do not 
provoke illusions of the character of well-being but appear to bring us closer to 
the ‘true’ character of well-being within biomedical ethics. It has already been 
portrayed in the introductory parts to this book that the character of well-being 
is rather vague within the field of biomedical ethics and also in general. The 
finding that the concept is vulnerable to instrumentalisations and interferences 
fits in with this vagueness. Nonetheless, the results do indeed suggest that the 
character of well-being is not totally subject to instumentalisations and interfer-
ences deriving from other notions within biomedical ethics. There are some 
other characteristics of well-being which cannot be attributed to the impact of 
other prevalent notions, as the results of our analysis show. These might be of 
assistance in clarifying the ‘true’ character of well-being in biomedical ethics. 
However, in order to rule out the possibility that these characteristics also result 
from interferences or instrumentalisations, we must examine their provenance. 
Thus, a more detailed exploration of these other traits is essential to attain the 
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goal of rethinking well-being within biomedical ethics and is provided in the 
following section.  
7.2. Attempts in revealing the ‘true’ character of well-
being in biomedical ethics  
So far we have ascertained that the character of well-being with regard to its 
subjectivity or objectivity is strongly influenced by the other notions predomi-
nant in the various debates within biomedical ethics. Impacts which we classi-
fied as interferences and instrumentalisations have been considered trouble-
some whereas impacts of the kind of requirements, in contrast, do not appear to 
provoke illusions but rather express specific needs which must be fulfilled if 
the concept of well-being is to be applied. As our findings suggest, there are 
further characteristics (apart from the subjective and objective dimensions) be-
longing to the notion of well-being such as the breadth of the concept, the con-
sideration of alternative levels and the reference to the restoration, the protec-
tion and the promotion of well-being within biomedical ethics. In order to ac-
complish the endeavour of rethinking well-being within biomedical ethics, it is 
important that these other findings are also placed under scrutiny. We need to 
investigate whether these characteristics of well-being result from either in-
strumentalisations and interferences or requirements. This might help to identi-
fy further illusions and brings us closer to what could be considered the ‘true’ 
character of well-being if they can be identified as requirements.  
Ontological, epistemic and evaluative level 
The results of the analysis of the character of well-being against the back-
ground of the subjective/objective scheme of alternative levels provided in 
chapter 3 indicate that the reference to well-being within the realm of biomedi-
cal ethics occurs on the ontological, the epistemic and the evaluative level. 
However, a striking observation that we have made in the course of our journey 
through the four different debates is, that each debate has a different focus with 
regard to the three alternative levels. Discussions dealing with prenatal testing 
and selection have been identified as, for the most part, addressing the epistem-
ic level. As portrayed in chapter 3, this level is concerned with the question of 
who has the best access to individual well-being. The major contentious issue 
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between proponents and opponents is the question as to whether we can antici-
pate the well-being of future children, especially in cases in which they will 
have/have a disabling condition. 
The debate on mood enhancement, in contrast, is mainly concerned with 
the ontological level in dealing with the essence of well-being. Proponents and 
opponents of mood enhancement have been proven to have different notions of 
the essence of well-being. They purport different objective conceptions of well-
being with regard to the ontological level. 
Discussions with regard to well-being in the context of organ allocation 
mainly operate on the evaluative level focusing on appropriate criteria for the 
estimation and comparison of the well-being of potential recipients who are 
waiting, as well as competing, for a graft. This is due to the fact that, generally 
speaking, the discourse on organ allocation is a debate on appropriate criteria 
for the distribution of grafts. 
Both the evaluative and the epistemic level with regard to well-being are 
of central interest in discussions on euthanasia. Rather than dealing with the 
essence of well-being, participants in the debate place great emphasis on the 
fact that the well-being of patients at the end of life should be evaluated by 
means of subjective criteria because only the patient him-/herself has access to 
his/her well-being. 
Taken together, all of these levels appear to constitute dimensions of the 
character of well-being. But what exactly determines which level is to predom-
inate in the respective debates and are these dimensions components of the 
‘true’ or ‘false’ character of well-being? Instead of resulting from the impact of 
other prevalent notions, these alternative levels of the consideration of well-
being appear to be linked to the specific content of each debate. The content of 
a discussion encompasses the material facts under discussion as well as ethical 
aspects dealt with. If we take, for instance, the debate on organ allocation, the 
fact that this discourse is, mainly, concerned with criteria for the allocation of 
grafts and measures to put these criteria into operation results in discussions 
with regard to the concept of well-being which operate for the most part on the 
evaluative level. In each discourse the level on which well-being is considered 
results from the specific issues under discussion, that is to say its content. 
Therefore, the contents of the respective debates appear to have an impact on 
the character of well-being by determining the level at which well-being is dis-
cussed. 
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However, here the impact cannot be classified as an instrumentalisation or 
interference. The content of each debate rather seems to place specific re-
quirements on the character of well-being to be a fruitful point of reference. If 
well-being does not fulfill the demands placed upon it by the content, it simply 
is not applicable to the context under consideration. Hence, if the concept of 
well-being is not open to the question e.g. ‘who has the best access to individu-
al well-being’ (epistemic level), a discussion about prenatal testing and selec-
tion serves no purpose. Obviously, the same holds true for both other levels. 
Thus, the three alternative levels can be viewed as part of the ‘true’ character of 
well-being.  
Broad versus narrow concepts of well-being 
Within the four debates we have encountered both broad and narrow concep-
tions of well-being. It has been shown that, above all, in the enhancement de-
bate a comparatively broad approach to well-being is taken, which is by no 
means limited to health-related aspects. The dimensions of well-being under 
consideration extend far beyond the reduction of pain and suffering and en-
compass aspects such as social relationships, love attachments and career ful-
filment. The approach to well-being predominant in the enhancement debate 
can, for this reason, be classified as a broad concept of non-health related well-
being. The approach to well-being concerned in the context of organ allocation, 
in contrast, is strikingly narrow. As the examination provided in chapter 5 has 
shown, the notion of well-being under consideration is, for the most part, based 
upon a limited number of health-related aspects. Truncated conceptions such as 
narrow models of ‘species typical functioning’ frequently come into play. A 
narrow conception of health-related well-being is referred to. 
Discussions dealing with the beginning and end of life are tied to a con-
cept of well-being lying between the two poles. Notions of well-being in these 
debates are not as broad as those concerned in the enhancement debate and not 
as narrow as approaches to well-being applied in the context of organ alloca-
tion. The dimensions of well-being under consideration in discussions on pre-
natal testing and selection and the subject of euthanasia are, for the most part, 
directly related to health. Instances of this are the future child’s freedom from 
pain and suffering, but also the desire of patients at the end of life for intellec-
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tual participation in the world. Hence, a concept of health-related well-being of 
average breadth is applied. 
In conclusion, it appears to be the case that also the breadth of the concept 
of well-being under consideration in the respective debates is determined by the 
specific content dealt with in the discussions. Therefore, the contents of the var-
ious debates also appear to have requirements with regard to the breadth of the 
concept of well-being. In order to gain a more vivid picture, two examples 
might be helpful: as illustrated in chapter 4, the enhancement debate is inher-
ently concerned with aspects which extend beyond the protection and restora-
tion of health. Hence, where well-being is concerned in the debate, dimensions 
of it are referred to which are not limited to the protection and restoration of 
health-related well-being. The content of the enhancement debate, therefore, 
determines which dimensions of well-being come into consideration. It requires 
a comparatively broad concept if well-being is to be applied. Also the context 
of organ allocation appears to have specific requirements with regard to the 
breadth: discussions on organ allocation focus on appropriate criteria for the 
distribution of grafts. The concept of well-being is referred to within these dis-
cussions on appropriate criteria. As shown in chapter 5, if the concept of well-
being is to play a role within the criteria for organ allocation, it needs to be an 
operational measure. It has been shown that narrow concepts of well-being fa-
cilitate the operationalizability and application of well-being and are, for this 
reason, required where organ allocation is concerned. Also in debates on the 
beginning and the end of life, the contents under discussion determine what is 
to be understood as well-being. Since these debates are mainly concerned with 
health-related issues, health-related well-being comes into play. On the grounds 
of these elaborations, we can assert that this flexibility in breadth is an integral 
part of the ‘true’ character of well-being. However, the findings illustrate that 
there are still even more characteristics of well-being within biomedical ethics. 
The restoration, protection and promotion of well-being  
It has been extrapolated that negative as well as positive dimensions of well-
being are referred to in the various debates, that is to say, the field of biomedi-
cal ethics is concerned with the restoration, the protection and the promotion of 
well-being. These three dimensions of well-being come into play to different 
degrees in the various debates. Discussions on prenatal testing and selection 
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deal, above all, with the protection of well-being. The well-being of the pro-
spective parents is to be protected by avoiding unwanted childlessness or the 
burdens of raising a severely disabled or ill child, also the well-being of future 
children is said to be protected by preventing the birth of children who have a 
comparatively low prospect of a good life due to disability and illness. None-
theless, the promotion of well-being comes into play sporadically, too. This is 
the case when it is argued that procedures of prenatal testing and selection ena-
ble parents to fulfil their dearest wish for a biological child and also within the 
arguments of the so-called procreative perfectionists such as Harris and 
Savulescu, who argue that parents should select for the child with the best op-
portunity of a good life. Within the enhancement debate it is abundantly clear 
that the major concern is the promotion of well-being since, as mentioned in the 
above, it is inherently concerned with dimensions of well-being which extend 
beyond the restoration and protection of health. Conversely, deliberations in the 
context of organ allocation primarily focus on the restoration of well-being 
when distributing donor organ to patients in need who have a poor health sta-
tus. Nonetheless, in discussions on organ allocation also the protection of well-
being constitutes a consideration when the future well-being of patients if they 
do not receive a graft is taken into account. The debates at the end of life can, 
for the most part, be classified as focusing on the protection of well-being by 
preventing its substantial diminishment and furnishing the patients with the 
feeling and prospect that they can determine an end to their suffering if it be-
comes unbearable. On the grounds of these findings we can ascertain that also 
with regard to characteristics such as the restoration, protection and promotion 
of well-being, the respective contents of the four debates place requirements on 
the dimensions of well-being which come into play. 
 
On the basis of this detailed representation of the findings, we have managed to 
come closer to the ‘true’ character of well-being within biomedical ethics. This 
is due to the fact that the characteristics have been identified as resulting from 
requirements (and not interferences or instrumentalisation) which derive from 
the contents of the four debates. Characteristics such as the breadth of the con-
cept or the level of consideration are determined by the content of the specific 
discussion under consideration. Where the content exercises influence on the 
concept of well-being, there do not appear to be cases of interference or instru-
mentalisation. At this point it is important to emphasize once again that what is 
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considered to be the ‘content’ of a discussion does not encompass the notions 
or principles referred to in the debate but must be regarded as being separate 
from it. As a consequence of these elaborations, it can be concluded that the 
character of well-being is constantly subject to influences within biomedical 
ethics. These influences derive either from other predominant notions in the 
discussions or from the specific content of the respective debates. However, it 
has already been argued in the above that it is vital to differentiate between the 
various kinds of influences to which well-being is exposed. Some of the influ-
ences which derive from the other predominant notions have been identified as 
instrumentalisations and interferences. These have been considered trouble-
some since they dilute what is considered to be the essence of well-being. They 
steer away from the ‘true’ character of well-being since they merely provoke 
illusions. The other influences, in contrast, which derive from the contents of 
the discussions and the notion of justice and human nature are of a different 
kind. They are indeed of assistance in reaching the goal of rethinking well-
being in biomedical ethics. This is due to the fact that they provoke no illusions 
but rather express specific requirements which the realm of biomedical ethics 
makes on a concept of well-being. If well-being is to occur within these con-
texts and in connection with the specific contents, it needs to possess the char-
acteristics we have extrapolated. If this is not the case the concept of well-being 
would be rendered inapplicable to the contexts concerned and to the field of 
biomedical ethics in general. The findings, therefore furnish a first insight into 
the development of a concept of well-being that actually is applicable to the 
realm of biomedical ethics. The following provides an outlook about what the 
findings might tell us with regard to this matter. However, the complete revela-
tion of the ‘true’ character of well-being can be considered a huge task which 
cannot be completely accomplished within the frame of this book. Nonetheless, 
the above has furnished some initial steps in this direction.  
7.3. Tentative requirements for a concept of well-being 
in biomedical ethics – an outlook  
The present book has concentrated on the role of well-being in biomedical eth-
ics. This is expressed in the main goal of rethinking well-being in biomedical 
ethics. The journey through the various debates has furnished a varied picture 
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of the presence and character of well-being and underlying reasons for its 
changing role. However, the more fundamental question as to what should be 
the character of well-being within biomedical ethics remains open. Even so, the 
results provide an initial touchstone for the adequacy of conceptions of well-
being which are to function within the field of biomedical ethics. The following 
requirements can be formulated on the basis of the findings:  
1. An adequate concept needs to encompass subjective as well as objective 
dimensions of well-being: well-being is constantly shifting between its objec-
tive and subjective dimensions within biomedical ethics. Although we have at-
tributed a great deal of this shifting to the interference of other prevalent no-
tions and instrumentalisation, it becomes evident that there is more to be said 
about subjective and objective dimensions of well-being within biomedical eth-
ics. There seem to be further and more substantial reasons why a concept of 
well-being which is adequate for the field of biomedical ethics needs to encom-
pass subjective as well as objective dimensions. With regard to this aspect addi-
tional research is clearly needed. Moreover, the dualism of objective and sub-
jective dimensions of well-being in biomedical ethics needs to be furnished 
with further refinements. The results of the analysis have shown that, above all, 
if the evaluative level is concerned, concepts of well-being which can be classi-
fied as intersubjective often come into play. Although these approaches consti-
tute a form of objectivism they are not connected with realism. Instead they are 
tied to the assumption that there are socially shared ideas of what promotes or 
diminishes our well-being. These take an intermediate position in the face of 
subjective and objective conceptions. Therefore, there appears to be a need for 
a more subtle differentiation with regard to the subjective/objective distinction. 
2. An adequate concept needs to take account of the three alternative lev-
els concerning the subjective/objective distinction: the contents of the various 
debates lead to the fact that the consideration of well-being takes place on dif-
ferent levels, that is to say the ontological, the evaluative and the epistemic lev-
el. In order for it to be applicable, an adequate approach needs to take account 
of these various levels.  
3. An adequate concept of well-being has a variable breadth which is not 
limited to health-related aspects: the above depicted findings concerning the 
breadth of the concept of well-being illustrate the fact that some debates require 
the application of a comparatively narrow approach to well-being whereas oth-
ers, such as the enhancement debate, are in need of a broad conception which is 
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not limited to health-related issues. If the concept of well-being is to function in 
the various debates it needs to be adaptable with regard to its breadth. 
4. An adequate concept incorporates the restoration, protection and pro-
motion of well-being: on account of the content of the various debates the resto-
ration, protection as well as the promotion of well-being are involved within 
biomedical ethics. Hence, an adequate concept of well-being needs to be suffi-
ciently extensive so that it incorporates all three dimensions. 
 
Obviously, these four requirements merely provide a tentative and rough sug-
gestion and are in need of further examination and elaboration. Generally 
speaking, the results show that the various issues within biomedical ethics in 
which well-being comes into play demand the character of well-being to have a 
great flexibility and to be comprehensive. In the various contexts alternative 
dimensions are of relevance. At this point it seems possible to state that, on the 
basis of these tentative criteria of adequacy, neither of the three alternative uni-
tary theories depicted in chapter 2, namely hedonism, desire fulfilment theories 
and objective list theory, is sufficient for the field of biomedical ethics. This is 
due to the fact that they are inflexible and too narrow, above all, with regard to 
the criterion that an adequate concept needs to encompass subjective as well as 
objective dimensions of well-being. Furthermore, they confuse the three alter-
native levels concerning the subjective/objective distinction. However, it can be 
said that each theory provides an important perspective which deserves atten-
tion within a comprehensive approach to well-being appropriate for the field of 
biomedical ethics. 
The question of what can be considered an adequate comprehensive ap-
proach to well-being in the field of biomedical ethics is indeed challenging and 
needs to be approached from various angles, for example from the perspective 
of ethical theory or taking into consideration the fruits of empirical research on 
well-being. The context of biomedical ethics, which has been dealt with in this 
book, constitutes just one of these angles. Hence, it can be maintained that re-
thinking well-being for its application in biomedical ethics is an ongoing and 
also vital endeavour. 
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Rethinking Well-being in Biomedical Ethics
Barbara Stroop
The notion of well-being accompanies us on a daily basis right from 
the beginning of life through to its end. As a matter of course we base 
the decisions that we make on whether or not our alternative options 
will promote our well-being or the well-being of others. Yet there 
appears to be not the slightest suggestion of agreement as to what 
well-being actually is. 
???? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ?????? ?? ??????????? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ???
biomedical ethics since this is obviously in need of an operational 
concept with regard to the notion of well-being and urgently requires 
a common language. Rethinking Well-being in Biomedical Ethics sets 
out to undertake this task of developing a common language by estab-
lishing a criti cal analysis of the role which well-being currently plays 
in biomedical ethics. The book takes the reader on a journey through 
????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
debates concerning the beginning of life, that is to say prenatal test-
ing and selection, discussions in the intermediate phase of life such 
as the deliberations on enhancement, the allocation of scarce goods 
????????????????????????????? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????
end of life namely cases of assistance in dying and foregoing life-sus-
taining treatment. It thereby provides a vivid illustration of the pres-
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